IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 




Cotyrisht, iSqS, hy li. y . l-alk, Nno 

MAJOR-GENERAL WILLIAM R. SHAFTER, U. S. V. 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 



BY 



JOHN D. MILEY 



LIEUTENANT-COLONEL AND INSPECTOR-GENERAL, UNITED STATES 

VOLUNTEERS ; FIRST LIEUTENANT, SECOND 

UNITED STATES ARTILLERY 



PyiTH PORTRAITS AND MAPS 



NEW YORK 
CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS 

1899 

L 



q.1 



Copyright, 1899, by 
CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS 



TWOeOPIKS R£C::JV£D. 



(1 [.^AiiO- lii^y )) 



TROW OlflECTORY 
PRINTINQ AND BOOKBINOINO COMPANY 






PREFACE 

In this, volume it is my object to put before 
fiy readers a clear and intelligent narrative of 
he Santiago campaign, showing the orders re- 
eived and how they were executed ; the plans 
ormed and how they were carried out ; the 
obstacles met and how they were overcome, 
^he work is not in any sense a criticism of 
ersons or military movements, but a plain state- 
lent of facts as the writer knows them. At 
be outbreak of the Spanish-American War I 
jft San Francisco with General Shafter as one 
f his aides-de-camp, remaining continuously 
n his staff until the present, and for that rea- 
3n feel competent to speak from knowledge. 

J. D. MILEY, 

Lieutenant- Colonel and Inspector-General, 



United States Volunteers. 



Governor's Island, N. Y. 
January 5, 1899. 



CONTENTS 

CHAPTER I 
Assembling at Tampa, i 

CHAPTER n 

The Embarkation of the Santiago Expedition, . 15 

CHAPTER in 

The Embarkation of the Santiago Expedition 

{Continued), ........ 30 

CHAPTER IV 
The Disembarkation, 52 

CHAPTER V 
The Advance on Santiago, 82 

CHAPTER VI 
The Battles of San Juan and El Caney, . . loi 

CHAPTER VII 
The Battles of San Juan and El Caney {Con- 
tinued), iig 

vii 



CONTENTS 

CHAPTER VIII 
The Siege of Santiago, 129 

CHAPTER IX 

The Siege of Santiago {Contifmed), . . . 148 

CHAPTER X 
The Capitulation, 164 

CHAPTER XI 

The Capitulation {Continued), . . . .189 

CHAPTER XII 
Re-embarkation, 215 



vlii 



PORTRAITS 

Major-General William R. Shafter, U. S. V., 

Frontispiece 



General Shafter and Staff at Tampa, 
Major-General Joseph Wheeler, U. S. V., . 
General Calixto Garcia, .... 
Brigadier-General H. S. Hawkins, U. S. V., 
Brigadier-General William Ludlow, U. S, V., 
Brigadier-General A. R. Chaffee, U. S. V., 
Brigadier-General J. Ford Kent, U. S. V,, . 
Brigadier-General John C. Bates, U. S. V., 
Brigadier-General Samuel S. Sumner, U. S. V., 
Brigadier-General Henry W. Lawton, U. S. V., 
General Jos^ Toral, 



12 

26 

54 
68 
76 
84 
no 
122 
140 

186 



MAPS 

Santiago de Cuba and Vicinity, . At end of volume 

Map showing intrenchments and position of the 
Fifth Corps U. S. Army and those of the Spanish 
after the taking of Caney and San Juan Hill, 
evening of July I, 1898, . . . At end of volume 

Map showing intrenchments and position of the 
Fifth Corps U. S. Army and those of the 
Spanish at beginning of truce, 12,30 p.m., July 3, 
1898, ...... At end of volume 

Map showing intrenchments and position of the 
Fifth Corps U. S. Army and those of the 
Spanish the day of the surrender, July 14, 
1898, ...... At end of volume 




IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

CHAPTER I 

ASSEMBLING AT TAMPA 

PURSUANT to orders from the War De- 
^ partment General Shafter, with his staff — 
Lieutenants R. H. Noble and J. D. Miley, Aides- 
de-camp ; Colonel J. B. Babcock, Adjutant-Gen- 
eral ; Colonel Charles P. Eagan, Chief Commis- 
sary ; Major S. W. Groesbeck, Judge Advocate ; 
and Lieutenant Frank Greene, Signal Officer, 
left San Francisco April 21st for New Orleans, 
to take command of the United States forces 
assembling there. He arrived at New Orleans 
on the morning of the 25th, assumed command, 
and the following day left for Washington, in 
obedience to orders. 

Here he was informed that he had been se- 
lected to lead the first expedition into Cuba, and 
instead of returning to New Orleans would pro- 
ceed direct to Tampa. The expedition was to 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

be in the nature of a reconnoissance to gather in- 
formation for use in subsequent movements, and 
to furnish supplies to the insurgents. No exten- 
sive movement was contemplated at the time, 
but while waiting for events to shape themselves 
it was intended to give all possible aid to the Cu- 
ban insurgents, in order that they might continue 
to wage warfare against the Spanish troops. 
The navy entered into its part of the campaign 
with so much vigor and with such brilliant re- 
sults that the feeling prevailed throughout the 
army that there would be little left to do after 
the navy and insurgents had completed their 
work. This feeling seemed to be very general 
until the army finally faced the enemy before 
Santiago. 

On the 29th General Shafter received formal 
orders to remove his head-quarters to Tampa, as- 
sume command of all troops there, and prepare 
them for this expedition, which was to be com- 
posed of Company E, Corps of Engineers ; the 
Ninth United States Cavalry ; Light Batteries A 
and F, Second Artillery ; C and F, Third Artil- 
lery ; B and F, Fourth Artillery; D and F, Fifth 
Artillery; and the First, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, 
Tenth, Thirteenth, Twenty-second and Twenty- 
fourth United States Infantry. All these troops 



ASSEMBLING AT TAMPA 

were either at Tampa or en route for that place. 
The expedition was to sail under convoy of the 
navy, on as early a date as possible, with a large 
quantity of all kinds of supplies for distribution 
to the insurgents, and also arms and ammunition 
sufficient to enable the expedition to successfully 
engage any Spanish troops that might be en- 
countered. The first landing was to be made on 
the south coast of Cuba, to communicate with 
General Gomez, supplying him with arms, am- 
munition, and food. It was expected that this 
visit would infuse spirit into Gomez's army, when 
they realized that the strong power of the United 
States was actually behind them. After the in- 
terview with Gomez, the expedition was to pro- 
ceed to the northwest coast of Cuba and furnish 
supplies to the insurgents on that coast, unless, 
in the meantime, the movements of the Spanish 
navy had been such as to render this hazardous. 
In that event the expedition was to seek safety 
in the nearest American port. It was enjoined 
upon General Shafter that he was expected to 
stay in Cuba but a few days ; that the expedition 
was in the nature of a reconnoissance in force ; 
and that he should give aid and arms to the in- 
surgents, injure the Spanish forces as much as 
possible, and avoid serious injury to his own 
3 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

command. The idea of giving moral and mate- 
rial aid to the insurgents was now paramount, 
and the movements throughout the month of 
May all had that object in view. Hardly had 
General Shafter reached Tampa when he received 
orders from the head-quarters of the army, dated 
April 30th, to delay any movement, for the rea- 
son that the Navy Department did not feel that 
ships could be spared at that time to act as a con- 
voy. Those responsible for the conduct of the 
war believed that the first object was the destruc- 
tion of the Spanish sea-power, and that nothing 
should in the slightest degree interfere with this. 
While the expedition was not to sail until further 
orders, active preparation of the transports was 
to be continued. 

Care was taken that the lading of the trans- 
ports should be such as to enable all, or any part 
of them, to be sent as an expedition whenever the 
opportunity might arise. In the orders delaying 
the sailing of the expedition it was suggested that 
General Shafter confer with the naval officer in 
command of the blockading squadron on the 
north coast of Cuba, in order to learn his opinion 
of the feasibility of convoying the expedition at 
this juncture. Accordingly, he despatched Gen- 
eral Lawton on May 4th to Key West, to have 
4 



ASSEMBLING AT TAMPA 

an interview with Commodore Watson, then in 
command. In this interview Commodore Wat- 
son gave assurance that a small expedition of one 
or two vessels fitted out to land arms and ammu- 
nition on the north coast of Cuba could be con- 
voyed in absolute safety at any time. It was also 
considered by the Commodore safe to undertake 
the expedition ordered on April 29th to com- 
municate with Gomez, but he did not feel that 
he could undertake to convoy both expeditions 
at the same time. General Lawton had been in- 
structed by General Shafter to ascertain definitely 
the practicability of convoying an expedition of 
five to seven thousand men as a reconnoissance 
in force to the northwest coast of Cuba in the 
vicinity of Mariel. This was pronounced by 
Commodore Watson to be absolutely safe with- 
out any consideration of Cervera's fleet. On 
General Lavvton's return on May 7th, General 
Shafter prepared a letter to the Adjutant-General 
of the army forwarding General Lawton's report. 
In his letter he said that there was so much 
uncertainty about the operations of the Spanish 
fleet, that he did not at that time consider it pru- 
dent for his command to sail as a body. He 
stated further that his expedition would be com- 
pletely fitted out by May 12th, and he would be 
5 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

ready at any time after that date to execute the 
orders of April 29th, or to take possession of, and 
hold permanently, some point on the north coast 
of Cuba, to be used as a base of operations. As 
there had been received on May 6th orders to 
push forward a quantity of arms and stores to the 
insurgents, he informed the War Department in 
his letter that a small expedition for this purpose 
would be sent without delay. 

This expedition was organized by Captain 
(now Lieutenant-Colonel) Dorst, having in view 
the landing of stores to the westward of Havana. 
It was known as the Gussie expedition, and the 
troops engaged in it were two companies of the 
First Infantry. On account of the publicity 
given to the movements of this expedition by the 
newspapers throughout the country, the Spanish 
authorities in Havana were aware of the sailing 
of the expedition and of its destination. For that 
reason, the expedition was repulsed and wholly 
failed in its object. 

General Lawton's report and General Shafter's 
letter were sent by me to Washington, where I 
arrived on the morning of the 9th, and delivered 
my letters and plans to General Miles. It was 
on this day that General Wade superseded Gen- 
eral Shafter in command at Tampa. Some time 
6 



ASSEMBLING AT TAMPA 

in the morning, shortly after my arrival, General 
Wade was ordered by telegraph to inform Gen- 
eral Shafter that his suggestion of delay, in view 
of the uncertainty of the movements of the 
Spanish fleet, was accepted as satisfactory, and 
that the expedition would wait until further re- 
port from the fleet. However, on the afternoon 
of the same day telegraphic orders were sent to 
General Shafter, through General Wade, to move 
the troops originally intended for the reconnois- 
sance in force on the south coast of Cuba, to the 
vicinity of Mariel, or other important point on 
the north coast of Cuba. There he was expected 
to take up a strong defensive position and occu- 
py enough territory to permit all of the regular 
army available, as well as the volunteer troops, as 
fast as they were equipped, to be rendezvoused 
behind the lines thus held ; and there they were 
to be prepared for a campaign against Havana. 
The reason that General Shafter was superseded 
in command by General Wade was this: Prior 
to this date both these officers had been at Tampa 
holding the rank of Brigadier-General in the regu- 
lar army. General Shafter being the senior by 
date of appointment. On the 9th, however, these 
two officers were confirmed as Major-Generals of 
Volunteers, and the law is that when officers of 
7 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

the same grade are appointed on the same day 
the one with the longest service is senior. As 
General Wade had entered the service in 1861, a 
few weeks before General Shafter, he became 
senior under this law, and, therefore, assumed 
command. 

Only one day elapsed before the orders con- 
cerning the movements of the expedition were 
again changed. On the loth, the orders given 
on the 9th to take a defensive position on the 
north coast of Cuba were directed to be suspend- 
ed until Monday, May i6th. In the meantime, 
however. General Wade was instructed to send 
the infantry at Tampa to Key West and there 
disembark them, continuing the movement until 
twelve thousand had been assembled at that 
place. The instructions further stated that these 
troops would be moved later from Key West to 
Cuba and the Dry Tortugas on ships coming 
from New York. There were objections to this 
plan, for, as early as May 5th, on account of the 
insufficient supply, water had been sent from 
Tampa for the naval vessels rendezvoused at Key 
West and vicinity. If the infantry was to be 
moved, as just described, all the water for their 
use would have to be carried from Tampa. 

In view of this, and the lack of convoy, these 
3 



ASSEMBLING AT TAMPA 

instructions were never carried out. All the 
strength of the navy was now concentrated for 
the destruction of Cervera's fleet. As it would 
be necessary to detach at least a few of the naval 
vessels for any movement of troops that might be 
made, all idea of moving an expedition of land 
troops was abandoned. It was not until May 26th 
that any further orders were received, and these 
were the preparatory orders to sail against Santi- 
ago. On the 20th General Shafter again assumed 
command. General Wade having been relieved 
and ordered to the command of the camp at 
Chickamauga. 

On May 2d, Colonel C. F. Humphrey, of the 
Quartermaster's Department (now Brigadier-Gen- 
eral of Volunteers) was, at the request of General 
Shafter, ordered by the War Department to take 
general charge of the Quartermaster's Depart- 
ment at Tampa, in addition to the duties of fit- 
ting out the ocean transportation for the expedi- 
tion, to which he had been assigned the previous 
day. There were at Tampa, at the time, a Depot 
Quartermaster and a Chief Quartermaster on 
General Shafter's staff, and the resulting lack of 
harmony in the management and methods de- 
cided the General to place everything pertaining 
to the department under one head. The trans- 
9 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

ports began to arrive immediately after General 
Shafter took command, and, superintended by 
Colonel Humphrey and his assistant. Captain 
MacKay, a shipmaster, were coaled, watered, and 
policed as rapidly as possible. 

Both coal and water were expensive and very 
difficult to place on board, owing to the limited 
facilities for loading ; and, to prevent waste, the 
fires were drawn. A few of the transports came 
fitted with bunks and stalls for the reception of 
men and animals, but in the greater number the 
work of putting these in was done at Tampa. 
The object kept steadily in view was to have trans- 
ports prepared for any expedition that might be 
ordered. Events followed one another in rapid 
succession, making frequent changes of orders 
necessary by the War Department. At each 
change the expedition ordered would increase in 
size, and when the order finally came to sail for 
Santiago a long delay was still necessary in which 
to carry on the work of preparation. As soon 
as the transports began to arrive, the work of 
loading ordnance stores and all the heavy, bulky 
parts of the cargoes was begun and carried on 
simultaneously with the work of coaling and 
watering. During the time that General Wade 
was in command, from the 9th to the 20th, this 



ASSEMBLING AT TAMPA 

part of the work practically ceased, and no prog- 
ress was made in that direction until General 
Shafter assumed command the second time. Af- 
ter that the loading of the cargoes was resumed 
and continued without regard to hours or fatigue. 

Regiments of regulars and volunteers were 
arriving continually from the different camps 
throughout the country, and, at first, were all en- 
camped in the city of Tampa and near the Port 
of Tampa. As the command at Tampa increased, 
it was found that new camping grounds must be 
selected or the water-supply would prove insuffi- 
cient. Quite a large number of regiments were 
put in camp in Ybor City, a continuation of 
Tampa, and three regiments at Lakeland thirty 
miles to the northeast. General Lawton was 
sent to Jacksonville to examine the grounds of- 
fered there for camping purposes, and on his fa- 
vorable report nine volunteer regiments en route 
for Tampa were stopped there. 

The fleet of transports, which consisted of only 
three or four vessels on May ist, was slowly 
growing at Port Tampa, and by the 26th of 
May numbered about thirty. A second small 
expedition, under Lieutenant-Colonel Dorst, left 
Tampa, on the transport Florida, on the 17th, 
for the same purpose as that of the Gussie expe- 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

dition. General Lacret, a Cuban general, with 
three hundred Cuban soldiers, which he had re- 
cruited from among the Cuban refugees in Tampa 
and vicinity, was on board, to be landed at some 
port on the north coast with a large quantity of 
ammunition, arms, clothing, and food. Colonel 
Dorst, on his arrival at Key West, found the navy 
unable to convoy him at the time, and the expe- 
dition was delayed there for several days. 

Finally General Lacret, his command and 
supplies, were safely landed to the eastward of 
Havana. When the Florida expedition was 
about to sail. General Shafter, in order to avoid 
on this occasion the publicity that had been given 
to the Gussie expedition at the time it sailed, 
caused orders to be issued to all the war corre- 
spondents then at Tampa not to publish anything 
in their papers concerning the expedition until it 
had accomplished its object. Each correspondent 
was notified that he would be held responsible if 
anything concerning the expedition appeared in 
the paper he represented, and a copy of his paper 
was filed daily for examination by the press cen- 
sor. He was also notified to inform his paper 
that his credentials would be revoked in case the 
above instructions were violated. The corre- 
spondents realized the necessity for this order 



ASSEMBLING AT TAMPA 

and heartily approved of it. Some of them, how- 
ever, thinking that the expedition would soon be 
an accomplished fact, sent written accounts of 
it, and failed to notify their papers not to pub- 
lish these accounts when the delay arose at Key 
West. The result was that the story of the 
expedition appeared in several papers having 
correspondents at Tampa — the New York Press, 
Jacksonville Tijucs- Union, 'SiUfi Chicago Tribune. 
The order was promptly put into effect against 
the offending papers, but after a satisfactory ex- 
planation to the War Department, their corre- 
spondents were again permitted to furnish them 
with news from the front. 

General Shafter, on his arrival at Tampa, had 
established his head-quarters in the Tampa Bay 
Hotel, where it remained until his departure. 
The different staff officers also had their offices 
in rooms of the hotel. On the 24th General 
Shafter was asked to submit a plan for the for- 
mation of the Fifth and Seventh Army Corps 
from the troops then under his command. In 
submitting his plan he proposed that the Fifth 
Army Corps, of which he was to be the com- 
mander, should be exclusively of the regular 
troops, and the Seventh Army Corps, under 
command of General Lee, of the volunteers. 
13 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

He stated, as his reasons for this, that his 
corps was to form the first expedition into 
Cuba, and should be composed of tried troops. 
This suggestion was adopted, and the Fifth and 
Seventh Army Corps were formed on these 
lines. The wisdom of this was soon demon- 
strated. 



CHAPTER II 

THE EMBARKATION OF THE SANTIAGO 
EXPEDITION 

'X'HE period from the loth to the 26th of May, 
^ during which no orders were received, though 
a very busy one, was filled with anxiety. Due to 
the enterprise of the war correspondents the bul- 
letin-board in the hotel rotunda was covered 
with despatches, giving the predicted movements 
of the Spanish navy, with comments and sug- 
gestions in reference to them. After reading 
these despatches daily for some weeks one was 
in a frame of mind to expect anything. 

On the morning of the 26th a telegram was 
received which indicated that the period of sus- 
pense was broken, and that an expedition would 
soon leave Tampa. This telegram contained in- 
structions to General Shafter to be prepared to 
load on transports twenty-five thousand men, 
including infantry, four batteries of light artil- 
lery, eight siege-guns, including siege-mortars, 
and one squadron of cavalry. The movement 
15 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

of the expedition was to depend upon informa- 
tion concerning the Spanish fleet. If it was 
found inadvisable to send these forces, then it 
was expected that all the transports would be 
loaded at Tampa for another movement on Cuba 
similar to that ordered on April 29th. This tel- 
egram stated that definite instructions would be 
sent later. 

This was the first intimation General Shafter 
had that the troops at Tampa would be sent 
against Spanish forces. Up to this time a con- 
flict was to be avoided if possible ; now an 
expedition was to be sent to seek one. No 
intimation, however, was given, so far, that the 
expedition was to go to Santiago, and many 
felt that Porto Rico was to be the destination. 
As the subsequent orders were sent in cipher 
and known only to General Shafter and a few 
of his staff, even after the sailing of the expe- 
dition many still felt that it was bound for Porto 
Rico. 

On May 29th orders were received to have 
thirteen volunteer regiments fully armed and 
equipped, and to place on the transports the most 
effective regiments of regulars and volunteers. 
Many of the volunteer regiments had come to 
Tampa not fully equipped ; one had no uniforms, 
16 



EMBARKATION OF THE EXPEDITION 

others were without serviceable arms, and nearly 
every regiment lacked something. 

On the 30th all doubt was removed in the 
mind of General Shafter as to the ultimate des- 
tination of the expedition, by the receipt of a 
cipher telegram, directing him " Go with your 
force to capture garrison at Santiago and assist 
in capturing the harbor and fleet." The order is 
so important that I quote it in full, as well as the 
order received the following day. 

Head-quarters of the Army, 

Washington, D. C, May 30, 1898. 

Major-General William R. Shafter, Tampa, 
Fla. 
Referring to my telegram last night. Admiral 
Schley reports that two cruisers and two torpedo- 
boats have been seen in the harbor of Santiago. 
Go with your force to capture garrisoti at Santiago 
and assist in capturing the harbor and fleet. Load 
your transports with effective force of infantry and 
artillery, both regulars and volunteers, taking siege- 
guns and howitzers and mortars and two or four 
field batteries. You can take any dismounted 
cavalry that you desire. Limit the animals to least 
number for artillery, as it is expected that you 
will go but a short distance inland. Your troops 
should have five hundred rounds of ammunition per 
man with possibly two months* supplies, and in ad- 
dition you can load supplies to last six months if 
practicable. Take five thousand rifles, with ammuni- 
17 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

tion for insurgents. You can organize your com- 
mand under Generals Arnold, Burt, Hawkins, Kent, 
Henry, Lawton, and Chaffee. Have your command 
embark as rapidly as possible and telegraph when 
your expedition will be ready to sail. I leave for 
Tampa to-night. 

(Signed) Miles, 
Major-General, Commanding the Army. 

The second cipher telegram received gives fur- 
ther detailed instructions. 

Washington, D. C, May 31, 1898. 
Major-General William R. Shafter, Tampa, 
Fla. 

With the approval of the Secretary of War, you 
are directed to take your command on transports 
and proceed, under convoy of the navy, to the vi- 
cinity of Santiago de Cuba, land your forces at suc- 
cessive places east or west of that point, as your 
judgment may dictate, under the protection of the 
navy, and move up on to high ground and bluffs 
overlooking the harbor or into the interior, as shall 
best enable you to capture or destroy the garrison 
there, and cover the navy as it sends its men in small 
boats to remove torpedoes; or with the aid of the 
navy capture or destroy the Spanish fleet now re- 
ported to be in Santiago Harbor. You will use the 
utmost energy to accomplish this, and the Govern- 
ment relies on your good judgment as to the most 
judicious use of your command. It is desired to im- 
press upon you the importance of accomplishing 
this with the least possible delay. You can call to 
18 



EMBARKATION OF THE EXPEDITION 

your assistance any of the insurgent forces in that 
vicinity, and make use of such of them as you think 
advisable to assist, especially as scouts and guides. 
You are cautioned against putting too much confi- 
dence in any persons outside of your own troops. 
You will take every precaution against ambuscade 
or surprise, or positions that have been mined or are 
commanded by the Spanish forces. You will coop- 
crate most earnestly with the naval force in every 
way, agreeing beforehand on a code of signals. 
Communicate your instructions to Admiral Samp- 
son and Commodore Schley. On completion of 
this enterprise, unless you receive other orders or 
deem it advisable to remain in the harbor of Santi- 
ago, re-embark your troops and proceed to the har- 
bor of Banes, reporting, by the most favorable 
means, for further orders in future important ser- 
vice. This with the understanding that your com- 
mand has not sustained serious loss, and that the 
harbor is safe for your transports and convoys. 
When will you sail ? 

By Order of Major-General Miles, 

(Signed) H. C. Corbin, 

A djutayit- General. 



General Miles with his staff arrived in Tampa 
on June ist, and from that time until the expe- 
dition finally sailed he and General Shafter united 
in their efforts to hasten its departure. 

Up to May 26th, while the work of prepara- 
tion had been energetically pushed, it had been 
19 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

done quietly, but now there was a change, and 
head-quarters and the different departments began 
to work under a strain. Working hours were no 
longer confined to the day, but were prolonged 
into the night, and for several days before sailing 
the embarkation was kept up continuously all 
night. The troops in camp at Lakeland were 
brought to Tampa and a camp of volunteer regi- 
ments was established close to the Port, so that 
they would be more convenient when the time 
came to embark. This camp of volunteers con- 
sisted of nine volunteer regiments of infantry, 
organized as a provisional division to accom- 
pany the expedition, when it was thought that 
the carrying capacity of the ships would be about 
27,000. This was soon found to be an error and 
the Provisional Division, much to the regret of 
General Shafter, had to be left behind. The 
supplies from the storehouses in Tampa and 
trainloads of supplies that had not been unloaded 
all now began to move down that single track of 
railroad between Tampa and the Port, and out 
on the narrow tongue of land alongside of which 
the transports were moored. On one side of this 
narrow strip of land a channel had been dredged, 
in which vessels could lie while loading. There 
was no dock, however, alongside the channel, and 



EMBARKATION OF THE EXPEDITION 

everything had to be carried on these ships up an 
incline. 

The transports had been fully supplied with 
coal and water by the 31st, and on that date the 
rations for the command began to be loaded. 
Colonel Weston, the Chief Commissary of the 
expedition, was directed to place on board rations 
for twenty thousand men for six months. This 
order was modified, on account of the necessity 
for haste, and he was instructed to cease loading 
when he had two months' rations on board. Sub- 
sequently, he was ordered to place one hundred 
thousand rations on each of several vessels des- 
ignated by Colonel Humphrey. These vessels 
had no reserve rations on board, and this action 
was taken so that there should be ample food 
supplies on each vessel in case of separation. 
The Chief Commissary was also directed to have 
proper arrangements made on each transport for 
making coffee in quantity, and ground coffee was 
directed to be issued with the travel ration. 

By the 31st, the coaling, watering, and polic- 
ing of the transports, as well as fitting them with 
bunks and stalls, was completed, and on June ist 
the loading of wagons, guns, and caissons of the 
light artillery began. This work was carried on 
simultaneously with the loading of commissary 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

Stores and continued for a week, when the em- 
barkation of troops began. The animals were 
left on shore as long as possible and embarked 
just before the troops. The loading of the trans- 
ports with supplies was a very difficult operation, 
because the wharf facilities were so limited. The 
railroad track was about fifty feet from and par- 
allel to the channel in which the vessels were 
placed, and the boxes and packages had to be 
carried from the cars across this sandy space on 
the backs of stevedores or trucked over impro- 
vised platforms. Eight vessels could lie for load- 
ing in the channel, and two at the pier built at 
the extremity of the narrow strip of land. On 
the latter vessels the supplies could be trucked 
direct from the cars. 

The components of the ration came direct 
from the contractors in different cars of the same 
train or on different trains. Therefore, in order 
to place a given number of rations on a trans- 
port, it was necessary to go from car to car on a 
train, or even to some car on another train to 
complete the cargo. Often the components 
needed to complete the ration were on trains 
that could not be brought to the wharf at the 
time, and the transport then being loaded would 
have to be pulled into the stream and another 



EMBARKATION OF THE EXPEDITION 

brought into its place to receive what remained 
on the train being unloaded. If the train-loads 
of commissary supplies had reached Tampa in 
time to be placed in storehouses and sorted, this 
difficulty would have been avoided. Even at this 
time, perhaps, it would have been better to "make 
haste slowly" by placing the food supplies in store- 
houses, sorting them, reloading complete rations, 
and running train-loads made up in this way to 
the Port. Now, however, cars of meat would 
come to the Port direct from some place in the 
North, cars of hard bread or flour from another 
place, cars of other components from still another 
place, and these cars were scattered along the con- 
gested track from the Port to Tampa City, a dis- 
tance of ten miles. 

There were in round numbers about ten million 
pounds of rations placed on board, a great deal 
of it carried there on the backs of stevedores. 
These stevedores, days before the loading was 
completed, were so worn out that they could be 
seen lying about everywhere, asleep, just where 
they happened to be when their working hours 
came to a close. Of course, it was very important 
that each ration should have its full proportion of 
bread and meat, but how much more important 
was it that each siege-gun should have its breech 
23 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

mechanism complete in every part and the proper 
fuse for the projectile. The siege-artillery and 
ammunition had come from different arsenals 
and at different times, and much delay arose in 
gathering all the parts and mounting the guns on 
the carriages. For several reasons it was believed 
necessary to mount the guns before placing them 
on board the transports, and the artillery troops 
worked night and day to hasten the work. To 
add to this congestion of the railroad, passenger 
trains were continually running between Tampa 
and the Port, carrying crowds of sightseers and 
tourists; and the regular freight, passenger, and 
express business of the Plant System between 
Tampa and Key West went on without interrup- 
tion. Large quantities of naval supplies were 
also shipped from Tampa to the blockading squad- 
ron on the north coast of Cuba, and on one occa- 
sion in one of the transports. The whole trouble 
lay in the fact that the place in all particulars pos- 
sessed most insufficient facilities for the embar- 
kation of so large a command. Many have won- 
dered why the Government did not seize the 
railroad or parallel it. To build a track from 
Tampa to the pier, under the most favorable cir- 
cumstances, would have taken a month or per- 
haps two. If the present track had been seized, 
24 



EMBARKATION OF THE EXPEDITION - 

with green employees, it is feared the Quarter- 
master's Department would simply have increased 
its difficulties. 

All the organizations composing the expedi- 
tion were notified on the 31st of the order in 
which they would embark, but no troops went 
on board until the 7th of June. Commanding 
officers of regiments were ordered to see that 
their commands were furnished with five hun- 
dred rounds of ammunition per man and ten 
days' travel rations. When the embarkation of 
troops began, officers from head-quarters watched 
the progress made, and as soon as one organi- 
zation had been started for the Port, the next 
in order was put in readiness to follow. The 
trains were made up of both baggage and pas- 
senger cars, so that a regiment with its baggage 
would occupy an entire train. Upon arrival at 
the port the commanding officer of each organi- 
zation was directed to apply to Colonel Hum- 
phrey, or his representative, for assignment to a 
transport. As far as practicable, regiments and 
battalions were unbroken when placed on board. 

On the evening of May 31st General Shafter 

telegraphed General Miles, who was then on 

his way to Tampa, that he was making fair 

progress in the loading of supplies, and that he 

25 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

thought it would take three days to complete it. 
The enormous amount of labor to embark an 
expedition of this size was not yet appreciated, 
for it took more than twice that time. There 
were five regular regiments of cavalry and one 
volunteer regiment of cavalry, the Rough Riders, 
available for the expedition. To take them with 
their horses was out of the question ; there was 
absolutely no transportation for the horses. The 
five regiments of regular cavalry were as fine 
troops as any in the army, and the volunteer 
regiment gave great promise. The cavalry 
could be dismounted and go as infantry, the al- 
ternative being to take untrained volunteer regi- 
ments of infantry. The instructions contained 
in the telegram of May 30th, "Take any dis- 
mounted cavalry that you desire," were promptly 
complied with, by directing the commanding gen- 
eral of the cavalry division. General Wheeler, to 
select one squadron in each of the six regiments. 
These squadrons were to be dismounted and pre- 
pared for field service. This order was quickly 
modified to include two squadrons from each of 
the regiments, the remaining squadrons taking 
charge of all the horses and baggage belonging 
to the departing squadrons, and finally bringing 
them to Montauk, where the regiments were re- 
26 




MAJOR-GENERAL JOSEPH WHEELER, U. S. V. 



EMBARKATION OF THE EXPEDITION 

united after the campaign. Everybody was in a fe- 
verish haste to go on board the transports ; often, 
before one regiment was completely embarked the 
next would arrive, impatient and chafing at any 
delay in giving them the assignment of a vessel. 

The channel could accommodate but eight 
vessels in one line, and often the embarkation 
would have to be made across these vessels on to 
a second line of vessels tied alongside of them. 
The canal, or channel, in which the vessels lay 
when moored to the pier, was just wide enough 
to accommodate three vessels abreast, and as the 
embarkation proceeded, vessels were being drawn 
out into the stream to be replaced by others. 
This was a delicate operation, tending to in- 
crease the confusion, and one of the transports, 
the Florida, was cut down amidships and had to 
be abandoned for this expedition. The anxiety 
to go on board a transport, no matter which one, 
was heightened when it was discovered, on June 
ist, that the fleet of transports, which by some 
mistake in calculation was supposed easily to ac- 
commodate twenty-seven thousand men with all 
their necessary impedimenta, had only a carrying 
capacity of eighteen or twenty thousand. It was 
very evident that many organizations would have 
to be left, and the frantic efforts for places on the 
27 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

transports were only equalled by similar efforts 
to get back to the United States after the expe- 
dition had been in Cuba a short time. On June 
I St General Shafter telegraphed the War De- 
partment that he was making rapid progress in 
loading the transports with supplies ; that he ex- 
pected to have sixteen regiments of regular in' 
fantry, forty-eight troops of dismounted cavalry, 
four light batteries, two heavy batteries, and two 
companies of engineers, with a few volunteer 
regiments of infantry, to make the eighteen or 
twenty thousand. He said he thought he could 
start by June 4th, but on that day he telegraphed, 
'* Everything possible is being done to get off, 
but it is impossible to complete the embarkation 
before Monday night, June 6th. The regiments 
ordered from Chattanooga and Mobile have not 
yet arrived, and the difficulties attending the 
loading cannot be appreciated." 

Later in the day he sent a second telegram de- 
scribing the situation in detail : 

Tampa, Fla., June 4th, 

Adjutant-General U. S. Army. 

Replying to your dispatch that the President 

wishes a report of the situation, I have to say that 

everything possible is being done to get away, but 

delays occur that cannot be prevented or foreseen. 

28 



EMBARKATION OF THE EXPEDITION 

Siege-guns have been assembled only late this after- 
noon. These will be loaded on the cars late to-night 
and sent to transports early in the morning and the 
loading rushed. Will begin putting on men to- 
morrow P.M., if possible, and be ready to start Mon- 
day night or Tuesday morning. The last of the 
troops from Chattanooga are expected to night. 
Officers engaged in loading transports have worked 
night and day. The main cause of the delay has 
been the fact that great quantities of stores have 
been rushed in promiscuously, and I have no facili- 
ties to handle all or a part of them. The last ten 
miles before reaching the wharf is a single track, 
and there is a very narrow place at wharf in which 
to work. The capacity of this place has been greatly 
exceeded. Could have put the troops on and rushed 
them off, but not properly equipped as I know the 
President wishes them. I will not delay a minute 
longer than is necessary to get my command in con- 
dition, and will start as early as practicable. 

(Signed) Shafter, 

Major- General. 

The loading of commissary stores, ammuni- 
tion, arms, accoutrements, forage, wagon transpor- 
tation, medical supplies, and animals, was com- 
pleted at II A.M. June 6th. Orders had been 
given that troops should begin to go on board at 
noon the same date, but owing to the inability 
on the part of the railroad to move the trains, the 
first troops did not arrive until 2.30 a.m., June 7th. 
29 



CHAPTER III 

THE EMBARKATION OF THE SANTIAGO 
EXPEDITION {CONTINUED) 

SUCH was the situation on the evening of June 
7th. Many of the troops were embarked, 
and head-quarters was to be transferred the fol- 
lowing day from the Tampa Bay Hotel to the 
Seguran9a, the ship selected as the flag-ship. The 
hotel was full to overflowing with followers of 
the expedition, friends and relatives of officers, 
with Cuban officers and their friends, and sight- 
seers. About six o'clock on the evening of this 
day, the operator of the Western Union office in 
the hotel came to General Shafter's office to in- 
form him that a through line to the White House 
had just been made, and that the President and 
Secretary of War wished him to come to the 
telegraph office, so that they could talk to him. 
It caused much excitement in the crowded lobby 
when the General was seen going in person to 
the telegraph office. It was felt that some crisis 
had arrived. As soon as the President was told 
that General Shafter was in the office he asked if 
30 



EMBARKATION OF THE EXPEDITION 

General Miles was there, and if not, that he also 
be sent for. The General was close by and came 
at once, and he. General Shafter, Captain Brady 
— an officer of the signal department who handled 
the key — and the writer, were the only persons 
present in the room, when the following conver- 
sation took place: 

" General Shafter : 

"You will sail immediately, as you are needed at 
destination. " (Signed) R. A. Alger, 

" Secretary of War'' 

" Secretary of War : 

" I will sail to-morrow morning. Steam cannot 
be gotten up earlier. There are loaded to-night one 
division of infantry (nine regiments), sixteen troops 
of dismounted cavalry, four light batteries, two bat- 
teries of siege artillery, and two companies of engi- 
neers, and the troops from Mobile. I will try and get 
on the rest of the cavalry and another division of 
regular infantry by morning. Will sail then with 
whatever I have on board. 

♦* (Signed) Shafter, 

" Major-General*' 
"General Shafter: 

" That you may know the situation, the President 
directs me to send you the following from Sampson : 

" ' Port Antonio, June 7th. 

♦' * To Secretary of Navy, Washington : 

'"Bombarded forts at Santiago 7.30 to 10 a.m., 
to-day, June 7th. Have silenced works quickly, 

31 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

without injury of any kind though stationary at 
two thousand yards. If ten thousand men were 
here, city and fleet would be ours within forty-eight 
hours. Every consideration demands immediate 
army movement. If delayed city will be defended 
more strongly by guns taken from fleet. 

'"(Signed) Sampson.' 

He further says that you will sail as indicated 
in your message, but with not less than ten thousand 
men. "(Signed) H. C. CORBIN, 

" Adjutant-General." 
" General Shafter : 

*' The last thing before sailing telegraph roster of 
regiments. By order of Secretary of War. 

"(Signed) H. C. Corbin, 

" Adjutant-Genera/." 

All night long every energy was bent toward 
hastening embarkation. 

Staff ofl[icers were dispatched to all concerned 
notifying the commanding officers that their or- 
ganizations must be on board in the morning or be 
left behind. This was incentive enough for rapid 
work. Since 2.30 in the morning the embarka- 
tion of troops had been going on rapidly and 
continuously, but at 10 p.m. the railroad became 
so congested that there was an interval lasting 
until daylight when no troops reached the pier. 
At the Tampa Bay Hotel, head-quarters was rap- 
idly packed up, and a special train ordered to be 
in front of the hotel at two o'clock in the morn- 
32 



EMBARKATION OF THE EXPEDITION 

ing. Owing to the congestion this train did not 
reach the Port until six o'clock. Early in the 
morning the loaded transports had begun to slip 
their moorings and move toward the entrance of 
the bay, and by two in the afternoon nearly all 
the transports had left the Port and proceeded 
down the bay so as to be in a position for an 
early start next morning, as it was expected the 
expedition would sail at that time. About two 
o'clock in the afternoon General Shafter, while 
on his way to board the Seguran9a, and to order 
it to join the fleet down the bay, had a telegram 
handed to him which read as follows : 

" Wait until you get further orders before you 
sail. Answer quick. 

" (Signed) R. A. Alger, 

" Secretary of War.'* 

It was not until late that night that the reason 
for the delay was learned. Then it was found 
that the Navy Department had requested a delay, 
as the Eagle had reported that a Spanish armored 
cruiser, second class, and a Spanish torpedo-boat 
destroyer had been seen the evening before in the 
Nicholas Channel, off the north coast of Cuba. 
This had been confirmed by the Resolute, which 
reported she was pursued the previous night by 
two vessels. 

33 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

Notwithstanding the order for delay, the em- 
barkation of troops on the remaining vessels con- 
tinued throughout the afternoon and was entirely- 
completed at 9 P.M. 

If there were Spanish vessels in Nicholas Chan- 
nel the previous night, it was thought that their 
object must be to attempt the destruction of the 
transports then lying in the bay. Certainly 
enough publicity had been given to every move- 
ment to provide the enemy with all the informa- 
tion necessary for such a design. Taking into 
consideration the time that had elapsed since the 
vessels were supposed to have been seen, the dis- 
tance, and probable rate of sailing, it was esti- 
mated that about lo p.m. on the 8th the enemy 
might be within a few hours' sail of Tampa Bay. 

At this time orders were received from Gen- 
eral Miles, at the Tampa Bay Hotel, to have all 
the transports down the bay recalled ; to place as 
many as could be accommodated in the channel ; 
and to close in the rest as near to it as possible. 
For some days field-guns had been in position at 
the end of the pier, and this movement would 
bring the transports under their protection. 

The whole night and some of the next morning 
was spent in notifying the transport captains to 
return to the Port, and in placing the ships three 
34 



EMBARKATION OF THE EXPEDITION 

abreast in the channel, while the few naval vessels 
at hand stationed themselves at the entrance of 
the Bay to engage the enemy when his vessels 
should put in an appearance. 

The next day was hot, making it fairly stifling 
on the vessels thus huddled together, and neither 
men nor animals could remain in serviceable con- 
dition if kept there very long. On the morning 
of the 9th it looked as if there would be several 
days' delay in the sailing of the expedition, as 
General Shafter received a telegram from the 
Secretary of War asking if it were practicable 
to disembark the command. After consultation 
with the general officers it was decided that it 
would be much better to keep the command on 
board the vessels and send them off in detach- 
ments for a few hours at a time, as there was no 
place in the vicinity where the whole command 
could be encamped with comfort. Moreover 
when the orders should come the second time for 
the expedition to sail, if the command was in 
camp the result would be that it could not get 
off inside of three days. 

Accordingly the following arrangements were 

made. Orders were issued allowing the men of 

the different commands the greatest liberty in 

going ashore. Passes were directed to be given 

35 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

in limited numbers, but not for tiie purpose of 
going beyond the Port, except upon the most 
important business, and then only for a few 
hours. The whole command was to be on board 
every night at nine o'clock, and a roll call was 
held at that hour. Orders were given to the 
various commanding officers while lying in the 
channel to practise their men in disembarking 
and embarking. Most of the animals were 
taken off and sent a short distance up the rail- 
road and picketed. This could be done with- 
out causing much delay, as their re-embarkation 
would occupy, it was thought, only a few hours. 
By the loth the transports were nearly all pulled 
out into the stream, where it was much cooler, 
and where the men had an opportunity of bath- 
ing in the bay. General Shafter was informed 
that he might take the opportunity presented to 
increase his command, if he thought it desirable. 
The transports, however, had been crowded to 
their fullest extent, and no more troops, except 
a few recruits in some of the regiments, were 
placed on board. A board of officers was ap- 
pointed on the loth to examine all the trans- 
ports and report whether any of them were too 
much overcrowded, and whether any of them 
could be still further utilized. The only recom- 
36 



EMBARKATION OF THE EXPEDITION 

mendation of the board was that two companies 
of the Second Massachusetts be taken from the 
Seneca and placed on the Knickerbocker. 

As early as the first of the month Captain 
Hunker, the commanding officer of the U. S. S. 
Annapolis, with his command, composed of the 
Annapolis, Helena, Castine, and a few other ves- 
sels, came to Tampa from Key West to act as a 
convoy. He had been directed by Commodore 
Remey, in command of the blockading squadron 
on the north coast of Cuba, to convoy the expe- 
dition to the neighborhood of Santiago, taking 
the northern route through the Windward Pas- 
sage, and to notify the commodore commanding 
of the time when the expedition would arrive 
off the Dry Tortugas. Here preparations were 
being made to increase the convoy by adding 
other vessels. Everything concerning the order 
of sailing and the formation of the transports 
en route, and in fact everything connected with 
the general charge of the expedition, as far as 
the passage was concerned, was turned over to 
Captain Hunker by General Shafter. 

The detailed instructions prepared by Captain 

Hunker provided that the transports as they left 

the Port should form inside the bay near the 

entrance, in three columns, eight hundred yards 

37 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

apart, and the vessels in column at four hundred 
yards interval. A diagram was prepared show- 
ing the position of each transport in the column 
to which it was assigned, and a copy of this 
diagram furnished each transport captain. The 
lighters and water-tenders were to be towed by 
the rear vessels at double interval. When the 
final order to sail was given, the vessels of the 
left column were to pass out over the bar first, 
followed by the centre column, and this in turn 
followed by the right column, and on the outside 
the original formation was to be resumed. Each 
column was led by a naval vessel, the other naval 
vessels either scouting some distance ahead, or 
on the sides of the fleet and in rear. If the 
enemy at any time was sighted, all but two of 
the naval vessels were to leave the transports and 
form in order of battle, the two vessels left di- 
recting the movements of the transports. Ex- 
plicit directions were given in case a transport 
was disabled or became separated from the main 
body. All vessels, both transport and naval, ex- 
cept the scouts, were directed to carry from sun- 
set to sunrise only a red light at the stern so 
screened as to " show only from right astern to 
two points on each quarter." All other lights 
were to be extinguished or carefully screened, so 
38 



EMBARKATION OF THE EXPEDITION 

that each ship would be as dark as possible. 
The transports, however, were to be prepared to 
show side-lights instantly if there was any danger 
of collision. Certain signals were to be made 
for change of speed, and in changing course the 
transports were to follow their naval leaders, 
turning in succession on the same ground. Ves- 
sels in the pivot column were to take steerage 
way only, in turning ; those of the centre column 
about six knots, and those in the outer column 
eight or nine knots an hour. 

On June loth orders were received from 
Washington stating that the part of the convoy 
to be added at the Dry Tortugas was to be rein- 
forced by ships from Admiral Sampson's fleet, 
and would be coaled and ready to sail for Santi- 
ago by the evening of Monday the 13th or 
by the morning of the following day, without re- 
gard to Spanish ships. The fleet of army trans- 
ports was directed to be in readiness to move 
from Tampa when orders were given from 
Washington, which would be about twenty-four 
hours before the naval convoy was ready to start. 

Sunday, June 12th, about one o'clock, orders 

came the second time from the Secretary of War 

for the expedition to move immediately. During 

the delay every effort had been made to perfect 

2>9 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

the equipment of the command. In the hurry 
on the 7th and 8th many small things and some 
of importance had been forgotten, and these 
defects were gradually being remedied. When 
the orders came, they found everyone still busy. 
Medical supplies, that had been expected for 
some time, had just arrived in Tampa, and every 
effort was made to get them aboard before sail- 
ing. The animals were ordered on board at 
once, and the final preparations were carried on 
that afternoon and during the night. It was 
fully expected there would be no difficulty in sail- 
ing at daybreak, and Captain Hunker was noti- 
fied accordingly. 

But early the next morning about half the ves- 
sels in the fleet displayed water signals, and on 
investigation most of these vessels were found to 
be really in need of water. The water-tenders 
worked all day supplying these vessels, and the 
loading of stock and supplies still continued. 
About noon Captain Hunker, in charge of 
the convoy, began to send the transports that 
were ready to sail, to the mouth of the bay ; but 
by night many were still left at the Port. At six 
o'clock the next morning, the 14th, all of the 
ships remaining in the Port were directed to 
cease loading, and sail at once, regardless of 
40 



EMBARKATION OF THE EXPEDITION 

everything. By nine o'clock all of the trans- 
ports, the Seguran9a in the rear, were steaming 
to the rendezvous at the mouth of Tampa Bay. 
The transports soon passed over the bar, and 
formed outside according to instructions. Just 
at dusk, on the 15th, the light at Dry Tortugas 
could be seen, and a little later the light on the 
Rebecca Shoals. On the water beyond, lights 
could be seen in every direction, and we knew 
that the additional vessels of the convoy were 
awaiting us. In the morning we were surround- 
ed by war vessels, large and small. The Indiana, 
the flag-ship of the convoy, commanded by Cap- 
tain Taylor, who as senior officer had taken over 
the command from Captain Hunker, was well to 
the front, and about ten in the morning the Cap- 
tain came on board the Seguran9a to pay his 
respects to General Shafter. 

Before coming on board Captain Taylor wrote 
the General, saying that the Navy Department 
was extremely anxious to have some of the forces 
arrive before Santiago at the earliest moment pos- 
sible, and had directed him to inquire of General 
Shafter whether a division of his forces would be 
approved by him. It was proposed to place the 
swifter transports in one division, which would 
push rapidly ahead, and the slower transports in 
41 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

a second division, which would follow as best it 
could. 

General Shafter did not favor the plan, and 
when Captain Taylor came on board the Segu- 
ran9a, a little while later, after discussing the 
matter, it was decided to try to gain time by 
increasing the speed of the expedition to the ut- 
most capabilities of the slowest vessel, and see if 
the formation could be maintained. After this 
had been kept up the rest of the day and through 
the night, the morning of the 17th found the 
transports scattered over a distance of thirty or 
forty miles, so the speed was lessened to enable 
the vessels in the rear to close up, and before the 
day had passed the original formation was re- 
sumed. It was also decided that nothing would 
be gained by dividing the expedition into two di- 
visions, and the rest of the voyage was made at a 
moderate rate of speed, maintaining a compact 
formation. 

Communication was maintained among all the 
transports by having on board each one a naval 
cadet and two or three members of the Signal 
Service detachment, who were provided with 
signal flags and a set of International Code 
signals, by the use of which messages were easily 
and freely sent. 

42 



EMBARKATION OF THE EXPEDITION 

About five o'clock in the afternoon of Sunday, 
June 19th, the expedition was abeam of Cape 
Maysi, and expectations began to run high,for we 
knew that early the next morning the objective 
point of our expedition would be in sight. This 
was the first time in the history of our country 
that an expedition of this size had ever left our 
shores, and the second time that an expedition of 
the kind had ever left. The expedition consisted 
of thirty-two transports, bearing troops ; two 
water-tenders ; one steam lighter and two decked- 
over lighters — one towed by the City of Wash- 
ington and one by the Concho. The one towed 
by the Concho was lost the night of the i6th, and 
it proved to be a very serious loss. A large steam 
lighter, in addition, had been chartered for the 
expedition, but failed to reach Tampa in time, 
owing to some break in machinery. A tugboat, 
the Captain Sam, started with the fleet, but de- 
serted the first night out. Each of the steamers 
had from ten to twenty days' coal on board, com- 
puted on the basis of their going at nine knots 
an hour. In addition, large reserve supplies of 
coal were stored in the holds of twenty-one of the 
transports. 

The fleet of transports carried 153 small boats, 
with a total carrying capacity of 3,034 men ; in 
43 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

addition, the steam lighter could carry 400 men. 
The total number of animals taken was 2,295 ; 
390 pack mules, 7 bell mares (forming six pack 
trains) ; 946 draft mules; 571 Government 
horses, and 381 private horses for general, field, 
and staff officers. The transportation consisted 
of 114 complete sets of six-mule harness, and 
114 army wagons (six-mule wagons); 84 com- 
plete sets of four-mule ambulance harness ; 81 
escort wagons, and 7 ambulances. There were 
many more ambulances at Tampa, but it was a 
question of putting them on and taking fewer 
army wagons. As the latter could do the double 
duty of transporting supplies and also the 
wounded and sick, it was decided to take wagons 
rather than ambulances. All the litters belong- 
ing to the various organizations, and those on the 
ambulances left behind, were ordered taken. On 
June 26th, four days after the expedition began 
to disembark, the transportation was increased by 
the arrival of two pack trains and ten ambulances. 
The strength of the expedition was 819 officers 
and 15,058 enlisted men ; 30 civilian clerks ; 272 
teamsters and packers, and 107 stevedores. 

The field artillery carried consisted of four 
light batteries of four guns each ; one Hotchkiss 
revolving cannon ; one pneumatic dynamite gun ; 
44 



EMBARKATION OF THE EXPEDITION 

four Gatling guns ; four 5-inch siege-rifles ; four 
7-inch Howitzers; and eight field mortars, calibre 
3.6 inches. 

Eighty-nine war correspondents, representing 
the principal newspapers and magazines in the 
country, accompanied the expedition. Seven of 
the correspondents were on board the Seguran9a, 
a few of the others were with the different bri- 
gade and division head-quarters, and the remaining 
number were given accommodations on board the 
Olivette. Eleven foreign officers, sent by their 
respective governments, had presented themselves 
to General Shafter at Tampa, with proper creden- 
tials, and these officers sailed with the expedition, 
having accommodations assigned them on board 
the Seguran9a. 

Upon the request of General Shafter, a sum of 
money was placed at his disposal by the War De- 
partment for the entertainment of these officers 
during the campaign. The names of the officers 
who had been designated to observe the opera- 
tions of our forces in the field were : Colonel 
Yermoloff, Military Attache to the Imperial Rus- 
sian Embassy at Washington ; Major Clement 
de Grandpr^, Military Attache to the French 
Embassy in Washington ; Major G. Shiba, of 
the Japanese Army; Captain Wester, Military 
45 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

Attache to the Legation of Sweden and Norway 
at Washington ; Captain Abildgaard, of the 
Royal Norwegian General Staff, and Military 
Attache to the Legation of Sweden and Norway 
at Washington ; Captain Arthur H. Lee, Royal 
Artillery, British Army, Military Attache to the 
British Embassy at Washington ; Count Von 
Goetzen, First Lieutenant of the Imperial Ger- 
man Army, and Military Attache to the German 
Embassy at Washington ; Lieutenant J. Roedler, 
Naval Attache to the Austro-Hungarian Lega- 
tion at Washington ; Commander Lieutenant 
Von Rebeur Paschwitz, of the Imperial German 
Navy, and Naval Attache to the German Em- 
bassy at Washington ; Commander Dahlgren, 
Naval Attache to the Legation of Sweden and 
Norway at Washington ; Lieutenant Saneyuki 
Akiyama, of the Imperial Japanese Navy. Af- 
ter our arrival off Santiago, Captain Alfred 
Paget, of the British Navy, and Naval Attache 
to the British Embassy at Washington, joined 
the expedition. 

The designation of the regiments composing 
the expedition ; the commanding officers of each ; 
the ship or ships on which each was embarked ; 
the designating number of each ship, which num- 
ber was painted in large figures on the smoke- 
46 



EMBARKATION OF THE EXPEDITION 

stack or on the sides of the vessel ; the names of 
the division and brigade commanders, and the 
ships on which the head-quarters of each was em- 
barked, are all set forth in the tabulated state- 
ment given on page 48. 

The staff of General Shafter at this time was 
made up as follows: Lieutenants R. H. Noble, 
First United States Infantry, and J. D. Miley, 
Second United States Artillery, Aides-de-Camp ; 
Lieutenant-Colonel E. J. McClernand, Assistant 
Adjutant-General United States Volunteers (Cap- 
tain Second United States Cavalry), Adjutant- 
General ; Captain J. C. Gilmore, Jr., Assistant 
Adjutant - General, United States Volunteers 
(First Lieutenant Fourth United States Artillery), 
assistant to the Adjutant-General ; Captain C. G. 
Starr, First United States Infantry, Acting In- 
spector-General ; Major Stephen W. Groesbeck, 
Judge Advocate United States Army, Acting 
Judge Advocate Fifth Corps ; Lieutenant-Colonel 
C. F. Humphrey, Deputy Quartermaster-General 
United States Army, Chief Quartermaster of the 
Expedition ; Major J. W. Jacobs, Quartermaster 
United States Army, Acting Chief Quartermas- 
ter, Fifth Corps ; Colonel J. F. Weston, Assis- 
tant Commissary General of Subsistence, United 
States Army, Chief Commissary of the Expedi- 
^7 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 






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49 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

tion ; Lieutenant-Colonel B. F. Pope, Chief Sur- 
geon United States Volunteers (Major Medical 
Department, United States Army), Chief Sur- 
geon, Fifth Corps; Brigadier-General William 
Ludlow, United States Volunteers (Lieutenant- 
Colonel, Corps of Engineers, United States 
Army), Chief Engineer of the Expedition ; 
Lieutenant-Colonel George McC. Derby, Chief 
Engineer United States Volunteers (Captain, 
Engineer Corps United States Army), Chief En- 
gineer Fifth Army Corps; Second Lieutenant 
William Brooke, Fourth United States Infantry, 
Acting Chief Ordnance Officer ; Major Frank 
Greene, Signal Officer, United States Volunteers 
(First Lieutenant, Signal Corps United States 
Army), Acting Chief Signal Officer ; Lieutenant- 
Colonel J. J. Astor, Inspector-General, United 
States Volunteers, attached as a member of the 
staff ; Captain Stewart M. Brice, Commissary of 
Subsistence, United States Volunteers, attached 
as a member of the staff, and Mr. G. F. Hawkins 
of New York City, and Dr. George Goodfellow, 
of Tucson, Ariz., additional aides-de-camp. 

There was also on board the flag-ship Major- 
General J. C. Breckinridge, United States Vol- 
unteers (Inspector-General United States Army) 
with his three aides-de-camp — Captain F. M. Al- 
so 



EMBARKATION OF THE EXPEDITION 

ger, Assistant Adjutant-General, United States 
Volunteers ; Lieutenant S. M. FoOte, Fourth 
United States Artillery, and Lieutenant C. D. 
Rhodes, Sixth United States Cavalry ; Lieutenant- 
Colonel A. L. Wagner, Assistant Adjutant-Gen- 
eral United States Army, in charge of the Military 
Information Division, War Department, with his 
assistant, Lieutenant Edward Anderson, Seventh 
United States Cavalry ; Dr. Joaquin Castillo, 
Brigadier-General Cuban Army, and Dr. John 
Guiteras, who had been assigned to duty with the 
Chief Surgeon for work in connection with yel- 
low fever and other tropical diseases. 



5^ 



CHAPTER IV 

THE DISEMBARKATION 

/^^N Monday, June 20th, the expedition arrived 
^-^ off Guantanamo at eight in the morning. 
One of the vessels of the Mosquito Fleet, in our 
convoy, had been sent ahead the previous night 
to warn Admiral Sampson of the approach of the 
fleet, and he despatched his chief of staff. Captain 
Chadvvick, to meet us, which he did about eleven 
o'clock in the morning. Captain Chadwick gave 
sailing directions to the master of the Seguranga, 
and in an hour we were alongside the New York, 
which was lying immediately in front of the 
mouth of Santiago Harbor. Cheer after cheer 
from the different naval vessels in the vicinity 
greeted our arrival, and these were heartily re- 
turned by the soldiers. Admiral Sampson came 
on board at once, and after a mutual exchange of 
greetings between the Admiral and General Shaf- 
ter, the Seguranga steamed slowly along the coast 
to the eastward, and then back again past the 
Morro and to the westward. This was done that 
52 



THE DISEMBARKATION 

General Shafter might gain some idea of the 
nature of the country as best he could from the 
ship. 

Admiral Sampson informed General Shafter 
that General Garcia was in the vicinity of Aser- 
raderos, about twenty miles west of the mouth of 
the harbor. General Garcia had gone on board 
the flag-ship New York the day before, but the 
motion of the vessel distressed him so much that 
he had asked that General Shafter would see him 
on shore. Accordingly the Seguranga steamed to 
the vicinity of Aserraderos, accompanied by the 
Gloucester. The Admiral and the General were, 
with some members of their respective staffs, 
transferred to the Gloucester, which ran in close 
along the shore. The beauty of the place can 
hardly be exaggerated, the mountains came down 
to the sea, covered with a luxuriant tropical 
growth, and the little camp of the insurgents 
could be seen about six or eight hundred feet 
above the water. On approaching, a few men 
were seen on the beach, and the number was 
being constantly increased by those coming down 
from the camp in the hills. The party was trans- 
ferred from the Gloucester to the beach in small 
boats, the boat containing the Admiral and the 
General leading. The natives, by way of express- 
53 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

ing their delight at the arrival of the Americans, 
ran into the water, and just as the boat touched 
bottom, some short distance from the shore, 
they picked it up and carried it on land, high 
and dry. 

The distance to the camp was about a mile, 
and several Cuban mules were hastily gathered 
up, and most of the party mounted upon them. 
A small detachment of the insurgents, as a guard 
of honor, had been quickly sent down as soon 
as it was known who were landing. With this 
detachment leading, and with soldiers off duty 
and natives following, the party presented a most 
picturesque appearance as it wound its way along 
the narrow and crooked path to the camp. Gen- 
eral Rabi had his head-quarters in the camp, but 
General Garcia's head-quarters were still some 
distance in the interior. A courier was de- 
spatched for him, and in the course of half an 
hour he arrived. 

The meeting between General Shafter and 
General Garcia was very cordial, and they imme- 
diately repaired to General Rabi's tent, around 
which a guard was placed. General Garcia spoke 
English fairly well, and several members of his 
staff spoke it excellently. General Rabi is a 
descendant of the aborigines of the island, being 
54 




GENERAL CALIXTO GARCIA 



THE DISEMBARKATION 

a full-blooded Carib Indian. So few of these 
have been able to retain their racial identity that 
this fact made him a very interesting personage. 
In General Rabi's tent v^ere gathered Admiral 
Sampson, General Shafter, General Garcia, Gen- 
eral Rabi, and a few members of their respective 
staffs. The object of General Shafter's visit was 
to learn from General Garcia and his officers 
what they knew concerning the strength of the 
enemy in and around Santiago, to question them 
concerning the nature of the country, and to 
ascertain what assistance could be expected of 
them. 

Before leaving Tampa the War Department 
had informed General Shafter that 7,000 Span- 
iards were intrenched at Siboney and Daiquiri ; 
5,000 at the mouth of Santiago Harbor, and about 
1,000 at other points near the city. These num- 
bers had been furnished by the Navy Depart- 
ment, but greatly exceeded the real strength at 
these points. During the voyage of the fleet to 
Santiago General Shafter made a careful study of 
the country, deriving his information from all 
available sources. On board the Seguranga were 
Dr. Joaquin Castillo and Mr. Porro, a civilian 
engineer, assistant to Colonel Derby. Both were 
residents of Santiago de Cuba, and very familiar 
55 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

with its surroundings. There were very few maps 
of this portion of Cuba on a scale large enough 
to make an intelligent study of it possible, but all 
obtainable had been procured. So thorough had 
been the study of the ground that after the inter- 
view with General Garcia nothing new concern- 
ing the terrain around Santiago was learned. 
General Garcia estimated that there were about 
12,000 Spanish soldiers at Santiago and vicinity. 
At Daiquiri there were about 300 men, at Si- 
boney about 600 men, at Sardinero 100 men, at 
Jutici 150 men, at Aguadores 150 men, the main 
body of the troops being at the Morro and 
around the city at Santiago. The question of the 
most suitable place for the landing of troops was 
then discussed, and General Garcia gave it as his 
opinion that Daiquiri would be the best place. 
Cabanas, to the west of the Morro, was suggest- 
ed, but was immediately dropped, General Shafter 
and General Garcia both considering it imprac- 
ticable. Guantanamo was also thought of, but 
this place, being forty miles from Santiago, was 
considered entirely too far away. The interview 
lasted about an hour, and, just before its termi- 
nation. General Shafter, while thanking those 
present for their advice, announced that the fol- 
lowing would be his plan for disembarkation : 
56 



THE DISEMBARKATION 

The disembarkation of the troops would begin 
on the morning of the 21st at Daiquiri, and as 
soon as possible thereafter would also be begun 
at Siboney, and continue at both places simul- 
taneously. As a feint to attract attention from 
the real place of landing, several of the trans- 
ports would be sent under the protection of the 
navy to Cabanas to make a show of landing. 
General Rabi, with five hundred men, on the 
morning of the 2 2d, would attack Cabanas in the 
rear. Just before the disembarkation would be- 
gin the navy would shell the coast at Daiquiri, 
Siboney, Sardinero, Aguadores, and Cabanas. 
General Castillo, who was present at the meet- 
ing, stated that he had five hundred men at a 
small town a few miles to the east of Daiquiri. 
General Shafter decided that on the next day, 
the 2ist, he would transfer five hundred more 
insurgents from Aserraderos to be added to 
General Castillo's command, and asked General 
Castillo to take this force early on the morning 
of the 2 2d to the rear of Daiquiri to intercept 
the Spaniards escaping after the navy began to 
shell the place. 

As soon as the General had outlined his plan 
it was reduced to writing, and Captain Stanton, 
assistant Chief of Staff to Admiral Sampson, 
57 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

took a copy of it. General Garcia's forces num- 
bered about 5,000 men. In carrying out Gen- 
eral Shafter's plans, 1,000 of these would be 
present at the attack on Daiquiri, and 500 at 
Cabanas. It was arranged that the remaining 
3,500 should be assembled at Aserraderos by the 
24th, and conveyed on that day to Siboney on 
naval vessels and disembarked. This was done, 
some transports, emptied cm the 2 2d, being used 
instead of naval vessels. During the interview 
General Garcia informed General Shafter that 
he and his troops awaited his orders, but Gen- 
eral Shafter assured him that he could exercise 
no authority over him, but would, however, be 
very glad to accept his voluntary services. He 
informed General Garcia that he had food and 
arms in abundance, which would be issued to his 
troops. That night a few rations were put on 
shore, and the next day the number was increased 
to nine thousand rations. 

While the interview was going on the troops 
were being assembled to do honor to the Gen- 
eral on his departure. Several companies were 
drawn up in front of the tent to present arms as 
he came out, and a regiment escorted him to the 
beach down the winding path, which was now 
lined on both sides by Cuban soldiers standing 
58 



THE DISEMBARKATION 

about a yard apart and presenting arms. The 
scene made a strong impression on all in the 
party, there seemed to be such an earnestness and 
fixedness of purpose displayed that all felt these 
soldiers to be a power. About fifty per cent, 
were blacks, and the rest mulattoes, with a small 
number of whites. They were very poorly clad, 
many without shirts or ^hoes, but every man had 
his gun and a belt full of ammunition. 

On the return to the Seguran9a in the even- 
ing the orders to govern the disembarkation were 
formulated. Early in the morning it began to 
rain and continued until noon, accompanied by 
squally weather and a rough sea. This caused 
the transports to scatter to a great extent, and 
Captain Taylor of the Indiana was requested to 
take steps to bring the vessels conveniently near 
one another, so that the division and brigade 
commanders could be brought on board the Se- 
guran9a to receive the orders and instructions in 
person. The sea was so rough that not until 
four in the afternoon did these officers assemble. 
Even then several were unable to reach the Segu- 
ranga before dark, and the orders for these officers 
had to be carried to the separate ships during the 
night. 

Admiral Sampson issued minute instructions to 
59 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

govern the fleet during the disembarkation, based 
upon agreements made by him or his chief of 
staff with General Shafter at meetings on the 
2oth and 21st. Colonel Humphrey, on the part 
of the army, directed the disembarkation, and 
Captain Goodrich, on the part of the navy, both 
reporting to General Shafter for orders. 

General Shafter's and Admiral Sampson's or- 
ders governing the disembarkation give so much 
interesting information connected with the events 
of the 2 2d that I give them here in full. 

Head-quarters Fifth Army Corps, 
On board S. S. Seguranga, 

At Sea, June 20, 1898. 

General Orders, No. 18. 

I. Under instructions to be communicated to the 
proper commanders, troops will disembark in the 
following order: 

First. The Second Division, Fifth Corps (Law- 
ton's). The Gatling gun detachment will accom- 
pany this division. 

Second. General Bates's Brigade. This brigade 
will form as a reserve to the Second Division, Fifth 
Corps. 

Third. The dismounted Cavalry Division (Wheel- 
er's). 

Fourth. The First Division, Fifth Corps (Kent's). 

Fifth. The squadron of the Second Cavalry (Raf- 
ferty's). 

60 



THE DISEMBARKATION 

Sixth. If the enemy, in force, vigorously resists 
the landing, the Light Artillery, or part of it, will be 
disembarked by the Battalion Commander, and 
brought to the assistance of the troops engaged. If 
no serious opposition be offered, this artillery will 
be unloaded after the mounted squadron. 

2. All troops will carry on the person the blanket 
roll (with shelter tent and poncho), three days' field 
rations (with coffee ground), canteens filled, and 
one hundred rounds of ammunition per man. Ad- 
ditional ammunition, already issued to the troops, 
tentage, baggage, and company cooking utensils, 
will be left under charge of the regimental quarter- 
master, with one non-commissioned officer and two 
privates from each company. 

3. All persons not immediately on duty with, and 
constituting a part of, the organizations mentioned in 
the foregoing paragraphs, will remain aboard ship 
until the landing be accomplished, and until notified 
that they can land. 

4. The Chief Quartermaster of the expedition will 
control all small boats, and will distribute them to 
the best advantage to disembark the troops in the 
order indicated in paragraph i. 

5. The Ordnance Officer, Second Lieutenant 
Brooke, Fourth Infantry, will put on shore at once, 
one hundred rounds of ammunition per man, and 
have it ready for distribution on the firing line. 

6. The Commanding General wishes to impress 
officers and men with the crushing effect that a 
well-directed fire will have upon the Spanish troops. 
All officers concerned will rigidly enforce fire dis- 

61 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

cipline, and will caution their men to fire only when 
they can see the enemy. 

By command of Major-General Shafter : 

E. J. McClernand, 
Assistant Adjutant-General. 

North Atlantic Squadron. 
United States Flag-ship, New York (ist Rate). 
Off Santiago de Cuba, Cuba. 

June 21, 1898. 
ORDER OF BATTLE. 

1. The army corps will land to-morrow morning, 
the entire force landing at Daiquiri. The landing 
will begin at daylight, or as soon thereafter as prac- 
ticable. General Castillo with a thousand men com- 
ing from the eastward of Daiquiri will assist in 
clearing the way for an unopposed landing, by 
flanking out the Spanish forces at that point. 

2. Simultaneously with the shelling of the beach 
and block-houses at Daiquiri, the Ensenada de los 
Altares (Siboney) and Aguadores, both to the east- 
ward of Santiago, and the small bay of Cabanas, 
about two and one-half miles to the westward of 
Santiago, will be shelled by the ships stationed there 
for that purpose. 

3. A feint in force of landing at Cabanas will be 
made, about ten of the transports, the last to disem- 
bark their forces at Daiquiri, remaining during the 
day or greater part of the day, about two miles to 
the southward of Cabafias, lowering boats, and mak- 
ing apparent preparations for disembarking a large 

62 



THE DISEMBARKATION 

body of troops ; at the same time General Rabi, 
with five hundred Cuban troops, will make a dem- 
onstration on the west side of Cabanas. 

4. The following vessels are assigned to bombard 
the four points mentioned above : 

At Cabanas — the Scorpion, Vixen, and Texas. 

At Aguadores — the Eagle and Gloucester. 

At the Ensenada de los Altares (Siboney) — the 
Hornet, Helena, and Bancroft. 

At Daiquiri — the Detroit, Castine, Wasp, and New 
Orleans on the eastern flank. All the vessels named 
will be in their positions at daylight. 

5. Great care will be taken to avoid the wasteful 
expenditure of ammunition. The firing at Daiquiri 
will begin on signal from the New Orleans. 

At Cabanas it is probable that after a few min- 
utes, unless the firing is returned, occasional drop- 
ping shots from the smaller vessels will be sufficient, 
but the semblance of covering a landing should be 
maintained, the ships keeping close in. 

At Aguadores and the Ensenada de los Altares 
(Siboney), the same rule should prevail. At Daiqui- 
ri, the point of actual landing, vessels will of course 
use their artillery until they have reason to believe 
that the landing is clear. They will take care to 
make the firing deliberate and effective. As Gen- 
eral Castillo's column, approaching from the east- 
ward, is likely to come within range of the guns, 
sharp-eyed quartermasters with good glasses will 
be stationed to look out for the Cuban flag, and 
care will be taken not to direct the fire toward any 
point where that flag is shown. 
63 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

6. The Texas and Brooklyn will exchange block- 
ading stations, the Texas going inside to be near 
Cabanas. The Brooklyn, Massachusetts, Iowa, and 
Oregon will retain their blockading positions, and 
keep a vigilant watch on the harbor mouth. The 
Indiana will take the New Orleans's position in the 
blockading line east of Santiago, and between the 
flag-ship New York and the shore. This is only a 
temporary assignment for the Indiana, to strengthen 
the blockading line during the landing, and avoid 
any possibility of the enemy's breaking through 
should he attempt to get out of the port. 

7. The Suwanee, Osceola, andWampatuck will be 
prepared to tow boats. Each will be provided with 
two five or six-inch lines, one on each quarter ; each 
long enough to take in tow a dozen or more boats. 

8. These vessels will report at the New York at 
3 A.M. on June 22d, prepared to take in tow the 
ships' boats which are to assist the landing of troops 
and convey them to Daiquiri. 

9. The Texas, Brooklyn, Massachusetts, Iowa, 
Oregon, New York, and Indiana will send all their 
steam-cutters and all their puUing-boats, with the 
exception of one retained on board each ship, to as- 
sist in the landing. These boats will report at the 
New York at 3 a.m. 

10. Each boat, whaleboat, and cutter will have 
three men; each launch five men, and each steam- 
cutter its full crew and an officer for their own 
management. In addition to these men, each boat 
will carry five men, including one capable of acting 
as coxswain to manage and direct the transports' 

64 



THE DISEMBARKATION 

boats. Each steam-launch will be in charge of an 
officer, who will report to Captain Goodrich. Care 
will be taken, in the selection of boat-keepers and 
coxswains, to take no men who are gun-pointers or 
who occupy positions of special importance at the 
battery. 

11. Unnecessary oars and impediments should be 
removed from the pulling-boats, for the greater con- 
venience for the transportation of troops, but each 
boat should retain its anchor and chain. 

12. Captain C. F. Goodrich, commanding the St. 
Louis, will have, on the part of the navy, general 
charge of the landing. 

13. The New Orleans will send her boats to re- 
port to Captain Goodrich upon her arrival at Dai- 
quiri. 

14. The attention of commanding officers of all 
vessels engaged in blockading Santiago de Cuba is 
earnestly called to the necessity of the utmost vigi- 
lance from this time forward — both as to maintain- 
ing stations and readiness for action, and as to 
keeping a close watch upon the harbor mouth. If 
the Spanish Admiral ever intends to attempt to es- 
cape that attempt will be made soon. 

William T. Sampson, 
Rear -A dm iral, Com mander- in- Ch ief, 
U. S. Naval Force, North Atlantic Station. 

At daybreak on the morning of the 2 2d, the 

transports began to close in upon Daiquiri. 

General Lawton's First Brigade was the first to 

be disembarked, and it was not until about nine 

65 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

o'clock that this brigade was in the boats. 
Agreement had been made with Captain Good- 
rich that he would hoist a "Blue Peter" on 
board the New Orleans as soon as all the small 
boats were filled and ready to leave for the 
shore. This was to be taken by the navy as a 
signal to begin the bombardment on Daiquiri, 
and as soon as General Shafter considered it was 
time for the troops to begin landing, a " Blue 
Peter " would be hoisted on board the Segu- 
ranga, and the bombardment would cease. 

At 9.40 A.M. the " Blue Peter" was hoisted on 
the New Orleans, and the bombardment lasted 
for about twenty or thirty minutes, when the 
** Blue Peter " was hoisted on the Seguran9a. 
At 10.25 A.M. some mounted troops, carrying the 
Cuban flag, were seen coming down to the beach 
at a gallop, which indicated that General Castillo 
had arrived. From the Seguran9a it looked as if 
the first boatload of American troops landed al- 
most immediately afterward. Shortly after the 
landing began, the naval vessels again shelled the 
hills and valley back of Daiquiri vigorously for 
some time, but not a shot was fired from shore to 
prevent the landing of our men. Later in the 
day it was learned that the Spanish garrison left 
the town about five o'clock in the morning, after 
66 



THE DISEMBARKATION 

attempting to burn the place. Early in the 
morning these fires were seen from the trans- 
ports, but they soon went out and did but little 
damage in the way of destroying property that 
could be made use of by the American forces. 
A shed, in which there were two locomotives and 
some cars, was burned, and the locomotives were 
ruined. An attempt was also made to burn a 
small wooden wharf, but this fire was extin- 
guished by the employees of the Spanish-Ameri- 
can Company, which owns everything at Dai- 
quiri. This company has some iron mines a few 
miles back in the mountains, and the railroad is 
used only to bring the ore to an immense ore 
pier here. 

The harbor at Daiquiri, if such it could be 
called, was an open roadstead with its waters 
slightly sheltered. There was a strip of sandy 
beach about three hundred yards long, and back 
of this the country rose gradually for about four 
or five miles, terminating in mountains about a 
thousand or fifteen hundred feet high. Most 
of the men and supplies were disembarked on 
the wooden wharf, which was about twenty-five 
by forty feet, and approached by a piled tramway 
about one hundred and fifty feet in length. Ves- 
sels having a draught of not more than eight or 
67 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

ten feet could be brought up to this wharf. Over 
the track running on to the wharf several push-cars 
were operated, and on these cars all supplies were 
taken from the wharf to the shore. The iron-ore 
pier was so high that it was of no practical use 
during the disembarkation. Attempts were made 
to utilize it, but were soon abandoned, though 
later it was used for mooring vessels while they 
were being supplied with water from a pipe on 
the pier. 

There was considerable open ground back of 
Daiquiri, which was utilized for camps and cor- 
rals. The road to Siboney was at first a narrow 
trail, but with a very little work by the troops it 
was soon widened to permit the passage of wag- 
ons and light artillery. It was useless to attempt 
to get from Daiquiri to Siboney by land, except 
by this road, the country being covered by a 
scrubby, bushy growth, and over all this grew 
trailing vines, making it almost impenetrable. 
Time was too much an element of success to be 
expended in cutting out new roads, and troops 
and artillery were taken over the existing road 
without much difficulty. 

The order prescribed for disembarkation was 
followed as closely as possible during the 2 2d, 
and by night there were about six thousand troops 

68 




BRIGADIER-GENERAL H. S. HAWKINS, U. S. V. 



THE DISEMBARKATION 

on shore ; nearly the whole of General Lavvton's 
Division, all of General Bates's independent bri- 
gade, and one brigade of General Wheeler's Cav- 
alry Division, The small boats carried by the 
transports, or belonging to the naval vessels, after 
being filled with troops, were fastened together, 
one after the other, and the whole string was 
towed to the wooden wharf by steam launches 
belonging to the navy. When the tide was high 
it was an easy matter to step from the boats to 
the wharf, but at certain times during the day the 
water was so low, it was difficult to climb upon 
the wharf. The sea gradually became rougher 
during the afternoon, and on the second and third 
days of the disembarkation it was so rough that 
it was unsafe to trust the boats alongside the 
wharf. The only casualty that happened during 
the disembarkation was late in the afternoon of 
the 2 2d, when two soldiers in the act of climbing 
on the wharf slipped into the water, and on ac- 
count of the weight they carried did not rise 
again. Their bodies were recovered some days 
later. A few animals were disembarked on the 
2 2d, the rest during the two days following. To 
disembark them the side hatches were opened and 
the animals pushed into the water. The vessels 
were only a few hundred yards from the shore, 
69 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

and the animals usually headed at once for it. 
Sometimes, however, they would get started out 
to sea and, in spite of every effort, were lost. 
After a few had been lost in this way, strict or- 
ders were given that three or four animals should 
be tethered together and towed ashore. This 
was a much slower method, but after this there 
were no more losses. 

General Shafter was extremely anxious to 
push on to Santiago with the utmost haste, and 
at first did not realize it would take a week to 
completely disembark the command and supplies 
for it. On the morning of the 2 2d he wrote Ad- 
miral Sampson that it was his intention to pro- 
ceed from Daiquiri to Santiago as rapidly as pos- 
sible, taking only a few wagons and pack-trains. 
He stated that his animals were in absolute need 
of some rest, and for that reason he could not go 
very far the first day. Before the animals were 
taken off the vessels it was feared they would be 
in a very poor condition when landed, but after 
the immersion in the salt water and a rest of a 
few hours on shore, they all seemed to be ready 
for their work. About four o'clock in the after- 
noon General Lawton was informed that the 
enemy's troops at Siboney had left there in the 
morning as soon as the navy began to shell the 
70 



THE DISEMBARKATION 

place, and he was directed to push down a force 
of two regiments to occupy the place where the 
railroad between Siboney and the Juragua iron 
mines crossed the road into Santiago. If he met 
with no opposition, he was to go into camp, 
entrench, and remain there. General Lawton 
with his division, in obedience to this order, 
pushed forward from Daiquiri about five miles, 
when night overtook him and he bivouacked on 
the road. At four the next morning he was on 
the march, arriving at Siboney, five miles farther 
on, at daybreak. At 9.20 on the 23d, he in- 
formed General Shafter of the capture of Si- 
boney. The Spanish troops at that place, who 
had retired when the navy began their bombard- 
ment, had returned and were there when General 
Lawton arrived. They, however, hastily aban- 
doned the place without any attempt at resist- 
ance, except a few scattering shots. An ambus- 
cade had been prepared for the advance guard, 
but was discovered, and the hasty retreat of the 
enemy only prevented its capture. General Cas- 
tillo with his troops was with General Lawton. 
The American troops took up a good defensive 
position at the point indicated in General Shafter's 
instructions of the day before, while General Cas- 
tillo with his force harassed the enemy's retreat. 
71 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

The capture of Siboney and the work done by 
our Cuban allies is so excellently described in Gen- 
eral Lawton's reports sent to head-quarters, after 
a hasty ride early in the morning, that I quote them 
in full : 

JURAGUACITO (Siboney), June 23, 1898. 

To THE Adjutant-General, Fifth Army Corps. 

Sir: — In addition, at 10.25 a.m. General Castillo 
has just returned. The Cubans are following up the 
Spanish rear-guard. Have just captured some carts. 
The retreat is rapid ; impossible to follow up with 
infantry. A squadron of cavalry would have ena- 
bled me to capture the command. A locomotive 
and several cars, mostly loaded with coal, were capt- 
ured, and a casual examination leads to the belief 
that the railroad will be available for the supply of 
our troops as we push forward from this point. 
General Castillo says he learned from inhabitants 
that General Linares was here yesterday with a bat- 
talion — General Linares, the Spanish Commander at 
Santiago, is meant. Very respectfully, 

H. W. Lawton, 
Brigadier-General Volunteers. 

P.S. — Nearly one hundred small car-loads of steam 
coal. 

Supplemental to Report of June 23, 1898. 

JURAGUACITO, June 24, 1898. 

The Adjutant-General, Fifth Army Corps. 

Sir: — I have the honor to report that in the first 
of the Cuban skirmishes, nine of the Cubans were 
wounded, this fight being that following our occupa- 

72 



THE DISEMBARKATION 

tion of this place. Later, in the afternoon, another 
engagement occurred about three miles northeast, in 
the direction of Santiago de Cuba. In this seven 
more Cubans were wounded. None of the sixteen 
have necessarily fatal wounds. I shall give you the 
names when I learn them. The Chief Surgeon has 
been looking out for the wounded. Among other 
items of property found in the town when we oc- 
cupied it, were twenty-five or thirty barrels of liquor, 
wine and whiskey. I directed that a guard be 
placed over it, and suggest that it be taken posses- 
sion of by the Medical and Subsistence Depart- 
ments. Yesterday afternoon, late. General Wheeler 
and staff arrived and established his head-quarters 
within the limits of my command. Saw him after 
dark. Late last night Colonel Wood's regiment of 
dismounted cavalry volunteers passed through my 
camp at Division Head-quarters, and later General 
Young, with some of the dismounted cavalry, and 
early this morning other of the dismounted cavalry. 
I believe that I completely and successfully exe- 
cuted your instructions of the 22d inst. in your let- 
ter, and feel that I would not be justified under the 
circumstances in passing forward farther than the 
point indicated in that letter. I shall lie here to- 
day and endeavor to ration my command, some por- 
tions of which have been practically without rations 
for two days, not having secured the three days' ra- 
tions ordered on leaving the boats. I presume that 
I shall receive instructions from yon as to my future 
movements. Very respectfully, 

H. W. Lawton, 
Brigadier- General Volunteers. 
73 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

On the morning of the 23d General Wheeler 
had been directed to take his command out on 
the road toward Siboney and throw out pickets 
to connect with General Lawton. He was also 
directed to send Colonel Wood's regiment to be 
added to the force already at Siboney. General 
Wheeler pushed forward with Colonel Wood's 
regiment, and upon arriving at Siboney, reported 
by letter to General Shafter, which gives addi- 
tional information concerning the capture of 
Siboney. 

JURAGUACITO, Cuba, June 23, 1898. 

Adjutant-General, Fifth Corps, 
S.S. Seguran^a. 
Sir: — I have the honor to report that General 
Lawton was at this place when I arrived here. He 
informs me that he has reported to you in full. The 
people here report that General Linares was here 
yesterday and left on the train at 4 A.M. to-day. 
General Castillo reports that the men of his com- 
mand that followed the Spaniards to-day are now at 
Sevilla, about six miles from here, and nine miles 
this side of Santiago. He reports that one hundred 
and twenty insurgents, under Lieutenant-Colonel 
Aquirre (of General Castillo's command), began 
fighting the Spaniards about two miles west of here, 
and continued the fight as far as Sevilla. I have 
seen the Cubans wounded in the fight. One is severe- 
ly wounded, the others slightly. Two Cubans were 
killed. It is reported that about one thousand to 
74 



THE DISEMBARKATION 

one thousand two hundred Spaniards were at this 
place; they left early this morning-. I directed 
Colonel Wood to come to this place in compliance 
with your instructions. He will bring his dynamite 
gun. General Lawton and the Cubans have accom- 
plished all that can be done at present. I think 
General Lawton has shown energy and good judg- 
ment. Very respectfully, 

Joseph Wheeler, 
Major-General United States Volunteers. 

P. S. General Castillo reports that one dead 
Spaniard was left in the hands of the Cubans. I 
understand that General Lawton reported the lo- 
comotives and coal at this place. 

Only one brigade (General Young's) of Gen- 
eral Wheeler's division had been disembarked in 
time to go forward on the 23d. General Wheel- 
er's second brigade (General Sumner's), after 
disembarking on the 24th, was given orders to re- 
main at Daiquiri for the time being as a guard. 
This brigade afterward joined General Wheeler 
on the 26th, leaving a squadron of four troops as 
a guard, which was strengthened by landing the 
two batteries of siege-artillery (Captains Ennis 
and Cummings) to act as infantry. All these 
troops were withdrawn and sent to the front by 
July loth. Colonel Wood's regiment was a part 
of General Young's brigade, and about dark on 
75 



IN CUBA WITH SH AFTER 

the 23d the rest of the brigade (the First and 
Tenth United States Cavahy) had all arrived in 
Siboney and were occupying the same ground as 
General Lawton. 

The disembarkation of the troops on the 23d 
continued throughout the day at Daiquiri, until 
about four o'clock in the afternoon, when the sea 
then became so rough it had to be discontinued. 
At Siboney, the first division. General Kent's, 
began to disembark about noon, and this was 
kept up the rest of the day and through the 
night under the search-lights of some of the 
naval vessels. The artillery horses were taken off 
on the 23d at Daiquiri, as well as a considerable 
quantity of forage and rations. Colonel Weston, 
Chief Commissary, having been directed to put 
on shore at Daiquiri and Siboney two hundred 
thousand rations in each place, this work was 
pushed vigorously ; but all that could be done was 
to keep one or two days in advance of the daily 
needs of the command. At nightfall on the 23d 
there were about twelve thousand men on shore. 

On the 24th the disembarkation at Daiquiri was 
confined mainly to draught and pack animals and 
guns and caissons of the light artillery, it having 
been decided to land the rest of the troops at 
Siboney. At Siboney the landing of the troops 
76 




BRIGADIER-GENERAL WILLIAM LUDLOW, U. S. V. 



THE DISEMBARKATION 

went on all day. One company of the Engineer 
battalion had been sent to this place to erect 
a temporary wharf upon which to land supplies, 
but most of the troops were disembarked by run- 
ning the small boats on the beach, the men walk- 
ing ashore through the surf. General Garcia's 
command of thirty-five hundred men arrived at 
Siboney on the 24th, and it was not until some 
time on the 25th that they were all on shore. A 
part of General Kent's division was also landed 
on the 25th. By the evening of this day, the 
25th, the disembarkation of the troops was prac- 
tically completed, about twenty-two thousand 
men having been put on shore. 

To facilitate the embarkation of General Gar- 
cia's command at Aserraderos, General Ludlow 
went there on the 23d and constructed a tempo- 
rary wharf with the pontoon material on the 
transport Alamo. On the 2 2d arrangements had 
been made to construct a similar structure at 
Daiquiri, but when it was found that the perma- 
nent wooden wharf at the place could be used, 
nothing was done with the pontoon material. 
The sea was so rough at this place that it would 
have been impracticable in any event to use a 
structure of this kind, except very early in the 
morning before the trades began to blow. 
77 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

The navy continued to give their assistance 
until all the troops were ashore, disembarking 
about three -fourths of the whole command. 
The small boats belonging to the transports were 
used as well as those furnished from naval ves- 
sels, but all these boats were towed ashore in 
strings by the naval steam-launches. Sometimes 
a few boats would be rowed ashore, either by sol- 
diers or sailors, but this was the exception. Dur- 
ing the disembarkation at Daiquiri and Siboney, 
but five row-boats had been wrecked — two of 
which belonged to and were manned by the 
navy, and one steam-launch. One thing in 
which the expedition was wholly deficient was 
steam-launches. These were absolutely neces- 
sary for the rapid transmission of orders among 
the fleet ; but through the courtesy of the navy 
one was always at the disposal of General Shaft- 
er, and sometimes a greater number. It would 
have been a slow and tedious operation if the sol- 
diers had been forced to row themselves ashore, 
but it must be borne in mind that the army went 
with a sufficient number of small boats to dis- 
embark itself if necessary. The most satis- 
factory instance noticed of placing troops on 
shore was when the steam -lighter Laura had 
taken a regiment, or nearly that number, ashore, 
78 



THE DISEMBARKATION 

in one trip. This was done in at least two in- 
stances. 

The expedition was much crippled by the fail- 
ure of the Bessie, a sister ship to the Laura, to 
join at Tampa, owing to a break in her machinery. 
With steam-lighters to land troops and supplies, 
the difficulties presented would have been very 
much lessened. Two of the light-draft trans- 
ports, the Manteo and Cumberland, had some of 
their upper parts torn away, and were used as 
lighters continuously. For an expedition of this 
size at least four or five steam-lighters should 
have been provided, and an equal number of 
steam-launches. 

After it was decided to land all reinforcements 
and supplies at Siboney, the small wharf erected 
there by the Engineers was replaced by a larger 
one, constructed by the Thirty-third Michigan 
Volunteers. At this point the main depot for all 
supplies was established and remained there until 
the transports finally entered Santiago Bay. The 
railroad spoken of here started at the iron mines 
of Firmeza and Juragua, a few miles north of 
Siboney, came direct to the latter place, and 
thence along the coast to Aguadores, where it 
turned north and west, terminating in Santiago. 
The wagon road leading from Siboney to Santi- 
79 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

ago, though it had been in use by the natives for 
centuries, was not passable for anything but pack- 
trains when the troops first began to use it. Leav- 
ing Siboney, it gradually ascended until about 
half way it passed over a range of hills, and from 
there on it was an alternation of slight ascents and 
descents, passing, in its whole length, through 
ravines, along the beds of water-courses, and over 
small rivers. There were no bridges, and the 
erosion of years had scooped and hollowed it out 
in such shape that in places the old bed had to 
be abandoned. In many places there were cuts 
so narrow that a mounted man could not pass 
a wagon. 

The soil is a black loam, inclined to adobe, and 
when wet makes a very sticky mud. Much time 
was devoted to work on the road by the United 
States Engineers, the Thirty-third and Thirty- 
fourth Michigan Infantry, and the Seventy-first 
New York Infantry. They corduroyed it in 
places with brush and timber, filled depressions 
and ruts, made turnouts at intervals, removed 
bowlders, built bridges, and in places built an en- 
tirely new road. In spite of this work, the road 
often, on account of the excessive rainfall, became 
practically impassable. The rainy season had set 
in just about the time of our arrival. Except for a 
80 



THE DISEMBARKATION 

few scattering showers, it did not rain for the 
week that followed. After this it rained nearly 
every day in the afternoon from about one or two 
till four or five, and only once did it rain at night. 
Then it was a most terrific tropical thunder- 
storm. It was noticed that it rained oftener, and 
always harder, along the range of mountains 
several miles farther inland, and later, when I 
had occasion to go twenty-five miles from the 
coast, it rained, and rained copiously every after- 
noon, while at the same time, along the coast, 
days would elapse without a drop falling. 



8i 



CHAPTER V 

THE ADVANCE ON SANTIAGO 

WHILE the last half of the troops and the 
supplies were being disembarked, prepa- 
rations were also going on for the advance on 
Santiago. Early in the morning of June 24th 
General Lawton was directed to take up a strong 
defensive position a short distance from Siboney 
on the road to Santiago, and hold it until the 
transportation was ready. At the same time the 
following order was also sent to the three divis- 
ion commanders and to General Bates : 

The Commanding General begs me to say, it is 
impossible to advance on Santiago until movements 
to supply troops can be arranged. Take up strong 
positions where you can get water and make your- 
self secure from surprise or attack. Lawton's divis- 
ion will be in front ; Kent's near Siboney, Wheeler's 
near Daiquiri, and Bates's command where it will 
be in support of Lawton. 

The evening before, General Wheeler, with 
General Young's brigade, had pushed so far for- 
82 



THE ADVANCE ON SANTIAGO 

ward that he was abreast or ahead of General 
Lawton. Learning that the Spanish troops 
driven out of Siboney had intrenched themselves 
about two and one-half miles out on the road 
leading to Santiago, he decided to push his bri- 
gade forward and attack them in that position. 
Accordingly, on the morning of the 24th, before 
the receipt of the second order defining his posi- 
tion, his troops moved forward. From Siboney to 
the place where the Spanish forces had intrenched 
themselves there were two roads, one a mere trail, 
joining just beyond their intrenchments, and 
General Young's brigade advanced by both these 
roads and engaged the Spanish troops. This en- 
gagement is known as the battle of Las Guasimas. 
The enemy was strongly intrenched, with a rapid- 
fire gun in position, and so stubbornly contested 
the advance that at 8.30 a.m. General Wheeler 
sent a courier to General Lawton informing him 
that he was engaged with a larger force of the 
enemy than was anticipated, and asked that his 
force be sent forward on the Sevilla road as 
quickly as possible. Prior to the receipt of this 
letter, General Lawton, learning that General 
Young's brigade had gone in the direction of San- 
tiago, sent orders to General Chaffee, the com- 
mander of the first brigade in his division, to move 
83 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

to the front, as he anticipated a fight close to Se- 
villa. Before General Lawton's troops, however, 
could reach Las Guasimas, the three regiments of 
cavalry had completely routed the enemy and they 
were in full retreat toward Santiago, The losses 
in this engagement were sixteen killed and fifty- 
two wounded. The strength of the American 
forces was nine hundred and sixty-four. In the 
Spanish official reports the strength of the Span- 
ish forces is given as about five hundred men, 
and their losses as nine killed and three officers 
and twenty-four men wounded. After the en- 
gagement General Chaffee's brigade took up a 
position about two miles nearer Santiago, while 
General Lawton's and General Wheeler's divi- 
sions remained near the scene of the action, the 
place being generally known as Sevilla. 

Some of the troops had now been off the trans- 
ports three days, and the rations carried with them 
were nearly consumed. As the transportation 
was not ready for use, details were ordered to go 
into Siboney, one to two miles, and carry out as 
many rations as possible. The pack-trains, how- 
ever, were completely fitted out on the 25th and 
began carrying food from Daiquiri and Siboney 
to the troops. 

Orders had been given on the 24th that the 
84 




BRIGADIER-GENERAL A. R. CHAFFEE, U. S. V. 



THE ADVANCE ON SANTIAGO 

transportation, as fast as unloaded, should be dis- 
trib' ted as follows : 

Twenty-five wagons and one pack-train to each 
division ; five wagons to the independent brigade ; 
fifteen wagons and one pack-train as an ammu- 
nition train ; one wagon to each troop of the 
mounted cavalry ; one wagon to each battery of 
artillery ; and the remaining wagons and one 
pack-train as a corps train. 

While it was an easy matter to prepare the 
pack-trains for work, much delay was experienced 
with the wagons, for they had been taken apart 
in loading at Tampa, and now must be set up. 
As the troops were close to Siboney, it was 
thought the pack-trains alone could carry suffi- 
cient rations, and during the 24th and 25th atten- 
tion was directed to taking off troops and sup- 
plies, rather than wagons. On the 26th it was 
found that the pack-trains were insufficient, espe- 
cially as 4,000 reinforcements were expected the 
next day, and urgent orders were given Colonel 
Humphrey to put off sixty six-mule wagons with- 
out regard to anything else. These wagons were 
put together at Daiquiri, loaded with rations and 
forage, sent to the front, and assigned in equal 
numbers to the three division commanders. 

In two days more all the wagons were off, 
85 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

but the plan of assigning them to divisions soon 
proved unsatisfactory. All the teaming, as well 
as packing, had to be done on the single road, and 
with the transportation divided into independent 
wagon and pack-trains, directed by as many dif- 
ferent heads, confusion and delay resulted. 

Two additional pack-trains had come with the 
reinforcements, and a reassignment of the trans- 
portation was soon made, two pack-trains to each 
of the three divisions and all the rest of the trans- 
portation, wagons, ambulances, and one pack- 
train, were placed under one competent head, 
Captain Edward Plummer, Tenth United States 
Infantry. This arrangement continued until the 
capitulation, and probably was the most satis- 
factory one that could be devised under the cir- 
cumstances. With the exception of the pack- 
trains assigned to divisions, all the transportation 
was kept at head-quarters, where communication 
could be had in every direction, and where sub- 
depots for forage, rations, and ammunition were 
established. Captain Plummer received his or- 
ders direct from the Commanding General, and 
the transportation was sent where it was most 
needed. Each morning as many wagons as could 
be spared were sent back to the main depot at 
Siboney, and also to Daiquiri, until that place 
86 



THE ADVANCE ON SANTIAGO 

was abandoned, for supplies to stock the sub- 
depots at head-quarters, about two miles in the rear 
of the firing line. The wagons for Siboney would 
reach there in time to be loaded and return to 
head-quarters before night, but the trip to Dai- 
quiri took two days. By this arrangement all 
empty wagons were going toward Siboney in 
the morning, and in the opposite direction, 
loaded, in the afternoon. The rest of the trans- 
portation was engaged in supplying the troops 
at the front with food, and when any could be 
squeezed out for the purpose, the poor, starving 
refugees, at El Caney. 

If this scheme for supplying the command 
had worked as smoothly as might be expected 
with macadam roads to travel over, the troops 
would have had full supplies of every kind 
and description. But the road to the rear be- 
came blocked by wagons stalled in the mud or 
breaking down, delaying the entire train into the 
night and sometimes so as to interfere with the 
next day's trip. There were barely enough wag- 
ons and pack-trains for the command under fav- 
orable circumstances. Then the streams toward 
the front would often rise after a rain, so they 
could not be forded until the next day, and loaded 
trains would have to pass the night in the road. 
87 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

The teamsters and packers as well as the troops 
contracted fevers, and this condition was some- 
times so serious as to impair the efficiency of the 
transportation very much. The sick teamsters 
were generally replaced by soldiers, who could 
handle six-mule teams fairly well, but to supply 
the places of the sick packers was not so easy. 
On several occasions some of the pack-trains were 
laid up for lack of packers. After the untrained 
men began to take the places of the experienced 
men who came with the expedition, the delays 
arose more frequently, in spite of the fact that 
the men were doing their best. 

The mules, as well as the horses, were affected 
very much like the men. Day by day these ani- 
mals sickened and became unserviceable, but 
often kept going until they dropped in their 
tracks. 

It was very soon evident that only the coarser 
components of the rations — bread, meat, coffee, 
and sugar could be supplied to the troops with 
any certainty. Whenever it was possible, the 
rest of the ration — potatoes, onions, canned to- 
matoes, and other things — were, of course, car- 
ried to them ; but often it was impossible to 
provide a full supply of the four principal com- 
ponents. There were instances where individual 
88 



THE ADVANCE ON SANTIAGO 

regiments were without rations for a day or 
more. These cases arose, not from any fault in 
the general system, but from the failure on the 
part of the immediate commanders properly to 
carry out orders given them. Two regiments, 
for example, had been ordered to march from 
Siboney to the front, each man carrying three 
days' rations. One of these regiments drew one 
day's rations, and the other little or none. It 
took nearly two days for these regiments to reach 
the front, and their condition was desperate ; but 
as soon as it was known, food was sent to them 
as quickly as possible. 

On the morning of the 25th General Shafter 
expressed to General Wheeler his pleasure over 
the result of the Las Guasimas engagement, but 
directed him not to try any forward movement 
until further orders. General Shafter informed 
him that from the place where he was now in 
camp, or approximately there, he wished to ad- 
vance upon Santiago in force, but would make 
no move until he had all the troops well in 
hand. General Bates was directed on the same 
day to place his command in Siboney and send 
out a strong detachment along the railroad from 
Siboney to Santiago to guard the property and 
prevent surprises from the enemy, and also to 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

put as large a force as possible, with all the tools 
that he could get possession of, to repair the 
road from Siboney to Sevilla. One light battery 
(Best's) was sent to report to General Wheeler, 
who was now given general charge of all the 
troops in the neighborhood of Sevilla. 

General Wheeler was the senior officer there, 
and all General Shafter's orders for the troops at 
the front were transmitted through him, until 
General Shafter went himself to the front on the 
29th. As the different organizations were pre- 
pared to move to the front, they were ordered 
to report to General Wheeler, and were by him 
placed in camp. General Shafter did not leave 
for the front until the reinforcements arriving 
on the 27th were disembarked, and until his sup- 
ply departments were thoroughly organized. 

Advantage was taken of every possible means to 
push supplies to the front. Officers often walked 
and loaded their horses with rations. The four 
troops of the Second Cavalry were fitted out at 
Daiquiri on the 25th and ordered forward, carry- 
ing three days' forage and four days' rations on 
the saddle, the troopers leading their horses. 
Every organization of troops as it marched away 
from Siboney or Daiquiri carried three days' ra- 
tions, which, combined with the weight of the 
90 



THE ADVANCE ON SANTIAGO 

equipment, caused many soldiers to cast away 
articles that were afterward badly needed. As 
far as possible it was seen that nothing was car- 
ried which was not absolutely necessary, so if 
anything was left on the way the loss was keenly 
felt later. The most stringent orders were is- 
sued, and repeated from time to time, defining 
what was to be taken, and constant supervision 
maintained to see that the order was strictly 
obeyed. General Hawkins's brigade was sent 
forward to General Wheeler on the 24th, but it 
was not until the 26th that the other two bri- 
gades of the same division (General Kent's) were 
at the front. As fast as the light batteries were 
fitted out they moved forward and reported to 
General Wheeler. General Garcia's command 
moved out from Siboney on the Santiago road a 
short distance and took up a position in the rear 
of the main body of American troops at Sevilla. 
The reinforcements arriving on June 27th, 
consisting of the Thirty-third Michigan and one 
battalion of the Thirty-fourth Michigan, re- 
mained in Siboney. On the 25th it was found 
that there was not room enough near Sevilla for 
all the troops to be comfortable in camp, and 
General Wheeler, in representing the condi- 
tions, recommended that the whole command be 
91 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

moved farther toward Santiago. This was au- 
thorized by General Shafter, though he directed 
General Wheeler to exercise great care not to 
bring on another engagement. On the 26th Gen- 
eral Lawton's command moved about three miles 
beyond Sevilla, with the cavalry division close be- 
hind, while General Kent's division occupied the 
ground around Sevilla. The light artillery and 
mounted cavalry were placed well to the front in 
the most convenient places. While at no place 
along the road was there any extent of open 
ground, by putting a brigade in one open place 
and a second brigade in another place to be found 
not very far away, and thus utilizing every bit of 
open ground, the different divisions were com- 
fortably camped. The water in the streams was 
clear and pure, ample for all purposes and a lux- 
uriant growth of grass was everywhere, which 
helped out the forage-supply very considerably. 

The position of the troops, as just described, 
was kept without much alteration until the 30th. 
There had always been an advance guard of Cu- 
bans, and the whole of General Garcia's com- 
mand was moved to the front of the American 
troops on the 29th. Colonel Derby, the Chief 
Engineer on General Shafter's staff, was on the 
25th directed to take charge of the work of re- 
92 



THE ADVANCE ON SANTIAGO 

connoissance and repair of the roads. The de- 
tails for the road work were furnished for the 
first few days from General Bates's brigade, but 
on the 27th the repairing of the road was turned 
over to the Engineer battalion, under Captain 
Burr. The work of reconnoissance was so im- 
portant that Colonel Derby's entire attention was 
devoted to it. He had six junior officers as as- 
sistants and they felt their way to the front, daily 
getting nearer and nearer, making rough maps 
and taking notes, and the information thus 
gained each day was carefully charted and com- 
piled by civilian assistants to Colonel Derby, for 
the information of the Commanding General. In 
addition to the work of reconnoissance under 
Colonel Derby, General Wheeler and General 
Lawton, with officers of their commands, were 
constantly carrying on similar work. As early 
as the 26th, General Shafter directed General 
Wheeler to " have the country to the right and 
left of the road carefully reconnoitred" and to 
especially examine the road leading to El Caney, 
as he thought it likely that he would send a divis- 
ion by that road to assault the town. 

During these days, the Chief Signal Officer, 
Major Greene, was carrying on his work of es- 
tablishing a system of telephone communication. 
9Z 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

A line was run from Daiquiri to the extreme 
front, connecting the supply depots with the 
troops. Subsequently, whenever the troops 
moved, the telephone line quickly followed and 
stations were established wherever it was neces- 
sary in order that the Commanding General 
could at all times talk directly to his division 
commanders, or to the officers in charge of sup- 
plies. 

Before July ist, a coastwise cable from Guan- 
tanamo to Santiago had been picked up, cut, and 
the end carried ashore at Siboney in order to es- 
tablish communication between the latter place 
and Playa del Este, a little place at the mouth 
of Guantanamo Bay, and terminus of the ocean 
cable. 

After this, by telephoning messages to Sibo- 
ney, General Shafter's head-quarters were always 
in direct communication with the War Depart- 
ment. Before the cable was picked up the mes- 
sages were carried by ship to Playa del Este. 

As early as the 25th, stragglers from Santiago 
began to come into the camps. They reported 
that both the soldiers and the citizens were very 
much in want of food, and that the only bread to 
be had was made out of rice-flour and starch. 
From these persons a description, which after- 
94 



THE ADVANCE ON SANTIAGO 

ward proved to be very accurate, of the defences 
of the city was obtained. They described the 
situation of the troops and fleet, and where the 
field-pieces were posted. A sum of money was 
placed at the disposal of General Wheeler for 
the purpose of sending spies into Santiago, but 
whether any were sent or succeeded in entering 
the place, I do not know. At a point near 
Sevilla, Santiago was in full sight about six miles 
away. 

The health of the command up to this time 
still remained excellent, the camps were estab- 
lished on the streams from which good water 
could be obtained, food-supplies were now ample, 
and the entire army was in the best of spirits. 
The successful encounter with the Spanish forces 
on the 24th had an excellent influence, and the 
entire command was keen for a second one. The 
wounded had been taken on board the ship Oli- 
vette, and a few temporarily placed on some of 
the other transports. After the fight at Las 
Guasimas it was found that most of the regi- 
mental surgeons had left their medicine-chests 
and supplies on board the transports. These 
medicine-chests were unloaded on the 26th by 
sending a lighter to all the transports, and the 
first three wagons set up on shore were turned 
95 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

over to the Chief Surgeon to forward these 
chests to the front. 

Preparations were made on the 26th for mov- 
ing head-quarters to the front, and the following 
letters to Admiral Sampson and General Bates, 
written that day, possess so much interest, that I 
quote them in full : 

On Board S. S. Seguran9a, 
Off Daiquiri, Cuba, June 26th. 

Admiral William T. Sampson, United States 

Navy, Commander-in-Chief United States Naval 

Forces, North Atlantic Squadron. 

Sir : The last of the men will be on shore to-night, 
but it will take until Tuesday to get them up to 
where the advance guard is at this time. In ad- 
dition to my own force of about 15,000 men, I shall 
have a little over 4,000 Cubans. I mean to advance 
on the road from Sevilla Wednesday, without fail, 
toward Santiago. 

I hear the main Spanish force is outside of the 
city, and is intrenching itself so as to prevent my 
reaching the bay south of the city. I shall, if I can, 
put a large force in Caney, and one, perhaps, still 
farther west, near the pipe-line conveying water to 
the city ; the ground in that vicinity being less 
brushy than that between the bay and the San Juan 
River; making my main attack from the northeast 
and east. If I can get the enemy in my front and 
the city at my back, I can very soon make them 
surrender, or drive them toward the Morro. You 
will hear my guns, of course, and can tell about 
96 



THE ADVANCE ON SANTIAGO 

where the action is taking place. I will be obliged 
if you can prevent any reinforcements crossing the 
railroad at Aguadores, but without destroying the 
bridge, as I may need it. 

I wish to express to you again the many obliga- 
tions the Army is under for your assistance. 

I have not, as yet, as much forage or rations 
ashore as I should like to have, but cannot delay for 
them any longer. Staff officers will continue put- 
ting off stores ; and if you will let Captain Good- 
rich continue to help, you will greatly assist in the 
campaign. I think I should have ten days' full ra- 
tions and forage on shore, so as to cover accidents 
by storm, or rough weather. To-day I have not 
more than half that amount, but now that the men 
and animals are out of the way, I think these stores 
can be discharged faster. 

Very respectfully yours, 

(Signed) William R. Shafter, 
Major-General United States Volunteers, Commanding. 

On Board S.S. SEGURANgA, 
Off Daiquiri, June 26, 1898. 

Brigadier-General Jno. C. Bates, U. S. V., 
Commanding Independent Brigade. 
Sir : The Commanding General directs me to 
say he places you in full charge at Juraguacito (Si- 
boney), and that you will furnish guards, preserve 
order, and take proper care of all supplies, and gen- 
erally superintend their issue. A commissary offi- 
cer is present in Siboney to make the issues. You 
will see that troops passing through obtain proper 
rations and forage, and that no delay occurs in sup- 
97 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

plying them. He wishes you to see that the Light 
Batteries pass on rapidly to the front and make no 
unnecessary delay at Siboney. You will picket the 
road along the beach for two miles toward the Mor- 
ro, and after the Cubans see how we establish such 
outposts, request General Garcia, if he is willing, to 
relieve you the next day. About four thousand re- 
inforcements are expected to-morrow on the Yale 
and Harvard, and they will be unloaded at Siboney. 
Place them in a suitable camp up the creek, and 
near by. See that our Cuban allies are furnished 
with the same rations as are given our own men, 
and if General Garcia calls for forage, suitably sup- 
ply his needs. Please see that General Garcia's 
officers obtain the necessary supplies without em- 
barrassment. If you can get his men to assist in 
unloading stores, do so ; and continue the work of 
unloading rations, forage, and ammunition as rapidly 
as you can. Very respectfully, 

(Signed) E. J. McClernand, 
Assistant Adjutajit-General. 

A letter written to General Wheeler the fol- 
lowing day gives reasons for delaying the ad- 
vance, and also contains so much other informa- 
tion that it is quoted from freely. 

On Board S. S. Seguran5A, 
Off Daiquiri, Cuba, June 27th. 

My Dear General Wheeler: 

I had intended to make an advance to-morrow, 
with the troops that I have, but, in view of the tele- 
98 



THE ADVANCE ON SANTIAGO 

gram received yesterday, that a large number of re- 
inforcements (about 4,000) are on the way, and the 
further fact that one of the ships has arrived this 
morning, I shall not feel justified in advancing until 
1 get them on shore. The Government seems to be 
very solicitous about us, and it is possible they have 
information of which we know nothing. 1 hope 
your scheme of sending spies into Santiago has 
worked. 1 also understand that a large number of 
poor people came out yesterday and are within the 
lines. Of course they will be received, as we can- 
not drive starving people back, at least not at the 
present time. Question them carefully and get as 
good an idea as you can of the condition of affairs 
there, and of the location of the forces that are said 
to be on the road to oppose us. I am shipping out 
stores as fast as possible ; ammunition, forage, and 
rations, and will direct it all sent to you, to avoid 
confusion. Will you have your Quartermaster take 
charge of it and pile it where we can get at it con- 
veniently ? The forage please issue to the artillery 
horses and cavalry, as well as horses of officers ; and 
issue subsistence stores to any troops that require 
it, but not more than three days at a time for any 
command. 



I hope you will look up the subject of finding if 
there is any means of moving a division off to your 
right, bringing it out at El Caney, a point ifrom 
which I do not believe we shall be expected, which 
in only about four and a half miles from the city. 
My Engineer officer tells me there is a wide road 
99 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

leading off to the left on the high ground generally 
in the direction of the San Juan River and which 
will be on Kent's left. From the fact that I hear 
Spanish troops are evidently working down toward 
the Morro, it is possible they may try, or be thinking 
of attempting, to flank us on our left flank; so send at 
least a regiment of Kent's out that road, a couple of 
miles I should say, to pretty near opposite the left 
of where Lawton is to be placed this morning, and 
establish a picket line connection with him, if prac- 
ticable. I am going to have Garcia keep men well 
to the front on our left. I am coming out to see you 
this afternoon. 

Very truly yours, 

(Signed) Wm. R. Shafter, 
Major-Gcneral U. S. V. Conintaiiding. 

On the afternoon of the 27th, accompanied by 
some of his staff officers. General Shafter in- 
spected the camps at the front, and after spending 
some time at General Wheeler's head-quarters, 
returned to Siboney the night of the same day. 
Final preparations were made on the 28th, and 
on the 29th the head-quarters of the expedition 
was established in advance of all the troops. 



CHAPTER VI 

THE BATTLES OE SAN JUAN AND EL 
CANEY 

EARLY in the morning of June 30th Gen- 
eral Shafter, with Colonel McClernand, 
Colonel Derby, Lieutenant Noble and Lieuten- 
ant Miley of his staff, rode about a mile and a 
half toward Santiago to El Pozo. From the 
hills at this place the General had an excellent 
view of the Spanish line along the crest of the 
San Juan hills, and could also see El Caney in the 
distance, as well as some of the country between. 
From El Pozo the General and his staff rode 
still farther along the road in the direction of 
Santiago until they were stopped by Cuban pick- 
ets, who said the enemy's pickets were about two 
hundred yards beyond. Some trails leading off 
to the right in the direction of El Caney were 
gone over by Lieutenant Noble and myself, both 
going as far as the enemy's pickets would permit. 
While General Shafter was looking over the 
country toward the San Juan hills. General Law- 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

ton and General Chaffee, with some members of 
their staffs, were making a reconnoissance of the 
country around El Caney. 

General Shafter returned to his head-quarters 
about noon, and Generals Lawton and Chaffee 
reported to him there very soon after. After 
hearing their report the General sent for the 
division commanders, in order to communicate 
to them his plans for the following day. The 
division commanders present were General 
Kent, General Lawton, and General Sumner, the 
latter in the place of General Wheeler, who was 
sick in his tent with fever, and whose attend- 
ing surgeon advised against informing him of 
the proposed battle the next day. However, the 
General the next morning, on hearing the noise 
of the engagement, went to the front and 
assumed command of his division about one 
o'clock. 

The plan of battle for July ist was to begin the 
attack at El Caney with one division of infantry 
and one battery of artillery at daybreak, or as 
early thereafter as possible, and as soon as the 
troops at El Caney were well engaged to move 
against the heights of San Juan with the rest of 
the command. Dispositions were ordered so as 
to detain at Aguadores and the Morro any troops 



BATTLES OF SAN JUAN AND EL CANEY 

stationed there, and also other dispositions were 
made to prevent the escape of the enemy or his 
being reinforced. 

After stating his general plan, the Command- 
ing General made the following assignment of 
the troops : 

General Lawton's Division, with Capron's Light 
Battery, was ordered to move on the afternoon of 
the 30th, taking the road to El Caney, which left 
the main road to Santiago about one hundred 
yards in advance of head-quarters camp. That 
night he was expected to bivouac as near El 
Caney as practicable and begin the assault upon 
the place at daylight. 

General Kent and General Sumner were to 
move their divisions, preceded by Grimes's light 
battery, along the main road to Santiago, going 
as far as El Pozo, where all would bivouac for 
the night. Three days' rations were ordered car- 
ried by every one. Gun pits were to be prepared 
on the heights at El Pozo, and during the night, 
or early the next morning, Grimes's battery was 
ordered to be in position there. 

General Bates, at Siboney, was directed to pro- 
ceed at once to the front and report his brigade, 
the Third and Twentieth United States Infantry, 
to the commanding general. This left General 
103 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

Duffield in command at Siboney, and he was 
directed to send one regiment, the Thirty-third 
Michigan, at four o'clock the next morning along 
the railroad against Aguadores, five miles away, 
and make a vigorous attack upon it, so as to 
retain the five hundred Spanish troops reported 
to be entrenched at the head of the bridge across 
the Aguadores River, emptying into the sea 
there. To Admiral Sampson a second letter 
was sent on the 30th, informing him of the ex- 
pected battle on the next day, and asking him 
to bombard the works at Aguadores in sup- 
port of the regiment to be sent there early in 
the morning, and also to make such demonstra- 
tion as he might think proper at the mouth of 
the harbor. Major Rafferty, commanding the 
mounted squadron of cavalry, was directed to 
remain in camp near head-quarters until the 
morning of the first, and when the road was clear 
to move forward to El Pozo and halt, under 
cover, for further orders. He was cautioned to 
be particular not to block the road against in- 
fantry or pack-trains. Major Dillenback, in 
command of the light artillery battalion, was 
directed to hold his two remaining batteries in 
readiness to move at a moment's notice on the 
morning of July ist. 

104 



BATTLES OF SAN JUAN AND EL CANEY 

General Garcia, with his command, which since 
the night before had been in the advance, was 
directed to move on the morning of July ist 
along the Caney road, pass to the rear of General 
Lawton, that is, between him and the San Juan 
Heights, and so dispose his troops on the north of 
Santiago as effectually to prevent escape of the 
garrison or entrance of reinforcements from any 
of the garrisons along the railroad to the north. 
A small body of his troops was detached to go 
with General Lawton, and a similar number to 
go with the troops against San Juan Heights. 
The Cuban troops, with General Lawton, did 
good service, but those at San Juan did nothing. 
One of the first shells thrown by the enemy ex- 
ploded among them at El Pozo, killing and 
wounding some, and completely demoralizing the 
rest. 

In General Lawton's report to General Shafter 
the day before, he had stated that, in his opinion. 
El Caney would fall in about two or three hours, 
but the resistance was so stubborn that it took 
nearly all day to reduce the place. This capt- 
ure being accomplished, General Lawton's in- 
structions were to move his command from El 
Caney along the main road leading from that 
place to Santiago, and place himself on the right 
105 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

of General Wheeler's Division in the attack on 
San Juan Heights, where it was supposed the 
enemy would make his main stand. The instruc- 
tions to Generals Kent and Sumner were to 
move forward from El Pozo, making the San 
Juan Heights their objective, very soon after 
they knew that General Lawton had well en- 
gaged the enemy at El Caney. Going from El 
Pozo toward the San Juan Heights, the Agua- 
dores River is crossed at about a thousand yards, 
and about five hundred yards still farther on the 
San Juan River is crossed, which is about one 
thousand yards from the crest of the heights. 
When the column marching against San Juan 
Heights crossed the Aguadores River, the Cav- 
alry Division, according to the orders given the 
afternoon before, was to turn to the right and 
deploy for a forward movement. General Kent's 
Division, according to the same orders, was to 
turn to the left after crossing this river, and de- 
ploy in the same manner. At about four o'clock 
in the afternoon of the 30th, the troops were set 
in motion and by dark were in their proper posi- 
tions for the night. 

At sunrise the next morning, General Shafter 
dispatched me to El Pozo to observe the disposi- 
tions that had been made, and to return to him 
106 



BATTLES OF SAN JUAN AND EL CANEY 

with a report. About seven, while I was still 
with Grimes's battery at El Pozo, firing by General 
Lawton was begun, and I returned very shortly 
to head-quarters. While talking to the General, 
Grimes's battery opened fire on the blockhouse 
on Fort San Juan Hill, the order for Grimes to 
open fire having been given by Colonel McCler- 
nand, whom General Shafter had dispatched to 
El Pozo to give the order when he considered 
the proper time had arrived. 

This was about eight o'clock, and I again left 
head-quarters, by direction of General Shafter, to 
personally supervise the carrying out of his orders 
for the attack on San Juan Heights. Grimes's 
battery soon drew the fire of all the Spanish guns 
that could be trained upon him, and as he had no 
smokeless powder he made an excellent target. 
The artillery duel lasted from a half to three-quar- 
ters of an hour, and as at 8.45 a.m. the artillery firing 
had ceased, General Wheeler's and General Kent's 
Divisions were formed in the road and moved 
forward. Colonel McClernand remained at El 
Pozo to represent General Shafter, with whom he 
was in communication, both by orderlies and by 
telephone, while I went forward with the troops 
to represent him at the front, and kept in com- 
munication with him and Colonel McClernand by 
107 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

mounted orderlies I took with me. As soon as 
the arrangements for communication had been 
made I left El Pozo and went forward about a 
quarter of a mile. 

The road was filled with troops, with the head 
of the column almost to the Aguadores River, but 
just at this time the troops were standing still. 
Roosevelt's regiment was the first regiment I 
passed. Colonel Wood, its Colonel, was in com- 
mand of Sumner's Brigade, while the latter was 
commanding the division. The head of the 
brigade was soon reached, and here General Sum- 
ner and Colonel Wood, and in a few minutes 
General Kent and General Hawkins, came up. 
General Sumner had ordered his leading brigade 
to cross the river, and had temporarily halted 
Colonel Wood's Brigade. The enemy's earth- 
works could be seen about one thousand yards 
away, it looked then, but actually about two 
thousand yards distant. Fears were entertained 
that rapid-fire guns would be directed down this 
road, and the Commanding General gave orders 
to Grimes's Battery to protect the advance by 
shelling the Heights. This battery resumed firing 
in a little while, and kept it up until the troops 
were ready for the final charge. This was about 
ten o'clock, and then there was no firing of any 

io8 



BATTLES OF SAN JUAN AND EL CANEY 

kind on the part of the enemy. Just at this time 
Captain Howze, on General Sumner's staff, came 
up and reported that Colonel Carroll's Brigade 
had crossed the river without drawing the enemy's 
fire, and General Sumner at once put his second 
brigade in motion. General Kent had the head 
of his division about El Pozo waiting for the 
troops in front of him to move. The Cavalry 
Division was soon across the Aguadores and in 
position to advance, where it remained under cover 
until General Kent's Division had been deployed. 
The war balloon, which had been prepared for 
service the previous afternoon, followed in rear of 
the Cavalry Division. 

In it were Colonel Derby and Lieutenant 
Maxfield, and the balloon was towed by four 
men holding on to the guy-ropes. Winding 
their way among the troops the balloon was soon 
within a few hundred yards of the Aguadores 
River. The enemy's musketry fire was already 
becoming quite spirited, but when the balloon 
reached this point it was opened upon by a 
heavy fire from field-guns, and the musketry fire 
also increased. The third shell or shrapnel fired 
at the balloon struck it, and the next one tore 
it so badly that it at once descended. Time 
enough, however, was afforded Colonel Derby to 
109 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

discover a road leading from the main road to 
the left and crossing the Aguadores River four 
or five hundred yards farther down the stream. 
This was a most opportune discovery, as the 
main road was congested with troops, and the 
fire so heavy as to tend to demoralize the men. 
Colonel Derby reported the existence of this 
road to General Kent, who at once turned his 
division into it. About this time General Kent, 
with General Hawkins, who commanded his 
First Brigade, came forward and joined me at 
the crossing of the Aguadores River. General 
Kent said that he and General Hawkins consid- 
ered that the key to the position was a height 
directly in front of us, crowned by a block-house. 
This is known now as Fort San Juan Hill. The 
two Generals advanced far enough to gain an un- 
interrupted view of this place, and both decided 
that the principal attack should be directed 
against it, and General Hawkins with his brigade 
was assigned to the attack. He at once went 
back to the division, detached his brigade and 
brought it up the main road. In the meantime, 
the dynamite gun and the battery of Hotchkiss 
guns had come forward, and the latter were given 
to General Hawkins in order to clear his advance. 
The rest of General Kent's Division had taken 




BRIGADIER-GENERAL J. FORD KENT, U. S. V. 



BATTLES OF SAN JUAN AND EL CANEY 

the side road to the left, and the greater part of 
it was now across the Aguadores River. The 
advance forward then became general through- 
out the whole length of the line. Immediately in 
front of the Cavalry Division, and just across the 
San Juan River, was an elevation known as Kettle 
Hill, and the cavalry lost no time in taking this, 
the enemy retreating on to the San Juan Heights. 
In the meantime, General Lawton had found 
much more opposition than he had anticipated. 

General Shafter during the greater part of the 
day was on an elevation to the front of his head- 
quarters, and so situated that he could observe 
the movements at El Caney as well as those at 
San Juan. He accordingly despatched General 
Bates's brigade, which had come up from Siboney 
the evening before, to reinforce General Lawton. 
General Shafter was in communication with Gen- 
eral Lawton through his two staff officers. Lieu- 
tenant (now Major) Noble and Captain Gilmore. 

About two in the afternoon, General Shafter, 
fearing for the safety of the troops engaged at 
San Juan, despatched the following order to 
General Lawton : ' 

July 1st. 
Lawton: I would not bother with Httle block- 
houses. They can't harm us. Bates's Brigade and 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

your Division and Garcia should move on the city 
and form the right of line, going on Sevilla road. 
Line is now hotly engaged. 

(Signed) Shafter. 

When this order was received by General Law- 
ton, his command was engaged in the final assault 
upon the place, and it was impossible to withdraw 
until El Caney fell. At 4.45 in the afternoon he 
informed General Shafter that the enemy had 
been driven from the town about half an hour 
earlier, but it was impossible to tell to what ex- 
tent his troops had suffered. He reported that 
everybody was at work burying the dead, caring 
for the wounded, and gathering up the property 
preparatory to leaving. He further informed 
General Shafter that he had made an effort to 
communicate with his brigade commanders dur- 
ing the fight in order to withdraw them, but it 
was impossible to do so. The only alternative 
was to take the place, and this was done very 
soon after the order had been received. His 
head-quarters, he said, would be near the Ducrot 
House, but his men were completely worn out, 
and he doubted if he could get them beyond 
there that night. Upon the receipt of General 
Lawton's message, General Shafter sent him the 
following : 



BATTLES OF SAN JUAN AND EL CANEY 

July I St. 

Dear General: Very glad to hear of your suc- 
cess. Gather in your wounded and leave a sufficient 
force to take care of them — I should say a regiment 
and troop of cavalry, which I shall send over in a 
few moments. Rest and feed your men, but some 
time during the night or before daylight, you should 
be down at Santiago on the extreme right, joining 
Sumner, who is in front of the big barracks on this 
side of town. Keep the four men I send you, and 
Captain Brett, with his troop, will soon join you to 
remain with the force you leave at Caney, from 
which point messages can be sent in to me if any- 
thing should turn up. 

If you have any more ammunition than you need 
to-night and to-morrow, send it back here immedi- 
ately. Get your battery in a good position within 
easy range, and we will knock the town to pieces. 
Very sincerely, 

Wm. R. Shafter. 

I have just found that Troop D is with you, so 
keep that and I will not send the additional troops. 
Send back the messengers. 

W. R. S. 

To Brigadier-General H. W. Lawton. 

Returning to the battle at San Juan, the 
American lines at noon were entirely deployed 
and rapidly advancing. The Gatling Battery 
commanded by Lieutenant Parker had worked 
its way along the road crowded by soldiers. 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

crossed the Aguadores River and moved from 
position to position supporting the advance of 
the line. 

This battery did most excellent service and 
was one of the most important factors in the 
capture of the Spanish works. An emergency, 
or dressing station was established at the cross- 
ing of the Aguadores River, where, sheltered by 
the river-bank, a space was cleared, and as the 
wounded were brought to the rear they were 
placed here for temporary treatment. The block- 
house on San Juan Hill was taken by the Infantry 
Division about half-past one o'clock, and about 
the same time a block-house on the crest, several 
hundred yards to the right, was taken by the 
Cavalry Division. These two divisions now 
occupied the crest of the hill between these two 
points and for a considerable distance to the right 
and left. At about two o'clock, a light battery 
(Best's) went to the front, to take a position 
on the firing line. About this time the am- 
munition in charge of Lieutenant Brooke began 
to arrive, both by pack-train and wagon-train. 
Fears were entertained that the ammunition car- 
ried by the soldiers upon their persons would be 
exhausted before a new supply could reach them. 
This was not the case, and the hundred rounds 
114 



BATTLES OF SAN JUAN AND EL CANEY 

carried by the soldier wlien he entered the fight 
in the morning lasted him throughout the day. 

After the ammunition supply had been replen- 
ished attention was turned toward sending food 
to the troops. The regiments, just before reach- 
ing the San Juan River, threw aside their blanket, 
rolls and the three days' rations which had been 
issued to them the previous evening, and their 
advance found them at night almost a mile from 
their supplies, but late in the evening pack-trains 
of rations were distributed to the troops at San 
Juan. The intrenching tools, of which each com- 
pany carried three, had also been thrown aside, 
and as soon as possible after the Heights had 
been taken these were gathered up by wagons 
sent along the roads for the purpose and carried 
to the front, that they might be used that night. 

The empty wagons returning from the firing- 
line all stopped at the emergency hospital, and 
were filled with wounded men, who were carried 
back to the field hospital established near head-quar- 
ters. The firing ceased at sundown, leaving the 
American troops in full possession of the line of 
hills along the San Juan River about one mile and 
a half from the city of Santiago. During the night 
the Cavalry Division and General Kent's Division 
securely intrenched themselves. General Bates, 
"5 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

ordered detached from General Lawton's com- 
mand, was sent to the left of the line adjoining 
General Kent, where he arrived some time early 
in the morning of the 2d. General Lawton, after 
being ordered to place himself on General Wheel- 
er's right, marched along the El Caney road, but 
darkness overtook him before reaching his posi- 
tion. Major Webb, Inspector-General on his staff, 
had been sent ahead to find the right of General 
Wheeler's line, but he was fired upon by Spanish 
pickets. General Lawton, hesitating to advance 
into an unknown country, reported the situation 
to General Shafter, who ordered him to retrace 
the road he passed over the previous night, go 
forward on the road by El Pozo, and passing in 
the rear of General Wheeler's Division, place him- 
self on Wheeler's right. This movement was 
completed by about noon of the 2d. 

During the night the four light batteries were 
sent to the front, and directed to take positions 
along the San Juan Heights. General Shafter's 
orders to these batteries were to place themselves 
so that they could open upon the town early in 
the morning, and destroy the buildings in front 
of them. 

Instructions were sent to General Duffield that 
if the enemy were in force at Aguadores, where 
116 



BATTLES OF SAN JUAN AND EL CANEY 

he had attacked them, he should keep the 
Thirty-third Michigan there, and continue his 
demonstration upon the enemy the next day. 
It was enjoined upon him that this was very 
important, in order to keep our left from being 
turned, and to protect the depot at Siboney. He 
was directed to send the Thirty-fourth Michigan 
and the Ninth Massachusetts, which had arrived 
on the ist, to report to General Shafter at his 
head-quarters. These regiments arrived about 
nine o'clock in the evening, and were guided to 
the front by Major Noble and Captain Gilmore. 

The intrenchments of San Juan were defended 
by two companies of Spanish infantry, numbering 
about two hundred and fifty to three hundred 
men. At about eleven o'clock in the morning 
reinforcements were sent to them, bringing the 
number up to about seven hundred and fifty men. 
There were two pieces of mountain artillery on 
these hills, the rest of the artillery fire against 
our troops on that day being from batteries close 
to the city. 

On the same day there were in position, close 
to the city, on a line running from the El Cobre 
Road to the Punta Blanco battery, a distance of 
about five miles, one thousand sailors and ma- 
rines from the fleet and about twenty-five hun- 
117 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

dred soldiers. At El Caney the Spanish forces 
consisted of three companies of the Battalion of 
the Constitution, 430 men ; infantry of Cuba, 40 
men; and volunteers, 30 men; total 550 men, 
under command of General Vara del Rey, who 
was killed. 

I have not attempted to describe these battles 
in detail, but only to give a general idea of the 
movements of the day. Much has been written 
about them, but no description can convey to the 
reader a just appreciation of the gallantry and 
heroism displayed by officers and men alike. 



118 



CHAPTER VII 

THE BATTLES OF SAN JUAN AND EL 
CANEY {CONTINUED) 

T^HE morning of July 2d found the American 
*■ Army in a very exhausted condition. The 
men had had but little food during the previous 
twenty-four hours. After the tremendous exer- 
tions of the day before under a tropical sun they had 
had little rest or sleep during the night, as nearly 
the whole of it was spent in digging trenches and 
preparing for the next day's fight; their clothing 
was wet from wading the Aguadores and San 
Juan Rivers, and toward the morning they were 
thoroughly chilled, as their blankets still lay back 
along the road where they had thrown them the 
morning of the ist 

Promptly at daybreak the enemy opened a fire 
upon the American lines from a line of trenches 
just outside of Santiago. Our troops were now 
safely placed behind earthworks, and did not re- 
turn the fire very vigorously. A watchful care 
was exercised, however, upon the enemy's lines 
119 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

to prevent surprises. General Shafter, who had 
been ill for the past two days, having been almost 
prostrated by his exertions on the first day of the 
battle, remained in camp on July 2d, until late in 
the afternoon. Quite a number of prisoners capt- 
ured at El Caney, and a few captured at San Juan, 
were brought to head-quarters during the morn- 
ing. These prisoners were searched and fed, and 
then sent to Siboney, where they were held until 
the final surrender. 

So thoroughly had the idea possessed the 
Spanish soldiers that the Americans would kill 
their prisoners, that these men expected to be 
shot this morning. A small detachment which 
was being guarded by two or three men, saw a 
party coming to relieve the guard, and, think- 
ing it was a firing-party, they dropped down 
on their knees and awaited their death. While 
we had heard that this feeling had been spread 
among the men by the Spanish officers, it was not 
realized that it had taken such firm root until this 
incident occurred, and it is thought by many that 
this explains the desperate fighting of the Span- 
iards at El Caney. The interpreter at head-quar- 
ters, Mr. Ord, spent some time in assuring the 
prisoners that their lives would be spared, and 
that they were to be well taken care of, and a 



BATTLES OF SAN JUAN AND EL CANEY 

few days later, when some of the prisoners were 
exchanged for the captured American sailors, 
they went back to Santiago very reluctantly. 

Throughout the day the Signal Corps was at 1 
work completing lines of telephonic communi- 
cation between head-quarters and the various i 
division camps. The work of bringing forage 
and rations from Siboney and Daiquiri to the 
depot established at General Shafter's head- 
quarters was pushed forward with the utmost 
energy, and this was a most important factor in 
the situation. These supplies were carried to the 
depot in wagons, and as the empty wagons re- 
turned they picked up the sick and wounded at 
the hospitals, and carried them to the general 
hospital at Siboney. From the depot to the dif- 
ferent divisions the supplies were carried by pack- 
trains, and often, where it was practicable, in 
wagons. Ammunition was distributed behind 
the firing-line on the 2d, and a large reserve was 
accumulated at head-quarters. Ammunition was 
now carried at the expense of rations. 

General Bates, with his brigade, reported to 
General Kent about 1.30 a.m. on the morninj of 
the 2d, and was assigned a position on General 
Kent's left. At 11.00 a.m. the Ninth Massachu- 
setts reported to General Kent, and was placed in 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

position to support General Bates's brigade. At 
i.oo P.M. the Thirteenth Infantry, which had been 
withdrawn from General Kent's Division on the 
I St, and sent to support General Wheeler's Divi- 
sion, was returned and given a place in his lines 
by General Kent. The Thirty-fourth Michigan 
was held in reserve in the rear of General 
Wheeler's head-quarters. At twelve o'clock noon 
General Lawton had completely formed his divi- 
sion on General Wheeler's right, with his right 
brigade thrown forward so as to partially encircle 
the town. A force of about six hundred Cubans, 
under Colonel Gonzales, was placed by General 
Lawton on his extreme right. General Garcia, 
early in the morning, informed General Shafter 
that he was covering General Lawton's right 
flank, and would so place his forces as to pre- 
vent reinforcements entering Santiago. In reply, 
the position of General Lawton was explained to 
General Garcia, and he was told that General 
Pando, with 5,000 men, who was reported on the 
march from Manzanillo to Santiago, must be 
intercepted, and to do this it was necessary for 
General Garcia to close the gap between General 
Lawton's right and the Santiago Bay. Thirty 
hours later 2,800 Spanish troops, under General 
Escario, entered the city by the Cobre road. 




Photo by Strauss, St. Louis. 

BRIGADIER-GENERAL JOHN C BATES, U. S. V. 



BATTLES OF SAN JUAN AND EL CANEY 

The light batteries which had been placed on the 
San Juan Heights during the night of the ist, 
found their position untenable during the morning 
of the 2d, and Major Dillenback received orders 
to place his four batteries on the El Pozo Heights. 
At 3 P.M. these batteries were reported in posi- 
tion, but not a shot was fired from them, as they 
were entirely too far away from the enemy. The 
First United States Infantry was ordered as a 
support for the battalion of light artillery. 

The exhaustion incident to the second day's 
fight began to tell very severely upon both of- 
ficers and men by the afternoon of the 2d, and 
several officers went to Generals Wheeler and 
Kent and urged them to advise a withdrawal from 
the heights of San Juan. Several reports were 
made to head-quarters that siege and field guns 
had been placed by the enemy so as to enfilade 
our lines or take them in reverse, and it was ^jared 
that our batteries could not, from El Pozo, dis- 
lodge those guns, and some officers even came 
back to head-quarters and importuned General 
Shafter to withdraw. The long-range bullets of 
the Mausers were constantly dropping all day 
along the road for at least a mile in the rear of 
the American lines, often striking down men who 
were going to or coming from the front. This 
123 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

led to the belief that the jungle on both sides of 
the road was infested by sharpshooters, and this 
belief was very demoralizing. Companies of in- 
fantry and a mounted troop of cavalry were de- 
tailed to hunt down the sharpshooters, but they 
never found one. Still the fear of them existed, 
until the firing of the enemy ceased on the morn- 
ing of the 3d. 

A heavy fall of rain on the afternoon of the 2d 
had made the single road from Siboney to the front 
almost impassable, and it was greatly feared that 
one or two days' more rain would make it utterly 
impossible to bring supplies to the front. At 
six o'clock that evening. General Shafter direct- 
ed me to summon the different commanders to a 
meeting at El Pozo at seven o'clock. Generals 
Wheeler, Kent, Lawton, and Bates were present, 
and General Shafter invited them, beginning with 
the junior, to express their views on the situation. 
The discussion then became general and lasted 
about two hours. The methods to be adopted in 
the event a withdrawal was decided upon, were 
carefully gone over, and finally General Shafter 
said that for the next twenty-four hours the troops 
would remain in their present position, and that 
at the end of that time he would again summon 
the generals for a second conference. Just as 
124 



BATTLES OF SAN JUAN AND EL CANEY 

General Shafter reached his head-quarters, at lo 
P.M., the Spaniards opened upon our lines with a 
terrific musketry fire, which lasted about an hour. 
It was thought at the time that the Spaniards 
were attempting to break through our lines, but 
this afterward proved to be without foundation. 
During the night General Shafter decided to send 
a flag of truce into Santiago early the next morn- 
ing demanding the surrender of the town. 

On the morning of the 3d the firing from both 
sides was desultory, and was kept up until about 
ten o'clock. The Secretary of War had been 
constantly informed of all our movements, and 
early on the morning of the 3d General Shafter 
cabled him that he was seriously considering 
withdrawing his forces to high ground about five 
miles in the rear. Santiago had been found to 
be so well defended that General Shafter feared 
he could only take it with great loss of life, and 
he informed the Secretary that he must have re- 
inforcements, but that while waiting for them he 
was afraid he could not supply the army in its 
present advanced position. The Secretary cabled 
in reply that he desired him to hold the San 
Juan Heights if possible, but left the matter en- 
tirely to his judgment. Directly after cabling 
the Secretary, General Shafter directed a letter 
125 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

to the commanding general of the Spanish forces, 
demanding his surrender, and informed him that 
if this demand was not comphed with by lo a.m., 
the morning of the 4th, the town would be 
shelled, and he was asked to notify the citizens 
of foreign countries, and women and children, to 
leave the city before that hour. To prepare for 
the proposed bombardment. Colonel Derby and 
I reconnoitred the country to the front and left 
of El Pozo, and selected some high ground, on 
which two of the light batteries were placed that 
evening and the morning of the 4th. This 
brought the two batteries at least one thousand 
yards nearer the enemy, and in a position eleva- 
ted considerably above him. A third light bat- 
tery was ordered to report to General Lawton to 
be placed in position by him on high ground to 
the right of his division. 

On the morning of the 2d General Shafter had 
asked Admiral Sampson to force the entrance of 
the harbor, in order to avoid further sacrifice of 
life on the part of the army, but the Admiral 
explained that he was deterred from entering on 
account of the mines in the channel, and one or 
more of his ships, he thought, would be sunk in 
the attempt, which result would render the 
positions of both the army and navy only more 
126 



BATTLES OF SAN JUAN AND EL CANEY 

difficult. He had hoped, he said, that General 
Shafter would make an attack on the rear of the 
shore batteries, and reduce them, which would 
permit him to raise the mines and enter. He 
also informed General Shafter that he had 
a counter-mining outfit at Guantanamo, which 
would be brought up, and an attempt to destroy 
the mines in this manner would be made, if the 
General desired it, but, as the work was unfamiliar 
to the navy, it would probably require consider- 
able time. 

By appointment. Admiral Sampson was com- 
ing on the morning of the 3d to General Shaft- 
er's head-quarters, to discuss the situation, and 
he was on his way to Siboney, where saddle 
horses were awaiting him and his staff, when Cer- 
vera's fleet steamed out of the harbor. It was not 
until one o'clock the same afternoon, however, 
that this news reached head-quarters. The firing 
could be heard, but it was thought the navy was 
simply shelling the batteries at the mouth of the 
harbor. Captain Allen, with a troop of mounted 
cavalry, was on the extreme right of General 
Lawton's Division, with some Cuban troops near 
him, and these saw the fleet going out. A courier 
from Captain Allen brought the news to General 
Shafter, but we did not learn the fate of the fleet 
127 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

until late in the afternoon. The transport cap- 
tains at Siboney, at the first indications of the 
naval battle, followed in the wake of our vessels, 
and it was not until they returned that the news 
of the destruction of all the Spanish ships, ex- 
cept the Colon, was telephoned to head-quarters. 
That the Colon had also been destroyed was not 
known until some time the following day. 



128 



CHAPTER VIII 

THE SIEGE OF SANTIAGO 

'\^7'HEN the flag of truce left the American 
' ' lines at lo a.m. on July 3d, the firing on 
both sides ceased, and, with the exception of 
about two hours the evening of the loth and a 
few hours the morning of the i ith, was not again 
resumed. On the 3d, General Shafter felt that 
the situation warranted him in thinking that the 
forces in Santiago would surrender, if given time, 
and he decided that the problem before him now 
was to thoroughly invest the city by land, and, in 
connection with the navy, cut off all hope of re- 
inforcements or supplies of any kind. On the 
firing-line everything was done to make the men 
as comfortable as possible, and on the afternoon 
of the 3d all the clothing and rations which they 
had thrown by the wayside the morning of the 
I St, were gathered up and brought to them. The 
roads leading to the river were now free from 
dropping bullets, and water was plentiful once 
more. The men were taken out of the trenches 
129 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

in reliefs, and this refreshed and inspirited the 
whole command. Very little sickness had de- 
veloped so far, but the past three days had sown 
the seeds of disease which a few weeks later pros- 
trated almost the whole of our forces. 

The reply to the letter carried to the Spanish 
lines demanding the surrender, was received at 
6.30 P.M. that day. General Toral, now in com- 
mand in place of General Linares, who was 
wounded on the ist, announced that he declined 
to surrender, and that he had informed the for- 
eign consuls and inhabitants that they must leave 
Santiago before 10 a.m. on the 4th. The Brit- 
ish, Portu2:uese, Chinese, and Norwes^ian consuls 
came to the American lines with Colonel Dorst, 
who had gone in with the flag of truce, to ask if 
the non-combatants could occupy the town of El 
Caney, and begged that the bombardment be de- 
layed until ten o'clock the morning of the 5th. 
They stated that there were from 15,000 to 20,- 
000 people who would leave the city, and asked 
that they be supplied with food. Acting upon 
the representations of the consular officials, Gen- 
eral Shafter informed General Toral that he 
would delay the bombardment of Santiago until 
noon of the 5th, provided that in the interval 
there was no demonstration made upon the 
130 



THE SIEGE OF SANTIAGO 

American lines. At tlie same time, General 
Toral was asked to send the representatives of 
the foreign governments to the American lines 
the next morning (July 4th) at 9 a.m., for 
further conference as to the disposition of for- 
eign subjects and caring for them after leaving 
the city of Santiago. The problem of feeding 
20,000 people in addition to the troops, seemed 
well-nigh insoluble, and great suffering among 
them was inevitable. El Caney, where the bulk 
of the refugees wished to go, was about fifteen 
miles from the base of supplies, and so far it had 
been difficult to feed our own troops with the 
limited transportation at hand. For these rea- 
sons General Shafter felt doubtful of the justifi- 
cation of the extreme measures he had threat- 
ened, and submitted the matter for the action of 
the President, and his decision to bombard San- 
tiago on the 5th was approved. 

At nine o'clock the morning of the 4th, I was 
sent by General Shafter to interview the repre- 
sentatives of the foreign governments who had 
been asked to come between the Hues at that hour 
for further consultation. There were present at 
this interview : Mr. Mason, British Vice-Consul ; 
Mr. Augustin, Swedish and Norwegian Consul ; 
Mr. Ros, Portuguese Consul ; Mr. Navarro, 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

Secretary to the Civil Governor of the Province 
of Santiago, and First Lieutenant John D. Miley, 
of the Second Artillery, U. S. A. It was ex- 
plained to the consuls that El Caney had been 
badly shelled on the ist of July, and that many 
wounded were still in the houses at that place, 
and also that some of the dead were still unburied, 
but that any persons leaving Santiago could go 
there if they wished. To a limited number 
(3,000 or 4,000) General Shafter could furnish 
the rougher components of the ration — bread, 
bacon, sugar and coffee — but it was impossible at 
present to render assistance to a greater number. 
These gentlemen were told that the question of 
bombardment of the city had been submitted to 
the home government, and that a reply was ex- 
pected that day ; that in the event of a bombard- 
ment not being ordered, a close investment of the 
place would be made and the garrison starved 
out ; in the latter case, the people who could get 
something to eat had better remain in the city 
and come out gradually as the provisions failed, 
as by that time General Shafter would undoubt- 
edly be in a position to assist them, a thing which 
he could not do if they were all forced out at 
once. General Shafter had therefore advised a 
short wait, and a meeting for the next morning 
132 



THE SIEGE OF SANTIAGO 

was arranged, the consuls being assured that they 
would be given ample time to leave the city after 
it was decided that they would be obliged to do 
so. The Secretary to the Civil Governor insisted 
upon the importance of the broad use of the term 
" non-combatant " when indicating persons who 
could leave Santiago. He stated that there were 
many inhabitants of Spanish birth and sympath- 
ies, now engaged in civil pursuits, who would 
be glad to leave the city if given permission 
by Generals Shafter and Toral. 

Before I could meet the consuls again the 
morning of the 5th, as agreed, the entire popu- 
lation of Santiago had poured out of the city. 
The night of the 4th, near midnight, there was a 
terrific bombardment near the mouth of the har- 
bor, and the population of Santiago thought it 
was the American fleet forcing an entrance. The 
consuls at the meeting in the morning had told 
me that the fleet was hourly expected to come 
into the harbor, and that the inhabitants were 
prepared to flee at the first indication of its ap- 
proach. This they did the night of the 4th, and 
the morning of the 5th the road leading to El 
Caney was filled with women and children and 
old men. I went out between the lines to meet 
the consuls, as agreed, but not one of them came. 
^33 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

The firing arose over the attempt of the Span- 
iards to sink the Reina Mercedes in the mouth 
of the harbor, which drew a heavy fire from the 
American fleet. 

On the 4th Major Coolidge, commanding the 
Infantry Battalion at El Caney, was directed to 
provide burial for General Vara del Rey and 
others killed in the battle on the ist. 

At different times on the 4th, General Shafter 
sent the following three letters to General Toral. 
These letters I give in full, as well as the others 
that followed in the remarkable series of nego- 
tiations carried on by General Shafter to induce 
General Toral to capitulate. 



Head-quarters Fifth Army Corps. 
Camp near San Juan River, Cuba. 

July 4, 1898. 

To THE Commanding Officer, 

Spanish Forces, Santiago. 
Sir : It will give me great pleasure to return to 
the city of Santiago, at an early hour to-morrow 
morning, all of the wounded Spanish officers now at 
El Caney who are able to be carried and who will 
give their parole not to serve against the United 
States forces until regularly exchanged. I make 
this proposition as I am not so situated as to give 
these officers the care and attention that they can 
receive at the hands of their military associates and 
134 



THE SIEGE OF SANTIAGO 

from their own surgeons ; though I shall, of course, 
give them every kind treatment that it is possible 
to do under such adverse circumstances. Trusting 
that this will meet with your approbation, and that 
you will permit me to return to you these persons, 
I am, 

Your very obedient servant, 

(Signed) William R. Shafter, 
Major-General, Commanding United States Forces. 



Head-quarters Fifth Army Corps. 

Camp near San Juan River, Cuba. 

July 4, 1898. 

The Commanding General, Spanish Forces, 
Santiago de Cuba, Cuba. 
Sir : The fortune of war has thrown into my 
hands quite a number of officers and private sol- 
diers, whom I am now holding as prisoners of war, 
and I have the honor to propose to you that a cartel 
of exchange be arranged to-day, by which the pris- 
oners taken by the forces of Spain from on board 
the Merrimac, and any officers and men of the army 
who may have fallen into our hands within the past 
few days, may be returned to their respective gov- 
ernments on the terms usual in such cases, of rank 
for rank. Trusting that this will meet with your 
favorable consideration, I remain. 
Very respectfully. 

Your obedient servant, 
(Signed) William R. Shafter, 
Major-General, Commanding United States Forces, 
135 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

Head-quarters, Fifth Army Corps, 
Camp near San Juan River, Cuba, July 4, 1898. 

The Commanding General, Spanish Forces, 
Santiago de Cuba, Cuba. 

Sir: I was officially informed last night that 
Admiral Cervera is now a captive on board the U. 
S. S. Gloucester, and is unharmed. He was then in 
the harbor of Siboney. I regret also to have to an- 
nounce to you the death of General Vara del Rey at 
El Caney, who, with two of his sons, was killed in 
the battle of July ist. His body will be buried this 
morning with military honors. His brother, Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel Vara del Rey, is wounded and a 
prisoner in my hands, together with the following 
officers : Captain Don Antonio Vara del Rey, Cap- 
tain Isidor Arias, Captain Antonio Mansas, and 
Captain Manuel Romero, who, though severely 
wounded, will all probably survive. 

I also have to announce to you that the Spanish 
fleet, with the exception of one vessel, was destroyed, 
and this one is being so vigorously pursued that it 
will be impossible for it to escape. General Pando 
is opposed by forces sufficient to hold him in check. 

In view of the above, I would suggest that, to save 
needless effusion of blood and the distress of many 
people, you may reconsider your determination of 
yesterday. Your men have certainly shown the 
gallantry which was expected of them. 
I am. Sir, with great respect. 

Your obedient servant, 
(Signed) William R. Shafter, 

Major-Generaly Commanding United States Forces. 
136 



THE SIEGE OF SANTIAGO 

To these three communications General Toral 
replied as follows : 

Army of the Island of Cuba, 
Fifth Corps, General Staff. 

To HIS Excellency the Commander-in-Chief of 
THE American Forces. 

Excellency: I have the honor to reply to the 
three communications of your Excellency, dated to- 
day, and I am very grateful for the news you give 
in regard to the Generals, chiefs, officers and troops 
that are your prisoners, and of the good care that 
you give to the wounded in your possession. With 
respect to the wounded, I have no objection to re- 
ceiving in this place those that your Excellency may 
willingly deliver me, but I am not authorized by the 
General-in-Chief to make any exchange, as he has 
reserved to himself that authorit3\ Yet I have given 
him notice of the proposition of your Excellency. 

It is useless for me to tell you how grateful I am 
for the interest that your Excellency has shown for 
the prisoners, and corpse of General Vara del Rey, 
giving you many thanks for the chivalrous treat- 
ment. 

The same reasons that I explained to you yester- 
day, I have to give again to-day — that this place 
will not be surrendered. 

I am, yours, with great respect and consideration, 
(Signed) JoSE TORAL. 

In Santiago de Cuba, July 4, 1898. 

The idea of sending back the wounded prisoners 
had occurred to General Shafter when he saw how 
^37 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

confident the Spanish prisoners were that they 
would be shot after capture. It was thought that 
if these prisoners could go back into Santiago and 
tell of their treatment, it would create a reaction 
in the feeling entertained for the American 
forces. The consent of General Toral to receive 
the wounded prisoners necessarily postponed the 
commencement of the bombardment at noon on 
the 5th. Early that morning General Toral was 
informed that ambulances, with surgeons in 
charge, had gone to El Caney to convey the 
wounded prisoners into the city, and that they 
would arrive at his lines early in the afternoon, 
flying a Red Cross flag. Lieutenant Brooke and 
Dr. Goodfellow were sent by General Shafter to 
take charge of conveying the wounded men into 
Santiago. Four officers and twenty-four men 
were placed in the ambulances and driven to a 
point near the defences of the city. There they 
were met by a large number of Spanish officers 
and soldiers, who gathered about the ambulances 
and assisted in removing the men. Two com- 
panies of Spanish Infantry had been drawn up 
on either side of the road, and arms were presented 
as Lieutenant Brooke and his escort came up. 
The affair made an excellent impression upon the 
Spaniards, and very soon after General Toral 
138 



THE SIEGE OF SANTIAGO 

thanked General Shafter most profusely for his 
generous treatment. 

On the 5th General Toral informed General 
Shafter that the General in Chief of the Army of 
the Island of Cuba (General Blanco) had accepted 
the proposition for the exchange of prisoners 
proposed the day before. He asked that the 
names of the Spanish officers who were prisoners 
be sent him, that he might select one to be 
exchanged for Hobson. If General Shafter 
wished, he also agreed to exchange the seven 
sailors taken with Lieutenant Hobson for seven 
soldiers. Three Spanish officers had been taken 
prisoners, two Second Lieutenants and one First 
Lieutenant, the latter slightly wounded in the 
left arm. The names of the prisoners were sent 
to General Toral, and the afternoon of the 6th, 
at two o'clock, was designated as the time the 
two commissioners, one 'from each side, should 
meet between the lines to effect the exchange. 

I was designated by General Shafter as his 
Commissioner, and Major Irles was designated 
by General Toral. The letter from General 
Toral naming the officer selected to be exchanged 
for Lieutenant Hobson did not arrive before it 
was time to leave head-quarters to keep the ap- 
pointment, so General Shafter sent the three capt- 
n9 



IN CUBA. WITH SHAFTER 

ured officers that there might be no delay. They 
and the seven men, bhndfolded while passing 
through our lines, were brought to the place of 
meeting by Major Noble. I was instructed by 
General Shafter to effect the exchange, even if I 
had to give the three captive officers. 

On arriving at the place of meeting, Major 
Tries handed me a letter from General Toral, 
in which he designated Lieutenant Arias, the 
wounded First Lieutenant, as the one selected 
for exchange. I invited the Spanish Commis- 
sioner's attention to the fact that Lieutenant 
Arias was wounded, but after his assurance that it 
would not alter the decision, nothing further was 
said. The agreement was soon signed, and I still 
kept the two Second Lieutenants prisoners. 

Lieutenant Hobson, on entering the American 
lines, was given an ovation. After stopping a few 
minutes at General Wheeler's head-quarters, he 
accompanied me to General Shafter's head-quar- 
ters, and a little later in the evening went to Si- 
boney, and thence on board the New York. 

On July 5th Admiral Sampson and General 
Shafter were directed to have a conference, and 
as the Admiral was ill, his chief of staff. Captain 
Chadwick, came to General Shafter's head-quar- 
ters to represent him. An agreement was made 
140 




BRIGADIER-GENERAL SAMUEL S. SUMNER, U. S. V. 



THE SIEGE OF SANTIAGO 

that the army and navy should make a joint at- 
tack on Santiago at noon, July 9th. The city is 
in easy range of large guns on board ships, and 
the navy proposed to throw 8-inch, lo-inch, and 
1 3-inch shells into the city for twenty-four hours, 
and if this did not prove effective to force the 
entrance with their smaller vessels. 

After effecting the exchange of Hobson, my 
instructions were to notify the Spanish Commis- 
sioners that hostilities would be resumed in an 
hour. Before any shots were exchanged, a sec- 
ond demand for the surrender of the city was 
made, as follows : 

Head-quarters Fifth Army Corps, 
Camp near San Juan River, Cuba, July 6, 1898. 

To THE Commander-in-Chief, Spanish Forces, 
Santiago de Cuba. 

Sir: In view of the events of the 3d instant, I have 
the honor to lay before Your Excellency certain 
propositions to which, I trust, Your Excellency will 
give the consideration which, in my judgment, they 
deserve. 

I enclose a bulletin of the engagement of Sunday 
morning which resulted in the complete destruction 
of Admiral Cervera's fleet, the loss of six hundred 
of his officers and men, and the capture of the re- 
mainder. The Admiral, General Paredes, and all 
others who escaped alive, are now prisoners on board 
the Harvard and St. Louis, and the latter ship, in 
which are the Admiral, General Paredes, and the 
141 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

surviving- Captains (all except the Captain of the 
Almirante Oquendo, who was slain), has already 
sailed for the United States. If desired by you, this 
may be confirmed by Your Excellency sending an 
officer under a flag of truce to Admiral Sampson 
and he can arrange to visit the Harvard, which 
will not sail until to-morrow, and obtain the details 
from Spanish officers and men on board that ship. 

Our fleet is now perfectly free to act, and I have 
the honor to state that unless a surrender be ar- 
ranged by noon of the 9th instant, a bombardment 
of the city will be begun and continued by the heavy 
guns of our ships. The city is within easy range of 
these guns, the 8-inch being capable of firing 9,500 
yards, the 13-inch, of course, much farther. The 
ships can so lie that with a range of 8,000 yards 
they can reach the centre of the city. 

I make this suggestion of a surrender purely in 
a humanitarian spirit. I do not wish to cause the 
slaughter of any more men, either of Your Excel- 
lency's forces or my own ; the final result under cir- 
cumstances so disadvantageous to Your Excellency 
being a foregone conclusion. 

As Your Excellency may wish to make reference of 
so momentous a question to Your Excellency's Home 
Government, it is for this purpose that I have placed 
the time of the resumption of hostilities sufficiently 
far in the future to allow a reply being received. 

I beg an earl}^ answer from Your Excellency. 

I have the honor to be, 

Very respectfully, Your obedient servant, 
(Signed) W. R. Shafter, 
Major-General Commanding. 
142 



THE SIEGE OF SANTIAGO 

The period of truce was employed in straight- 
ening our lines, and making minor changes in the 
position of the troops. General Lavvton's Divis- 
ion was pushed from day to day farther to the 
right and closer to the bay. Two light batteries 
were placed on high ground on the north of the 
city, and the other two remained to the east of 
the city, where they were placed on the 3d. The 
eight field-mortars were taken off the ship and 
placed in position east of the city on San Juan 
Heights, and the two heavy artillery batteries, 
left as a guard at Daiquiri, were ordered to the 
front to man them. One of the siege-guns was 
disembarked, but the road was in such a frightful 
condition that it was considered impossible to 
bring it to the front. 

When General Toral received the second de- 
mand for his surrender, he asked that the em- 
ployees of the Submarine Cable Company be 
permitted to return to the city from El Caney, 
whither they had fled on the night of the 4th, in 
order that he might communicate with his home 
government. These employees were promptly 
placed within the Spanish lines early on the 7th, 
and on the 8th General Toral submitted his reply 
to the demand. He accepted the statements 
concerning the loss of the Spanish fleet without 
143 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

investigation, and proposed to evacuate the Di- 
vision of Cuba, which embraced the eastern half 
of the Province of Santiago ; the territory which 
was surrendered eight days later. He would do 
this if permitted to retreat to Holguin with his 
troops, their baggage, arms, and ammunition, 
without being attacked during the march. He 
said that the loss of the Spanish Squadron in no 
way influenced the defences of Santiago, and that 
the Spanish column, which General Shafter had 
doubted could get in the city, arrived on the 3d. 
Notwithstanding the water supply of the city had 
been cut off some days before, he declared he had 
water in cisterns in abundance, and was well pro- 
vided with ammunition and rations for a reason- 
ably long time. Besides his own supplies, he 
counted on those of the inhabitants who had fled. 
The bombardment would only be felt by house- 
owners, most of whom were the natives the Amer- 
icans had come to protect, for the troops were 
placed outside the city. He pointed out that the 
Spanish troops were acclimated, while the Amer- 
icans were not, and would successfully stand a 
siege, while the latter would succumb to the dis- 
eases incident to the climate. He urged that his 
proposition be accepted, but if not, the suspension 
of hostilities would cease at noon the next day. 
144 



THE SIEGE OF SANTIAGO 

General Toral's proposition was submitted at 
once to Washington and he was informed what 
had been done, General Shafter adding that he 
doubted if the authorities at Washington would 
accept it. Orders were given on both sides that 
the troops were to remain quiet until further or- 
ders. General Shafter submitted General Toral's 
proposition to Washington early on the 9th, and 
in the afternoon, after interviewing the division 
commanders, he sent a second despatch to 
Washington. 

Head-quarters Fifth Army Corps, 
Camp near Santiago, July 9, 1898. 

Hon. Secretary of War, Washington, D. C. : 

I forwarded General Toral's proposition to evacu- 
ate the town this morning without consulting any- 
one. Since then I have seen the General Officers 
commanding divisions, who agree with me, in that 
it should be accepted : 

ist. It releases at once the harbor. 

2d. It permits the return of thousands of women, 
children, and old men, who have left the town, fear- 
ing bombardment and are now suffering fearfully 
where they are ; though I am doing my best to sup- 
ply them with food. 

3d. It saves the great destruction of property 
which a bombardment would entail ; most of which 
belongs to Cubans and foreign residents. 

4th. It at once releases this command while it is 
145 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

in good health for operations elsewhere. There are 
now three cases of yellow fever at Siboney in a 
Michigan regiment, and if it gets started, no one 
knows where it will stop. 

We lose by this simply some prisoners we do not 
want and the arms they carry. I believe many of 
them will desert and return to our lines. I was told 
by a sentinel who deserted last night that two hun- 
dred men wanted to come, but were afraid our men 
would fire upon them. 

W. R. Shafter, 
Major-General, United States Voliaiteers. 

The reply to this was : 

Washington, D. C, July 9, 1898. 
Major-General Shafter, Playa, Cuba. 

In reply to your telegram recommending terms 
of evacuation as proposed by the Spanish Com- 
mander, after careful consideration by the President 
and Secretary of War, I am directed to say, that you 
have repeatedly been advised that you would not 
be expected to make an assault upon the enemy at 
Santiago until you were prepared to do the work 
thoroughly. When you are ready, this will be done. 
Your telegram of this morning said your position 
was impregnable and that 3^ou believed the enemy 
would yet surrender unconditionally. You have 
also assured us that you could force their surrender 
by cutting off their supplies. Under these circum- 
stances your message recommending that Span- 
ish troops be permitted to evacuate and proceed 
without molestation to Holguin is a great surprise 
146 



THE SIEGE OF SANTIAGO 

and is not approved. The responsibility for the de- 
struction and distress to the inhabitants rests entirely 
with the Spanish Commander. The Secretary of 
War orders that when you are strong enough to 
destroy the enemy and take Santiago, you do it. 
If you have not force enough, it will be despatched 
to you at the earliest moment possible. Reinforce- 
ments are on the way of which you have already 
been apprised. In the meantime, nothing is lost by 
holding the position you now have, and which you 
regard as impregnable. 
Acknowledge receipt. 

By order of the Secretary of War. 

(Signed) H. C. Corbin, 

Adjutant-General. 

Immediately upon the receipt of this despatch 
General Toral was informed that his proposition 
had not been favorably considered by the home 
government, and that his unconditional surrender 
was again demanded. An answer was requested 
by 3 P.M. of the loth, and if unfavorable, he was 
informed that active operations would be resumed 
at 4 P.M. 

General Toral promptly declined to surrender, 
and the truce was at an end. 



147 



CHAPTER IX 

THE SIEGE OF SANTIAGO (CONTINUED) 

/^N the 9th of July a battalion of light artil- 
^-^ lery, commanded by General Randolph, and 
the First Illinois Volunteers arrived at Daiquiri. 
On the loth General Randolph was directed to 
disembark the batteries as rapidly as possible 
and send them to the front. The roads were so 
bad that only two of these batteries were put in 
position by the 14th, when the negotiations to 
arrange terms of surrender began. The First 
Infantry, which had been held in support of the 
light batteries near El Pozo, was ordered on the 
loth to report to General Lawton, as well as the 
Seventy-first New York, which had been em- 
ployed for some time in repairing the road be- 
tween El Pozo and the front. Every effort was 
now made, not only to strengthen the right, but 
to extend it so as completely to encircle the city, 
to prevent any attempt on the part of General 
Toral to escape, and also to prevent any rein- 
forcements from reaching him. 
148 



THE SIEGE OF SANTIAGO 

In spite of General ToraFs assertions to the 
contrary, it was absolutely known that the food 
supplies in Santiago were almost exhausted. 
Water, it is true, was still to be found in cis- 
terns, and this supply was replenished from day 
to day by the rains ; but each day found the 
total supply less than on the preceding day. 
This fact was reported from time to time by 
deserters, and when the city finally capitulated, 
the water had become so low that one of the 
first things insisted upon by General Toral was 
the immediate re-establishment of the water 
supply. It was felt, therefore, that General 
Toral must either be meditating escape, or 
had information that reinforcements would posi- 
tively reach him. In fact, daily there were re- 
ports, coming through our Cuban allies, that 
the rest of Pando's forces, which were at Man- 
zanillo, or a force from Holguin and San Luis, 
were marching to the relief of Santiago. The 
right of the line, therefore, was the place to be 
made the strongest. At Siboney and all along 
the coast as far as Aguadores, there was still 
a considerable force to guard against any at- 
tempt of the enemy to turn the left of the 
lines. 

The following telegram sent by General Li- 
149 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

nares to Madrid describes very graphically the 
condition of the garrison in Santiago : 

Santiago de Cuba, July 12, 1898. 
The General-in-Chief to the Secretary of 
War. 

Although prostrated, in bed from weakness and 
pain, my mind is troubled by the situation of our 
suffering troops, and therefore I think it my duty to 
address myself to you, Mr. Secretary, and describe 
the true situation. 

The enemy's forces very near city ; ours extended 
fourteen kilometres (14,000 yards). Our troops are 
exhausted and sickly in an alarming proportion. 
Cannot be brought to the hospital — needing them in 
trenches. Cattle without fodder or hay. Fearful 
storm of rain, which has been pouring continuously 
for past twenty-four hours. Soldiers without per- 
manent shelter. Their only food rice, and not much 
of that. They have no way of changing or drying 
their clothing. Our losses were very heavy — many 
chiefs and officers among the dead, wounded, and 
sick. Their absence deprives the forces of their 
leaders in this very critical moment. Under these 
conditions it is impossible to open a breach on the 
enemy, because it would take a third of our men 
who cannot go out, and whom the enemy would 
decimate. The result would be a terrible disaster, 
without obtaining, as you desire, the salvation of 
eleven maimed battalions. To make a sortie pro- 
tected by the Division of Holguin, it is necessary 
to attack the enemy's lines simultaneously, and the 
150 



THE SIEGE OF SANTIAGO 

forces of Holguin cannot come here except after 
many long days' marching. Impossible for them to 
transport rations. Unfortunately , the situation is 
desperate. The surrender is imminent, otherwise 
we will only gain time to prolong our agony. The 
sacrifice would be sterile, and the men understand 
this. With his lines so near us, the enemy will an- 
nihilate us without exposing his own, as he did yes- 
terday, bombarding by land from elevations without 
our being able to discover their batteries, and by 
sea the fleet has a perfect knowledge of the place, 
and bombards by elevation with a mathematical ac- 
curacy. Santiago is no Gerona, a walled city, part 
of the mother-country, and defended inch by inch 
by her own people without distinction — old men and 
women who helped with their lives, moved by the 
holy idea of freedom, and with the hope of help, 
which they received. Here I am alone. All the 
people have fled, even those holding public offices, 
almost without exception. Only the priests remain, 
and they wish to leave the city to-day headed by 
their archbishop. These defenders do not start 
now a campaign full of enthusiasm and energy, but 
for three years they have been fighting the climate, 
privations, and fatigue, and now they have to con- 
front this critical situation when they have no en- 
thusiasm or physical strength. They have no ideals, 
because they defend the property of people who 
have deserted them, and those who are the allies of 
the American forces. 

The honor of arms has its limits, and I appeal to 
the judgment of the Government and of the entire 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

Nation, whether these patient troops have not 
repeatedly saved it since May i8th — date of first 
bombardment. If it is necessary that I sacrifice 
them for reasons unknown to me, or if it is neces- 
sary for someone to take responsibility for the issue 
foreseen and announced by me in several telegrams, 
I willingly offer myself as a sacrifice to my country, 
and I will take charge of the command for the act of 
surrender, as my modest reputation is of small value 
when the reputation of the Nation is at stake. 

(Signed) Linares. 

To get more troops to strengthen General 
Lawton's Division, the Sixth and Sixteenth 
United States Infantry, the remaining tv^^o regi- 
ments of the brigade to which the Seventy-first 
New York belonged, were detached from Gen- 
eral Kent's Division, and ordered to report to 
General Lawton on the loth. The First District 
of Columbia and the Eighth Ohio arrived at 
Siboney on the loth. The First Illinois, which 
had arrived the previous day, and the First Dis- 
trict of Columbia were ordered to provide them- 
selves with three days' rations and march to the 
front. These two regiments were placed to the 
right of General Wheeler's Division on the morn- 
ing of the nth, General Lawton's Division hav- 
ing been moved far enough to the right to make 
room for them. 

152 




Photo by B. y. Falk, Ne7u York. 

BRIGADIER-GENERAL HENRY W. LAWTON, U. S. V. 



THE SIEGE OF SANTIAGO 

At five o'clock on the evening of July nth, 
General Lawton's right brigade, commanded by- 
General Ludlow, rested on the bay, and the in- 
vestment of Santiago was complete. General 
Garcia's troops, which had up to this time been 
guarding the gap between the right of the line 
and the bay, were now placed in the rear of Gen- 
eral Lawton's Division, with instructions to act 
as a reserve for his division and also to thor- 
oughly picket the interior for many miles, in 
order to give timely warning of the approach of 
reinforcements. 

Promptly at 4 p.m. on the loth the Spanish 
troops opened a vigorous fire upon the American 
lines with musketry and field-pieces. The fire 
was returned by all of the American artillery with 
much effect, and before the firing ceased, at about 
six o'clock, all of the enemy's artillery, except 
one gun, had been silenced. The infantry kept 
under cover in their trenches, and did little fir- 
ing. The navy threw 8 and lo-inch shells into 
the city, and continued their firing on the nth 
until the second period of truce began. The 
shells thrown by the navy could be seen falling 
in the city, and once or twice fires were started 
by them, which, however, were apparently quickly 
extinguished. The town was built solidly of 
153 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

stone, and the shells produced little or no effect. 
The second day the American artillery did a little 
firing, but the infantry practically none, and the 
Spanish fire was very weak. 

The situation in regard to supplies for Ameri- 
can troops was now at its worst. The rains had 
been unusually heavy, and not only were the 
roads practically impassable for wagons, but the 
streams were so swollen that at times they were 
unfordable by pack-trains. A limited amount of 
food had, up to this time, been carried to the 
refugees, but on the nth and 12th the supplies 
were entirely cut off from El Caney, and the 
refugees were urged to go to Firmeza, in the 
neighborhood of the mines, a few miles north 
of Siboney. Prior to this time the command- 
ing officer at Siboney had been ordered not to 
permit the Cuban refugees to enter that place, 
and again he was directed that this order must 
be strictly complied with, and that all Cubans in 
his immediate vicinity must at once be sent to 
the iron mines, as food could be taken to them 
at that point by rail. However, there were 
thousands in El Caney who could not walk to 
this place, which was ten miles distant, and the 
suffering of these people was acute. The Red 
Cross Society, as well as the army, had provisions 
154 



THE SIEGE OF SANTIAGO 

at Siboney in great profusion, but to get them to 
these people at El Caney was an impossibility. 

Yellow fever had now most unmistakably made 
its appearance, the first cases being manifested at 
Siboney. At first it was attempted to keep the 
command at the front in ignorance of it, but this, 
of course, was impossible for any length of time, 
and by the nth the whole army was aware that 
it would have to fight a foe more dangerous than 
the Spaniards. Every effort was made to carry 
out the hygienic measures to prevent the spread 
of the disease, but when an army is fighting 
battles it has little time to fight anything else. 
All possible measures were taken to confine the 
disease within the limits of Siboney, and the com- 
manding officer at that point was directed to use 
every possible means to check its spread, and on 
the morning of the nth he was directed by 
General Shafter to burn all of the buildings in 
the town designated by the surgeon in charge. 

At noon on the nth the surrender of Santiago 
was again demanded in the following letter : 

Head-quarters United States Forces, 
Camp near San Juan River, Cuba, July ii, 1898. 

To His Excellency, the Commander-in-Chief 

OF the Spanish Forces, Santiago de Cuba. 

Sir : With the largely increased forces which 

have come to me, and the fact that I have your line 

155 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

of retreat securely within my hands, the time seems 
fitting that I should again demand of Your Excel- 
lency the surrender of Santiago and Your Excel- 
lency's army. I am authorized to state that, should 
Your Excellency so desire, the Government of the 
United States will transport your entire command 
to Spain. 

I have the honor to be, very respectfully. 
Your obedient servant, 
(Signed) Wm. R. Shafter, 

Major- Geiicj-al Com manding. 

A telegram had been received from the Secre- 
tary of War early that morning, authorizing the 
offer to return the Spanish command to the home 
country. General Toral's reply was as follows : 

Army of the Island of Cuba, Fourth Corps, 

July II, 1898. 
To His Excellency, the Commander-in-Chief 
OF the Forces of the United States, in 
the Camp of the San Juan. 
Esteemed Sir : I have the honor to advise j-our 
Eminence that 3^our communication of this date is 
received, and in reply desire to confirm that which 
I said in my former communication, and also to ad- 
vise you that I have communicated your proposition 
to the General-in-Chief. Reiterating my sentiments, 
I am. 

Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
(Signed) JoSE TORAL, 
Commander-in-CIiicf of tJie Fourth Corps^ 
and Military Governor of Santiago. 



THE SIEGE OF SANTIAGO 

General Miles, with reinforcements, arrived 
on the afternoon of the nth. He remained at 
Siboney that night, and came to General Shaft- 
er's head-quarters about 3 p.m. the next day. 

During the morning of the 1 2th General Toral 
informed General Shafter that he must insist 
upon his former proposition to evacuate the 
"plaza" and the territory of the Division of Cuba 
under conditions honorable to the Spanish arms, 
and trusted that General Shafter's chivalry and 
sentiments as a soldier would find a solution that 
would leave the honor of his troops intact. He 
invited the General's attention to an advance of 
the American troops on the north, and asked 
that they be ordered back to their original posi- 
tion and remain there during the armistice. 
General Shafter gave assurances that there would 
be no further movements of his troops, and sent 
explicit orders on this point to all of the division 
commanders. 

Referring to General Toral's desire that the 
honor of the Spanish arms be preserved. Gen- 
eral Shafter informed him that the Commanding 
General of the American army had just arrived, 
and would probably be at his head-quarters some 
time during the day, and that the matter would 
be submitted to him. 

157 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

General Toral's letter, stating that he had sub- 
mitted the proposition for surrender to the home 
government, though dated on the nth, was not 
received until shortly after daybreak on the 1 2th, 
as after sundown it was considered unsafe to 
attempt to pass a letter through the lines. As 
soon as this letter was received, General Shafter 
took under consideration the matter of asking 
General Toral for a personal interview ; and, 
shortly after the arrival of General Miles in the 
afternoon, sent the following letter to General 
Toral : 

Head-quarters Fifth Army Corps, 
Camp near Santiago de Cuba, July 12, 1898. 

To His Excellency, Commander-in-Chief of 
Spanish Forces, Santiago de Cuba. 

Sir : I have the honor to inform Your Excellency 
that I have already ordered a suspension of hostili- 
ties, and I will repeat that order, granting in this 
manner a reasonable time within which you may re- 
ceive an answer to the message sent to the govern- 
ment of Spain, which time will end to-morrow at 
twelve o'clock, noon. 

I think it my duty to inform Your Excellency that 
during this armistice I will not move any of my 
troops that occupy the advanced lines, but the 
forces that arrived to-day and which are debarking 
at Siboney, require moving toward this camp. 

I wish that Your Excellency would honor me with 
a personal interview to-morrow morning at nine 
158 



THE SIEGE OF SANTIAGO 

o'clock. I will come accompanied by the Com- 
manding General of the American Army and by an 
interpreter, which will permit you to be accompa- 
nied by two or three persons of your staff who speak 
English. Hoping for a favorable answer, I have 
the honor to be. 

Very respectfully. 

Your obedient servant, 
(Signed) William R. Shafter, 

Major- General Commatiding. 

General Toral answered as follows : 

Army of the Island of Cuba, Fourth Corps, 

Santiago de Cuba, July 12, 1898, 9 P.M. 

To His Excellency, the General of the 
American Troops. 
Esteemed Sir: I have the honor to answer your 
favor of this date, informing Your Excellency that 
in deference to your desires I will be much honored 
by a conference with His Excellency, the Command- 
ing General of your army, and Your Excellency, to- 
morrow morning at the hour you have seen fit to 
appoint. 

Very respectfully, 

Your obedient servant, 

(Signed) JosE Toral, 
Comrnander-in-Cluef of the Fourth Army Corps. 

At the hour appointed, Generals Toral and 
Shafter met between the lines, and the result of 
the interview is best described by quoting from 
159 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

a telegram sent by General Shafter to the Adju- 
tant-General at Washington immediately upon 
his return to the American lines : 

I have had an interview of an hour and a half with 
General Toral, and have extended the truce until 
noon to-morrow. I told him that his unconditional 
surrender only would be considered, and that he 
was without hope of escape and had no right to 
continue the fight. 1 think it made a strong impres- 
sion upon him, and hope for his surrender. If he 
refuses, I will open on him at twelve o'clock, noon, 
to-morrow, with every gun I have, and have the as- 
sistance of the navy, who are ready to bombard the 
city with 13-inch shells. There is a good deal of 
nervousness throughout the army on account of 
yellow fever, which is among us certainly. 

Before the two Generals separated, it was 
agreed that General Shafter should come again 
the next day at eleven o'clock to the same place, 
to meet General Toral and receive his final an- 
swer. Before the time appointed for the meet- 
ing on the 14th, General Toral wrote General 
Shafter a letter stating that on the evening before, 
at 7 P.M., he had received the following telegram 
from General Blanco : 

Believing that business of such importance as the 
capitulation of Santiago should be known and de- 
cided upon by the government of His Majesty, I 
160 



THE SIEGE OF SANTIAGO 

give you notice that I have sent the conditions of 
your telegram, asking an immediate answer. You 
may show this to the General of the American 
Army, to see if he will agree to await the answer of 
the government, which cannot arrive before the ex- 
piration of the time he has set, for the reason that 
communication by the way of Bermuda is much 
slower than via Key West. In the meantime, Your 
Honor and the General of the American Army may 
agree upon the terms of capitulation upon the basis 
of repatriation. 

In sending this telegram to General Shafter, 
General Toral remarked that he hoped the con- 
tents would be satisfactory, and that General 
Shafter would be pleased to designate commis- 
sioners to meet commissioners appointed by him, 
who might agree, in advance of the decision of 
the Spanish government, upon the terms of capit- 
ulation. At the meeting a little later, General 
Toral insisted that he was certain the Spanish 
government would approve of the capitulation of 
the place, but without this approval he would not 
surrender. General Shafter insisted that he sur- 
render unconditionally at that time and without 
any further waiting. The discussion of the 
matter between the two lasted for some time, 
carried on by means of interpreters, who in some 
way conveyed to both General Shafter and Gen- 
i6i 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

eral Miles, who was also present, that General 
Toral finally did agree to an unconditional sur- 
render, and both of the Generals returned to the 
American lines confident that General Toral had 
unqualifiedly surrendered without waiting for any 
approval beyond that of General Blanco. 

In his letter in the morning. General Toral 
had designated as his commissioners, Brigadier- 
General Don Federigo Escario, Lieutenant-Col- 
onel Don Ventura Fontan, and Mr. Robert 
Mason, the British Vice-Consul. General Shaft- 
er, immediately upon his return to head-quarters, 
designated as his commissioners, Major-General 
Joseph Wheeler, Major-General Henry W. Law- 
ton, and First Lieutenant John D. Miley, Aide- 
de-Camp. 

The siege was now at an end, and the negotia- 
tions for a surrender began. Orders were sent 
all along the lines directing that all of the men 
be withdrawn from the trenches, and only a small 
guard left over them. 

During the 12th, 13th, and 1 4th active prepara- 
tions for an assault in the event of the failure of 
all negotiations were vigorously carried on. The 
disembarkation of the artillery that had arrived 
with General Randolph continued, and arrange- 
ments were made by General Miles to land a 
162 



THE SIEGE OF SANTIAGO 

strong force of infantry under General Henry 
at Cabanas, to march against the city from that 
point, a preliminary reconnoissance of the country 
west of the bay having been made on the 13th 
by Major J. C. Webb, of General Lawton's Staff. 
Many thought that General Toral was simply try- 
ing to gain time, and General Shafter was contin- 
ually advised and urged to break off negotiations 
and assault the town. He felt, however, that Gen- 
eral Toral would surrender in time, and the thanks 
of this country are due him that he allowed his 
better judgment to prevail. The trenches just 
outside the city had an entanglement in front of 
them made by running two parallel lines of 
barbed-wire fence around the city with a few 
openings at intervals which could be closed very 
quickly, thus presenting a complete barrier. Each 
line of fence was made with six or seven strands 
of wire, and the fences were placed in such a 
position that the American troops would be 
temporarily halted under a deadly fire. With 
the Spaniards fighting as desperately as on the 
I St of July, the probable result is something fear- 
ful to contemplate. 



163 



CHAPTER X 

THE CAPITULATION 

THE hour of meeting for the Commissioners 
had been set for 2.30 p.m., and punctually 
at that time they assembled. The meeting took 
place midway between the lines, under a magnif- 
icent ceiba tree,* where all the conferences be- 
tween General Shafter and General Toral had 
been held, and it was here, also, that the ex- 
change of Lieutenant Hobson had been arranged. 
The American Commissioners brought as inter- 
preters Mr. Ramon Mendoza and Mr. Aurelius 
Mestre, two Cubans, who had volunteered their 
services for the war and had been assigned as 
Volunteer Aides-de-Camp, the former to General 
Lawton and the latter to General Wheeler ; Mr. 
Wilson, General Wheeler's Secretary, acted as 
Secretary of the Commission. Mr. Robert Ma- 
son, the civilian member of the Spanish Commis- 

* This tree is now called " El Arbol de la Paz," and the authorities 
have had to put a double wire fence around it to prevent its being re- 
moved piecemeal by relic-hunters. 

164 



THE CAPITULATION 

sion, acted in the capacity of interpreter. Be- 
lieving that the surrender had been made without 
qualification, the American Commissioners before 
the hour for the meeting arrived had drawn up a 
rough draft of an agreement for the capitulation 
which embodied the points agreed upon by Gen- 
erals Shafter and Toral, a memorandum of which 
had been furnished. The draft being translated, 
was then discussed point by point, and the Span- 
ish Commissioners' views on each were obtained 
and some slight changes made to incorporate 
their ideas. After this, the Spanish Commis- 
sioners proposed the clauses they wished in the 
agreement, and these were taken up for discus- 
sion. 

As the negotiations lasted two days and the 
army and the people at home were waiting 
breathlessly the outcome, fearing that every min- 
ute some complication would arise by which 
active operations would be precipitated, I will 
give a detailed account of every stage. 

The draft drawn by the American Commis- 
sioners included : 

I St, that all hostilities cease from the signing 
of the agreement ; 

2d, that the capitulation includes all the forces 
and war material in the surrendered territory ' 
i6s 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

3d, that the Spanish Commander immediately 
make arrangements for the entrance into the 
harbor of Santiago of the Red Cross ship Texas ; 

4th, that the inhabitants of the City of Santi- 
ago at El Caney be permitted to return at once ; 

5th, that the Spanish authorities afford every 
facility for transporting by rail from Siboney to 
Santiago food for the returning refugees ; 

6th, that the United States agrees with as little 
delay as possible to transport the Spanish troops 
back to Spain ; 

7th, that the officers of the Spanish Army be 
permitted to retain their side arms and all officers 
and enlisted men their private property ; 

8th, that the Spanish authorities agree to re- 
move at once, or assist the American Navy in re- 
moving, all mines in the mouth of the harbor ; 

9th, that the Spanish Commander deliver with- 
out delay a complete inventory of all arms, etc., 
and a roster of the capitulated forces ; 

loth, that the Commander of the American 
forces re-establishes the water system of the city 
without delay. 

There was little discussion over the abeve 
points, and wherever the words "surrender" or 
"surrendered" occurred, the Spanish Commis- 
sioners desired them changed to "capitulation" 
166 



THE CAPITULATION 

or "capitulated," and this and other changes in 
wording were agreed to. The points covered 
seemed at that time perfectly satisfactory to 
them. They then requested that the Spaniards 
be permitted to carry back to Spain the military 
records and documents in the offices throughout 
the district. This was agreed to and a clause 
covering it was added to the agreement. 

The second point that the Spanish Commis- 
sioners wished put into the agreement was one 
covering the retention in Cuba of a large number 
of troops known as Volunteers, Movilizados, and 
Guerillas, recruited from Spanish sympathizers 
in the native population. These troops desired 
to remain in Cuba, it was stated, and a clause was 
added permitting them to stay, after giving a 
parole not to bear arms against the United States 
during the present war. 

The next point presented by the Spanish Com- 
missioners involved more difficulty. They desired 
that the Spanish troops be permitted to retain 
their arms, carrying them back to Spain. This, 
of course, could not be done. The troops, it was 
explained, would be prisoners of war and cer- 
tainly would have to be disarmed, but the Amer- 
ican Commissioners said that they would gladly 
recommend to their Government that the arms 
167 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

belonging to the Spanish regular troops be gratu- 
itously returned to Spain, when the Spanish pris- 
oners were sent back. It was evident the Span- 
iards felt very keenly over this point, and that it 
was their earnest desire to remove the sting from 
the surrender as much as possible. A clause was 
finally added in which the American Commis- 
sioners recommended the return of the Spanish 
arms to Spain. This in no way bound the Gov- 
ernment, but at the time had the effect of dispos- 
ing of the question in a way satisfactory to the 
Spanish Commissioners. Later the wording of 
this clause was altered, permitting the Spanish 
troops to march out of Santiago with their 
arms, depositing them at an agreed point, to 
await their disposition by the United States Gov- 
ernment, and a separate paper signed by the 
American Commissioners was forwarded to the 
War Department, recommending the return of 
the arms. This effectually disposed of this matter. 
The agreement embracing all the points pro- 
posed was drawn up in terms so as to make the 
instrument a final one, and the Spanish Commis- 
sioners having been asked if they were ready to 
sign, replied that they must first return with a 
copy to consult General Toral. An adjournment 
until 6 P.M. was taken, to afford them time to go 
i68 



THE CAPITULATION 

to the city and return, while the American Com- 
missioners remained at the place of meeting. 

During the interval a tent was put up, candles 
provided, and all preparations for a night session 
made. On the return of the Spanish Commis- 
sioners, shortly after six o'clock, it was fully 
expected that nothing remained for the Commis- 
sioners to do except sign the agreement after 
copies were made. For that reason it was sug- 
gested that the Spanish troops be drawn at once 
from the fortifications and from the trenches in 
front of the city ; also that the work of removing 
the obstructions from the mouth of the harbor, 
that our supply ships might enter, would begin 
immediately. 

Nothing definite on these points could be ar- 
rived at, and the Spanish Commissioners stated 
that they would like to adjourn until the follow- 
ing day, in order to consult General Linares 
about certain things before signing. This ap- 
peared to the American Commissioners a re- 
markable request, as they had just returned from 
consulting General Toral, and now to ask for 
time to consult General Linares, who, as it was 
well known, was not in command on account 
of wounds received on July ist, was hardly to 
be expected. The American Commissioners had 
169 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

come with full powers to settle all disputed points, 
and presumed that the Spanish Commissioners had 
come empowered likewise. Something seemed to 
be wrong, and the Commissioners on the two sides 
were working at cross purposes. The American 
Commissioners were determined not to adjourn, 
but to press the negotiations to an end that night. 
It began to appear as if the Spanish Commissioners 
were playing for time, or that there had been a mis- 
understanding on the part of General Shafter at 
the meeting with General Toral at noon. The 
situation was serious, for if an amicable under- 
standing could not be speedily reached, the only 
alternative was to break off negotiations. General 
Escario suggested that he return to the city and 
fetch General Toral, who could clear up the mat- 
ter. For fear that General Linares would have 
to be sent for, even after the arrival of General 
Toral, the American Commissioners offered, if 
there was no objection, to go into Santiago and 
continue the negotiations there, in order that the 
matter might be concluded the more speedily. 
This suggestion was not favorably considered by 
the Spanish Commissioners, and they again urged 
an adjournment until the next morning. 

It was plainly stated that on the part of the 
American Commissioners there was no desire to 
170 



THE CAPITULATION 

inconvenience General Toral by having him come 
out to the place of meeting at such a late hour, 
and further, that there was no desire to unneces- 
sarily force matters, but that the question whether 
there was to be a capitulation or whether there 
was to be further fighting must be determined be- 
fore adjournment for the night. The Command- 
ing General of the American forces and the 
Home Government demanded that there be no 
delay. So finally General Escario went for Gen- 
eral Toral and returned with him at 9.40. I had 
met the General before at his interviews with 
General Shafter, and so had General Wheeler, 
General Lawton was introduced to him, and a 
short time was passed in conversation. The 
General is a genial, courtly gentleman, and soon 
won our respect for his fair dealing. Proceeding 
to business he explained his position, which was 
still as he had described it in his letter to General 
Shafter early in the morning, which was that he 
was willing to surrender, and that he had the per- 
mission of General Blanco to do so, but the entire 
matter had been referred to Madrid for approval 
there. An answer had not yet been received, 
though he felt it would certainly come after 
General Blanco's sanction. Considerable time, 
two or three days, must elapse before the answer 
171 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

could be received, and both he and General Blanco 
desired that the points to be included in the 
formal surrender be decided upon while waiting. 
He was as anxious as the American Commander 
for a speedy solution of the matter, but without 
the approval of Madrid, he would not surrender. 
He owed it to his army and to himself that this 
sanction be first obtained, and without it he would 
resume fighting. With this sanction, he and his 
command would be permitted to return home, 
without it, there was much doubt. All this, he 
said, he had stated to General Shafter at noon 
through the interpreters, and now he wished it 
made plain to the Commissioners. More than 
this, he had never conceded at any time. 

It was obvious to us now that General Toral 
had been misinterpreted at the meeting with 
General Shafter, and that while General Shafter 
had come away under the impression that Gen- 
eral Toral had made an unqualified surrender, he 
really had not departed from his position set 
forth in the letter of the morning. Either this 
or General Toral had news of reinforcements 
and had decided to delay matters, if possible, 
until their arrival. 

The American Commissioners consulted Mr. 
Mason, in whom they had great confidence, and 
172 



THE CAPITULATION 

he assured them that General Toral was honest 
in all his statements. We felt that Mr. Mason 
would not be a party to any stratagem on the 
part of the Spaniards, and it is the writer's opin- 
ion that the negotiations would not have been 
successful if Mr. Mason had not been one of the 
Commissioners on the Spanish side. 

The duty of the Commission was now plain. 
A form of agreement must be prepared which 
could be made final when the approval of Spain 
arrived. To facilitate the preparation of such 
an agreement, the Spanish Commissioners were 
invited to draw the clauses as they wished them. 
General Toral and his Commissioners did this, 
and really from this time on the General was sole 
Commissioner on the Spanish side, the gentlemen 
appointed by him merely signing the instrument. 
The form of agreement as prepared and signed 
by the Spanish Commissioners was handed to the 
American Commissioners for their consideration. 
It was so nearly in accord with their views, now 
that it was felt the surrender had not been abso- 
lute, that it was believed the end of the negotia- 
tions were close at hand. It now being half an 
hour past midnight, the Commission adjourned 
until 9.30 the next morning. There was little 
doubt then in the minds of the American Com- 
173 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

missioners that General Toral was sincere in his 
declarations. It was necessary, however, to get 
at the bottom of the matter that night, for if there 
were reasonable grounds that the Spaniards were 
playing for time, the negotiations could not be 
broken off too quickly. 

The Spanish draft of the agreement was taken 
up for consideration at once next morning. To 
avoid discussion, and possibly friction, it was sug- 
gested by the American Commissioners that the 
clauses referring to the immediate entrance into the 
harbor by the Red Cross ship Texas, the return of 
the refugees from El Caney, the use of the railroad 
running into Santiago from Siboney, and the repair 
of the water system, be stricken out, and there 
being no objection, this was done. The main 
object was to get signatures to an instrument in 
which the Spanish Commissioners acknowledged 
they capitulated ; for after that there would be 
no trouble with other minor matters. Now that 
the instrument had been purged of as many sub- 
jects of contention as possible, there was little or 
no further delay. The clauses remaining were 
adopted, and nothing was left to do but to prepare 
English and Spanish copies for signatures. With 
our facilities this was a long and tedious operation. 
The final drafts were run off on a typewriter 
174 



THE CAPITULATION 

placed on a camp-stool, and were ready to receive 
the signatures at 3 p.m. The Spanish Commis- 
sioners signed the Spanish copy, and were followed 
by the American Commissioners ; but in signing 
the English version the reverse order of signing 
was adopted. The Spanish Commissioners took 
the Spanish copy and an unsigned English copy 
to be delivered to General Toral, while the Amer- 
ican Commissioners took the signed English copy 
and an unsigned Spanish copy for the American 
Commanding General. The preliminary agree- 
ment made by the Commission is given here in 
full. 

Preliminary agreement for the capitulation of 
the Spanish forces which constitute the division of 
Santiago de Cuba, occupying the territory herein 
set forth, said capitulation authorized by the Com- 
mander-in-Chief of the island of Cuba, agreed to by 
General Toral, and awaiting the approbation of the 
Government at Madrid, and subject to the following 
conditions : 

Submitted by the undersigned Commissioners — 
Brigadier-General Don Frederick Escario, Lieuten- 
ant-Colonel of Staff Don Ventura Fontan, and Mr. 
Robert Mason, of the city of Santiago de Cuba, 
representing General Toral, commanding Spanish 
forces, to Major-General Joseph Wheeler, U. S. V., 
Major-General H. W. Lawton, U. S. V., and First 
Lieutenant J. D. Miley, Second Artillery, A. D. C, 
175 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

representing General Shafter, commanding Ameri- 
can forces, for the capitulation of the Spanish forces 
comprised in that portion of the island of Cuba east 
of a line passing through Aserradero, Dos Palmas, 
Palma Soriano, Cauto Abajo, Escondida, Tanamo, 
and Aguilera, said territory being known as the 
Eastern District of Santiago, commanded by General 
Jos6 Toral. 

1. That pending arrangements for capitulation all 
hostilities between American and Spanish forces 
in this district shall absolutely and unequivocally 
cease. 

2. That this capitulation includes all the forces 
and war material in said territory, 

3. That after the signing of the final capitulation 
the United States agrees, with as little delay as pos- 
sible, to transport all the Spanish troops in said dis- 
trict to the kingdom of Spain, the troops, as near as 
possible, to embark at the port nearest the garri- 
sons they now occupy. 

4. That the officers of the Spanish Army be per- 
mitted to retain their side arms, and both officers and 
enlisted men their personal property. 

5. That after final capitulation the Spanish author- 
ities agree without delay to remove, or assist the 
American Navy in removing, all mines or other ob- 
structions to navigation now in the harbor of Santi- 
ago and its mouth. 

6. That after final capitulation the commander of 
the Spanish forces deliver without delay a complete 
inventory of all arms and munitions of war of the 
Spanish forces and a roster of the said forces now in 

176 



THE CAPITULATION 

above-described district to the commander of the 
American forces. 

7. That the commander of the Spanish forces, in 
leaving said district, is authorized to carry with him 
all military archives and records pertaining to the 
Spanish Army now in said district. 

8. That all of that portion of the Spanish forces 
known as Volunteers, Movilizados, and Guerillas, 
who wish to remain in the island of Cuba are per- 
mitted to do so under parole not to take up arms 
against the United States during the continuance of 
the present war between Spain and the United 
States, delivering up their arms. 

9. That the Spanish forces will march out of San- 
tiago de Cuba with honors of war, depositing their 
arms thereafter at a point mutually agreed upon, to 
await their disposition by the United States Gov- 
ernment, it being understood that the United States 
Commissioners will recommend that the Spanish 
soldier return to Spain with the arms he so bravely 
defended. 

Entered into this fifteenth day of July, eighteen 
hundred and ninety-eight, by the undersigned Com- 
missioners, acting under instructions from their re- 
spective Commanding Generals. 

(Signed) 
JOSEPH Wheeler, Frederico Escario, 

Major-General, U. S. Vols. VENTURA FONTAN, 
H. W. Lawton, Rob't Mason. 

Major-General, U. S. Vols. 

J. D. MiLEY, 

1st Lieut., 2d Art., A. D. C 
to General Shafter. 

177 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

The following is the recommendation made by 
the American Commissioners for the return of 
the Spanish arms : 

At Neutral Camp, near Santiago, 
Under a Flag of Truce, July 14, 1898. 

Recognizing the chivalry, courage, and gallantry 
of Generals Linares and Toral, and of the soldiers 
of Spain who were engaged in the battles recently 
fought in the vicinity of Santiago de Cuba, as dis- 
played in said battles, we, the undersigned officers 
of the United States Army, who had the honor to 
be engaged in said battles, and now are a duly 
organized commission, treating with a like commis- 
sion of officers of the Spanish Army, for the capit- 
ulation of Santiago de Cuba, unanimously join in 
earnestly soliciting the proper authority to accord 
to these brave and chivalrous soldiers the privilege 
of returning to their country bearing the arms they 
have so bravely defended. 

Joseph Wheeler, 
Major-General, U. S. Vols. 

H. W. Lawton, 
Major -General, U. S. Vols. 
J. D. MiLEY, 

1st Lieut., 2d Art., A. D. C. 

During the negotiations the anxiety of Gen- 
eral Miles, who was on board his ship at Siboney, 
and that of General Shatter was intense. Both 
178 



THE CAPITULATION 

were kept informed by telephone of the progress 
being made, for they felt that hostilities could 
not be resumed too quickly, if there was a dead- 
lock in the negotiations. General Miles was 
ready to sail for Porto Rico, but did not wish to 
leave under the circumstances. Early on the 
morning of the i6th all doubts as to a favorable 
outcome to the negotiations were dispelled by 
the receipt of this letter from General Toral : 

Army of the Island of Cuba, Fourth Corps, 
Santiago de Cuba, July 15, 1898, 10 P.M. 

To His Excellency, the General-in-Chief of 
THE American Forces. 

Esteemed Sir : As I am now authorized by my 
Government to capitulate, I have the honor to so 
advise you, requesting you to designate the hour and 
place where my representatives should appear to 
concur with those of Your Excellency to edit the 
articles of capitulation on the basis of what has been 
agreed upon to this date. 

In due time I wish to manifest to Your Excellency 
my desire to know the resolution of the United 
States Government respecting the return of the 
arms, so as to note it in the capitulation ; also for 
their great courtesy and gentlemanly deportment I 
wish to thank Your Grace's representatives, and in 
return for their generous and noble efforts for the 
Spanish soldiers, I hope your Government will allow 
them to return to the Peninsula with the arms that 
179 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

the American Army do them the honor to acknowl- 
edge as having dutifully defended. 

Reiterating my former sentiments, I remain, very 
respectfully. 

Your obedient servant, 

Jose Toral, 
Commander-in-CJdef of tJie Fourth Army Corps. 

Words cannot express the feeling of relief 
throughout the command that followed. Gen- 
eral Shafter promptly despatched to General 
Toral the following letter : 

Head-quarters Fifth Army Corps, 
Camp, July i6, 1898. 

To His Excellency, General Jose Toral, Com- 
manding Spanish Forces in Eastern Cuba. 
Sir : I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt 
of Your Excellency's letter of this date, notifying 
me that the Government at Madrid approves your 
action, and requesting that I designate officers to 
arrange for and receive the surrender of the forces 
of Your Excellency. This I do, nominating Major- 
General Wheeler, Major-Genei'al Lawton, and my 
Aide, Lieutenant Miley. I have to request that 
Your Excellency at once withdraw your troops 
from along the railway to Aguadores, and from the 
bluff in rear of my left ; also that you at once direct 
the removal of the obstructions at the entrance to 
the harbor, or assist the navy in doing so, as it is of 
the utmost importance that I at once get vessels 
loaded with food into the harbor. 
180 



THE CAPITULATION 

The repair of the railroad will, I am told, require 
a week's time. I shall, as I have said to Your Ex- 
cellency, urge my Government that the gallant men 
Your Excellency has so ably commanded, have 
returned to Spain with them the arms they have 
wielded. 

With great respect I remain. 

Your obedient servant and friend, 
William R. Shafter, 
Major-Geiieral Commandi7ig. 

So much time was necessarily consumed in 
taking a letter through the lines that General 
Toral replied as follows : 

Army of the Island of Cuba, Fourth Corps, 
Santiago de Cuba, July i6, 1898. 

To His Excellency, the Commander-in-Chief of 
THE Forces of the United States. 

Esteemed Sir: At half-past eleven I received 
your communication of this date, and I am sorry to 
advise you that it is impossible for my representa- 
tives to come to the appointed place at mid-day, as 
you wish, as I must meet them and give them their 
instructions. 

If agreeable to you, will you defer the visit until 
4 P.M. to-day, or until 7 to-morrow morning, and in 
the meanwhile the obstacles to the entrance of the 
ship of the Red Cross will be removed from the 
harbor. 

I beg Your Honor will make clear what force you 
wish me to retire from the railroad, as if it is that 
181 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

in Aguadores, I would authorize the repair of the 
bridge at once by your engineers; and if it is that 
on the heights to the left of your lines, I beg you 
will specify with more precision. 

I have ordered those in charge of the aqueduct to 
proceed at once to repair it with the means at their 
command. 

Awaiting your reply, I remain, very respectfully, 
Your obedient servant, 

Jose Toral, 
Commande7--in-Chief of tJic FoitrtJi Army Corps. 

General Shafter adopted the earlier hour sug- 
gested, and at four o'clock the Commission met, 
with the s?ime personnel as before. The wording 
of the preliminary agreement was simply changed 
to make it read as a final document, the English 
and Spanish copies typewritten, and the instru- 
ment was made binding by the signatures of the 
Commissioners at 6 p.m. During the two hours 
thus occupied. Generals Shafter and Toral were 
present talking over and arranging the details 
for the formal ceremony of surrender to take 
place the next morning. 

The final document reads as follows : 

Terms of the Military Convention for the 

capitulation of the Spanish Forces occup3'ing the 

territory which constitutes the Division of Santiago 

de Cuba and described as follows: All that portion 

182 



THE CAPITULATION 

of the Island of Cuba east of a line passing through 
Aserradero, Dos Palmas, Cauto Abajo, Escondida, 
Tanamo, and Aguilera, said troops being in com- 
mand of General Jos6 Toral ; agreed upon by the 
undersigned Commissioners : Brigadier-General Don 
Federico Escario, Lieutenant-Colonel of Staff Don 
Ventura Fontan, and as Interpreter Mr. Robert 
Mason, of the city of Santiago de Cuba, appointed 
by General Toral, commanding the Spanish Forces, 
on behalf of the Kingdom of Spain, and Major-Gen- 
eral Joseph Wheeler, U. S. V., Major-General H. 
W. Lawton, U. S. V., and First Lieutenant J. D. 
Miley, Second Artillery, A. D. C, appointed by 
General Shaffer, commanding the American Forces 
on behalf of the United States : 

1. That all hostilities between the American and 
Spanish forces in this district absolutely and une- 
quivocally cease. ' 

2. That this capitulation includes all the forces 
and war material in said territory. 

3. That the United States agrees, with as little 
delay as possible, to transport all the Spanish troops 
in said district to the kingdom of Spain, the troops 
being embarked, as far as possible, at the port near- 
est the garrisons they now occupy. 

4. That the officers of the Spanish Army be per- 
mitted to retain their side arms, and both officers 
and private soldiers their personal property. 

5. That the Spanish authorities agree to remove, 
or assist the American Navy in removing, all mines 
or other obstructions to navigation now in the har- 
bor of Santiago and its mouth. 

183 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

6. That the Commander of the Spanish forces 
deliver without delay a complete inventory of all 
arms and munitions of war of the Spanish forces in 
above described district to the Commander of the 
American forces ; also a roster of said forces now 
in said district. 

7. That the Commander of the Spanish forces, in 
leaving said district, is authorized to carry with him 
all military archives and records pertaining to the 
Spanish Army now in said district. 

8. That all that portion of the Spanish forces 
known as Volunteers, Movilizados, and Guerillas 
who wish to remain in the island of Cuba are per- 
mitted to do so upon the condition of delivering up 
their arms and taking a parole not to bear arms 
against the United States during the continuance 
of the present war between Spain and the United 
States. 

9. That the Spanish forces will march out of San- 
tiago de Cuba with the honors of war, depositing 
their arms thereafter at a point mutually agreed 
upon, to await their disposition by the United States 
Government, it being understood that the United 
States Commissioners will recommend that the 
Spanish soldier return to Spain with the arms he so 
bravely defended. 

10. That the provisions of the foregoing instru- 
ment become operative immediately upon its being 
signed. 

Entered into this sixteenth day of July, eighteen 
hundred and ninety-eight, by the undersigned Com- 
missioners, acting under instructions from their 
184 



THE CAPITULATION 

respective commanding-generals and with the ap- 
probation of their respective Governments. 

(Signed) 
Joseph Wheeler, Frederico Escario, 

Major -General, U. S. Vols., VENTURA FONTAN, 
H. W. Lawton, Rob't Mason. 

Major-General, U. S. Vols., 

J. D. MiLEY, 

1st Lieut. 2d Art., A. D. C. 
to General Shafter. 

Between the lines, at 9.30 the next morning, 
General Shafter, with the ofificers of his own 
staff and his general officers with their staffs, 
escorted by one hundred cavalry mounted, met 
General Toral and his staff, escorted by one hun- 
dred foot soldiers, and there General Toral for- 
mally surrendered the " Plaza" and the Division 
of Santiago de Cuba. 

At the time all the regiments were drawn up 
in line along the trenches, from which nearly 
everyone had a full view of the ceremony. Gen- 
eral Toral then escorted General Shafter to the 
Governor's Palace in the city and withdrew to 
his home. At the palace the civil officers of the 
province and of the town and the Archbishop 
were waiting to pay their respects to General 
Shafter. Precisely at twelve o'clock the American 
flag was raised over the palace by Captain William 
185 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

H. McKittrick, Aide-de-Camp to General Shafter ; 
Lieutenant Joseph Wheeler, Jr., Aide-de-Camp to 
General Wheeler ; Lieutenant J. D. Miley, Aide- 
de-Camp to General Shafter, while the escort of 
cavalry and the Ninth United States Infantry, 
which had been designated as the first regiment 
to occupy the town, presented arms. A salute of 
twenty-one guns was fired from Captain Capron's 
Battery, and the regiments again drawn up in 
line at the trenches, while all the bands played 
national airs. 

After saluting the Spanish flag General Toral 
had hauled it down before leaving the city to 
meet General Shafter between the lines. Since 
early in the morning the Spanish troops, by reg- 
iments and battalions, had been turning in their 
arms at the arsenal, a rambling stone structure 
which covered several acres in the heart of the 
town. Lieutenant Brooke, General Shafter's 
ordnance officer, with a troop of cavalry, re- 
ceived and inventoried them. As fast as an or- 
ganization was disarmed it was marched out of 
the city and placed in the camp on the San Juan 
Hills selected for the Spanish prisoners. 

Passing by the camp in the afternoon I saw 
the prisoners cooking horses that had been 
brought out with them ; but rations were soon 
i86 



^J^ 




/ 



^ 



w 



.^ 




\ 




GENERAL JOSE TORAL 



THE CAPITULATION 

issued to them from the stores on hand, and as 
the supply-ships entered the bay the next day, 
making it easy to get rations for everyone, the 
prisoners from that time on had the same ration 
as the American troops. 

About two hundred sailors on a gun-boat in 
the harbor were included in the surrender, and 
an officer and a detail of men were at once sent 
to take possession of it, and similar details to 
take possession of five Spanish transports. 

This action was approved by the War Depart- 
ment at the time ; but two days later the Depart- 
ment directed that these ships be turned over to 
the navy, in view of the fact that the captures 
made jointly by the army and the navy were held 
by the United States Supreme Court not sub- 
jects of prize-money. This was done, and the 
vessels removed to Guantanamo Bay ; but on the 
24th, by direction of the President, the transports 
were returned to the army. 

Details from the artillery were sent, early on 
the 17th, to all the batteries to take possession 
of the property in them, and the following day 
flags were raised at the Morro and other points. 

The work of clearing the entrance to the har- 
bor of mines was begun early on the 1 7th by the 
navy, and on the 19th the entrance was pro- 
187 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

nounced perfectly safe for any vessel. Eighteen 
mines had been laid in the mouth of the harbor, 
nine contact, and nine electric mines, but five of 
the electric mines had been fired at the Merri- 
mac. Seven of the nine contact mines were 
taken up and placed on shore, and the two re- 
maining ones, which could not be raised at the 
time, had their positions marked by buoys. Fort- 
unately, these positions were such with respect 
to the channel that the failure to raise them did 
not interfere in the slightest with navigation. 

The electric mines were destroyed by sending 
a current through them and exploding them in 
position, and to prevent any possibility of danger 
from two that failed to explode, the cables were 
broken and the key-boards carried away from the 
firing-station. 

This was also done at the Estrella Battery 
Station, from which the mines had been fired 
when the attempt was made to sink the Merri- 
mac, because it was not absolutely known that 
all of the five had exploded. 

Part of the transports entered the harbor on 
the 1 8th, and the remaining vessels on the 19th. 
The refugees at El Caney and other points began 
to return to the city on the i6th, and by the 
night of the 1 7th were once more in their homes. 



CHAPTER XI 

THE CAPITULATION (CONTINUED) 

T^HOUGH the troops in the city of Santiago 
■* had laid down their arms, there still remained 
an equal number of troops of General Toral's 
command at various points in the province who 
did not even know of the capitulation and that 
they were included in it. There were garrisons 
at Guantanamo, at Baracoa, and Sagua de Tan- 
amo, small towns along the coast, and at the inte- 
rior towns, or villages, of El Cristo, El Songo, 
Dos Caminos, Moron, San Luis, and Palma 
Soriano. On the morning of the i8th I was 
sent by General Shafter to consult with members 
of General Toral's staff, in order to make the 
arrangements for notifying the different outside 
garrisons of the capitulation, and at the same 
time receiving their surrender and collecting the 
small bodies of troops at points convenient for 
shipment to Spain. It was agreed that an offi- 
cer representing General Shafter, accompanied 
by one of General Toral's staff officers and es- 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

corted by a body of cavalry, should go from town 
to town in the interior of the surrendered dis- 
trict bearing a letter from General Toral to the 
commandants notifying them of the details of 
the capitulation and directing them to recognize 
the authority of General Shafter's representa- 
tives. The coast towns were to be visited in like 
manner. 

I was designated by General Shafter as his 
representative to take the surrender of the inte- 
rior towns ; Captain Ramus was sent by Gen- 
eral Toral, and the escort consisted of two 
troops of cavalry, commanded by Captain Lewis. 
A pack-train was taken with ten days' supplies 
for the command, and a Spanish pack-train, 
which had been surrendered the day before, went 
also, loaded with supplies for the hospitals at the 
various towns to be visited. These interior 
towns had heretofore drawn upon Santiago for 
their supplies, which were sent to them over a 
railroad running from Santiago, through El 
Cristo, Moron, Dos Caminos, and terminating at 
San Luis, with a branch running from El Cristo 
to El Songo. Palma Soriano lay about twelve 
miles beyond San Luis, the latter place being 
about twenty-two miles from Santiago. The 
expedition left head-quarters camp about noon 
190 



THE CAPITULATION 

on the 19th, passed through El Caney and began 
the ascent of the mountains which lie in the rear 
of Santiago. 

A guide had been secured, and the whole 
party, closely following him, went over the 
mountain-trail in single file. The trail was so 
rough in places and so overgrown with bushes 
alongside that it was a very difficult matter 
to force a way through. Finally the column 
reached the small town of San Vicente, and there 
being a little open ground at that place, it halted 
to permit the pack-train, which was scattered 
along the trail for miles in the rear, to close up. 
The Spanish pack-train was manned by Spanish 
packers taken from among the Spanish prisoners. 
No apprehension was felt about their escaping, for 
it was thought they would be only too glad to re- 
main close to the train of supplies. The column 
soon reached Dos Bocas, a little town two miles 
farther on, and at this place the column struck 
the railroad. The rest of the journey to San 
Luis was made either over the ties of the rail- 
road or on a path alongside, and while this 
afforded a very poor road, it was infinitely better 
than any of the trails in the country. 

In fact, the country was utterly devoid of either 
roads or passable trails. The few that had once 
191 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

existed were so overgrown as to have entirely 
disappeared. And the country travelled over on 
this trip was almost entirely a wilderness. After 
passing over the mountains, which were about a 
thousand to twelve hundred feet in elevation, we 
found the interior to be a vast table-land on a 
level with the summit of the mountains. Before 
the war this table-land had been cut up into well- 
tilled plantations producing sugar, tobacco, coffee, 
and bananas. Now from El Cristo to San Luis, 
a distance of twelve or fourteen miles, all traces 
of these plantations had disappeared except the 
ruins of dwellings in two places. The whole 
country was covered with a rank growth of 
grass, often as high as the back of a horse and 
with a scrubby growth of guava. The soil w^as a 
deep black loam, and, as it rained every afternoon, 
often quite heavily, the mud along the trail was 
dreadful. 

El Cristo was the first of the Spanish garrisons 
on our line of march. On approaching it a white 
flag was displayed, carried by one of the troopers, 
and this trooper rode ahead with Captain Ramus. 
There were two block-houses to be passed be- 
fore entering the town, and while the Captain 
was visitirig these the column was halted. After 
informing the little garrisons in the block-houses 
192 



THE CAPITULATION 

of his mission, he rode into the town and pre- 
sented his letter to the Spanish commanding offi- 
cer. Both the Spanish garrison and the native 
population were overjoyed to see us ; the gar- 
rison at the thought of going home to Spain, and 
the natives at the thought of having something 
substantial to eat. The few supplies in the town 
were in the hands of the Spanish troops, and the 
natives subsisted mainly on mangoes and vege- 
tables. 

Surrounding each of the towns that were vis- 
ited there was a little cultivated zone with a 
radius of half a mile or a mile, depending on the 
size of the place, planted mainly to corn and 
sweet potatoes. The mango-trees were to be 
found everywhere loaded with fruit. The natives 
in the towns consisted of old men, women, and 
children, while the able-bodied men were all 
soldiers in the insurgent army. I found all these 
towns surrounded by bands of insurgents, and 
the Spanish garrisons could not lay down their 
arms in safety unless I had American troops to 
leave as guard. For that reason, the garrisons at 
El Cristo, Moron, and Dos Caminos were not 
disarmed until I came back on my return to San- 
tiago. 

The column camped just outside the town 
193 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

of El Cristo on the night of the 19th, and just 
before leaving in the morning, Mr. H. E. Arm- 
strong, of the New York Evenmg Sun, joined 
it. He had left Santiago the day before, shortly 
after the expedition, and had been unable to 
overtake us until this time. The column soon 
reached Moron, where there was a small garrison 
of a little over a hundred men, and after staying 
there a very short time pushed on to Dos Cami- 
nos. Here we were received without any trouble, 
though the comandante at San Luis had or- 
dered the comandante at this place to resist us 
to the utmost. Captain Ramus had ridden ahead 
of the column some distance and when he 
showed his letter to the Spanish commander, he 
said there was nothing for him to do but to obey 
his superior commanding officer's orders. How- 
ever, he said at San Luis we would meet with re- 
sistance, for the commanding officer of San Luis 
had declared to him that he would not surrender 
as long as he had a man to fight. 

From Dos Caminos the column soon reached 
San Luis and halted about three hundred yards 
from the trenches on the outside of the town. 
Captain Ramus, riding forward, saw the soldiers 
being ordered into the trenches, and, spurring his 
horse, he galloped up to them and ordered them 
194 



THE CAPITULATION 

not to fire. The officer second in command at 
this place, and who, apparently, was responsible for 
the resistance encountered, then came out in front 
of his trenches and I went up to meet him. He 
declined to believe in the genuineness of General 
Toral's letter, and declared that the whole affair 
was a ruse of war and that the Captain was a 
traitor. After explaining the situation to him, I 
asked him to designate a place where the two 
troops of cavalry could camp for the night, and 
that I would come into the town at three o'clock 
for the comandante's decision. We were di- 
rected to the plantation of a French citizen, 
Mr. Rousseau, who lived near the town, and here 
we found the first, and only, evidences of civil- 
ization during the trip outside of the mean little 
villages we visited. 

Mr. Rousseau, at the time, was sick in bed, 
but on learning of the arrival of American 
troops, he was so much strengthened that in 
a very short time he came out to receive us and 
offer all facilities for the comfort of the troops. 
For three years, he said, he had seen his prop- 
erty, cattle, and farm -produce slipping away 
from him gradually, either from exactions on the 
part of the Spaniards, or thefts on the part of the 
insurgents, and he was overjoyed now at the 
195 



IX CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

thought that he might be secure in possession of 
what remained to him. He had been a prosper- 
ous sugar-planter, and his mills and buildings were 
still standing. At the beginning of the war he 
had paid the Cuban Government $10,000, and in 
return he was guaranteed the security of his prop- 
erty, but he soon found the guarantee worthless. 
At his own expense he had erected a block-house, 
which was garrisoned by a small body of Spanish 
troops, fed by him, but with these troops only 
about two hundred yards from his buildings, Mr. 
Rousseau had an armed man in his pay patrol 
the little corral alongside his house where every 
night he gathered the small remnant of what was 
once a large herd of cattle. That night he in- 
vited the six officers with the column, and the 
war correspondent, to dine with him, and I do 
not think that anyone ever enjoyed a meal more. 
His supplies were limited, but he had managed 
to hide away some things, which were now 
brought out, in honor of the Americans. It had 
been nearly a month since we had been on land, 
living on hardtack, bacon, and coffee, and we 
were prepared to thoroughly enjoy whatever was 
set before us. 

Before the hour set at which I was to enter 
the city for the comandante's answer, he came 
196 



THE CAPITULATION 

out himself, with some of his staff, to my camp, 
and informed me that he could not agree to sur- 
render the place until he had sent a commission 
of two or three of his officers into Santiago to 
learn for themselves the true state of affairs. It 
was useless to argue the matter any further, and 
as the animals in the command sorely needed 
rest, I readily consented to his idea of a com- 
mission, and sent two troopers along as a guar- 
antee for its safety. The commission returned 
about five o'clock the next day, and half an hour 
later the comandante rode out to camp and said 
he was satisfied, and at seven o'clock in the morn- 
ing came to camp to escort me into the town, 
where we repaired to his house, to arrange the de- 
tails of the surrender. The hospitals and the ar- 
senal were inspected and arrangements made to 
begin receiving the arms the next morning. One 
troop of cavalry, under Lieutenant Clark, was left 
at San Luis to carry out this work and guarantee 
the safety of the Spanish prisoners, and with the 
other troop I pushed on to Palma Soriano, leav- 
ing that afternoon at one o'clock. There was 
communication between San Luis and Palma by 
means of heliograph, and word had been sent that 
if the American column came there it w^ould be 
fired upon, but no attention was paid to this, and 
197 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

the column reached Concepcion, a little place two 
miles from Palma, about 5 p.m., and from there 
the Spanish staff officer rode ahead and presented 
General Toral's letter. 

As the commanding officer had come out to 
meet the column, there was but a short delay, and 
in spite of his brave assertions of the previous 
day, we were more cordially received than at any 
other place. While the command was going into 
camp, I rode into tow^n and made all the arrange- 
ments for beginning to execute the details of the 
surrender early the next day. Captain Ramus 
had told me that I should find a great many sick 
and wounded in the hospital at this place, and as 
I intended removing the garrison at once to San 
Luis, I engaged all the bullock-carts, eighteen, 
in San Luis, and directed them to follow the col- 
umn to Palma as quickly as possible, where they 
arrived the next day at noon. These carts are 
two-wheeled affairs called carretas, and drawn 
by six or eight oxen. It was arranged that the 
regular troops at Palma Soriano should march 
to San Luis and there deliver up their arms. 
This was the suggestion of the Spanish com- 
mander, and as I had intended to transport the 
arms on bullock-carts, which would require a sec- 
ond trip, I gladly adopted it. There were about 



THE CAPITULATION 

two hundred volunteers and guerillas at Palma, 
and these delivered up their arms and gave their 
parole. 

I was especially impressed with the manner 
in which the battalion of volunteers took the 
parole. The parole, written by me, was taken by 
the Major commanding the battalion, and as it 
was raining at the time, his two companies were 
formed facing each other in a narrow hall in his 
barracks. He addressed his men for a few mo- 
ments, telling them of the events which had just 
happened, and then read to them the parole, which 
he was about to take himself and in behalf of his 
command. On asking them if they agreed to its 
conditions, they all shouted "Si, Si" (yes, yes). 
Ranks were broken and the officers of the bat- 
talion were brought and introduced to me, and 
after a short conversation I found that they were 
delighted at the prospect of being able to go back 
to peaceful pursuits once more in security. By 
night all the arms of the paroled prisoners and 
all the ammunition were loaded on the carts, and 
these were brought out and parked at the camp. 

At this place there existed an intense feeling 
of hatred between the insurgents in the neighbor- 
hood and the Spanish volunteers and guerillas, 
and it was represented that a troop of cavalry 
199 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

would not be sufficient to enforce security of per- 
sons and property. The insurgents here, as well 
as at the other towns visited, were a part of 
General Garcia's command, sent to prevent the 
Spanish garrison from going into Santiago. 
Learning that General Sobreco, in command of 
the insurgents around Palma, was near the camp 
that morning, I sent a message asking him to 
come and see me, which he did, about noon. He 
talked a little broken English, but his Adjutant- 
General, who was with him, and had been edu- 
cated in the United States, spoke it fluently. 
The General was a full-blooded negro, and his 
entire command was made up of blacks and 
mulattoes. General Escario, with the reinforce- 
ments that entered Santiago on July 3d, passed 
through Palma, and were stubbornly opposed by 
Sobreco's command, the Spanish suffering quite 
severely, and it was on account of this engage- 
ment that the hospitals were so full. 

After some conversation with the General, it 
was very evident that the fears of the paroled 
prisoners in Palma were groundless, A courier 
from General Garcia had just informed him of 
the capitulation of the Spanish forces, and di- 
rected him to refrain from further acts of hos- 
tility. General Sobreco asked me to visit his 



THE CAPITULATION 

camp, and that evening about six o'clock, witli 
Dr. Jordan, United States Army, Mr. Mendoza, 
and Mr. Armstrong, I started with a guide for 
the insurgent camp. No description can convey 
a proper idea of the wild picturesqueness of this 
mountain fastness of the insurgents. Quickly 
descending to the bottom-lands along the Cauto 
River, the trail ran alongside until a narrow 
ribbon or ledge of rock was reached running 
across the stream. The water over the ledge was 
only a few inches deep, but on either side it 
was not fordable. We quickly picked our way 
across the stream, and then in single file followed 
the guide, now through grass as high as the horse, 
then through brush and thickets covering the 
trail, so that often the rider in front would be lost 
to sight, and one would have to depend upon the 
sense of hearing to make sure he was on the right 
path, until finally some open ground was reached, 
and for a short distance we went along a fairly 
good road. The trail soon left this road and led 
through an abandoned banana plantation, with 
the trees literally covered with morning-glories 
and other trailing vines, then over a second river 
with little water in it, and then through a forest 
of magnificent royal palms, and at last arrived 
close to the insurgent camp, where we were 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

halted by an insurgent picket. We were asked 
to wait a few minutes until the troops could 
be drawn up to receive us, and after a short de- 
lay we were escorted to the General's tent with 
much ceremony. 

The troops presented very much the same ap- 
pearance as those seen in General Garcia's camp 
the day of the arrival of the expedition in Cuba, 
except that these were all blacks and mulattoes. 
They certainly were leading a wretched existence, 
for the only visible sources of food were wild fruits 
and a few vegetables that were grown in some 
small cultivated spots. They had dried beans and 
rice in small quantities, and also coffee. The mem- 
bers of the party were invited by the General to 
be seated on some rude stools, and small cups of 
delicious black coffee offered to them. Many of 
the insurgents had their families with them, and 
lived in huts made from the leaves of palm-trees, 
which was excellent building material. These 
leaves form an immense cluster at the extreme 
end of the trunk, the stem of the leaf being from 
six to ten feet long and from one to two feet wide, 
and the leaf proper very much resembling a very 
large coarse fern leaf. The stems are cut off and 
used to form the sides of houses and the rest of the 
leaves to thatch them. The heart of the cluster 



THE CAPITULATION 

of leaves is called a cabbage, and eaten either raw 
or cooked. I found it very palatable when pre- 
pared as a salad, but it was not in the insurgent 
camp that this elaborate method of preparing it 
was used. 

The stay in camp was short, and, after a formal 
leave-taking, we began to retrace the trail, this 
time in the dark. The number of guides was in- 
creased to three, and we reached our camp with- 
out mishap, though I had some misgivings until 
the rock ribbon in the Cauto River was crossed. 
One of the guides had a little boy on the saddle 
in front of him, and he said that he had come to 
see the American doctor and find out if he 
could not give the child something to cure him 
of sickness that he had suffered from for years. 
Dr. Jordan gave the child something, but the 
only medicine the poor child needed was some 
nourishing food. The little boy was his only 
child, and since the death of the boy's mother, 
about two years before, the father had carried the 
child with him wherever he went, even in battle. 
Four or five days later, when the San Luis rail- 
road had been put in operation, going along in a 
car about twenty miles from the place where I had 
first seen the child, and happening to look out of 
the car window, I saw the father on his little 
203 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

Cuban pony, with the child in front of him, trot- 
ting alongside the railroad track. Though a few 
of the families were in the insurgent camp, gener- 
ally they lived in the little villages. Sometimes, 
if the insurgent father, son, or brother made him- 
self particularly obnoxious to the Spaniards, the 
whole family would be driven out of the village to 
live as best they could. The troop of cavalry 
(Captain Lewis's) that had come to Palma with 
me was left as a garrison for the place, and all 
preparations were made for returning to San Luis 
the next morning with the prisoners and stores. 

Shortly after daybreak the carts in the camp 
were ready for the march, and they were soon 
joined by the rest of the carts which had been left 
back in the town to be loaded with such of the 
sick in the hospitals as were able to travel. The 
train of carts had been brought over to Palma 
the previous afternoon, escorted by a guard of 
twenty-five Spanish cavalry, for, with the coun- 
try full of insurgents, a long string of bullocks 
was so much of a temptation that it was not wise 
to send them unguarded. 

At six o'clock in the morning the march for 

San Luis began, and such a motley procession 

has seldom been seen. With me marched one 

trooper, as an orderly, immediately behind came 

204 



HE CAPITULATION 

the Spanish cavalry which had come over the 
previous afternoon, and next came the ox-carts 
loaded with arms and the sick. After the carts 
came the Spanish commander marching at the 
head of about six hundred Spanish regulars, 
some of whom had families, and, as the families 
were to be transported to Spain with the troops, 
they came following after, with their household 
goods on pack-mules and some of them even 
carrying chickens and leading pigs. Behind 
these came the Spanish pack-train which had 
been brought from Santiago, now empty of the 
provisions, but laden with possessions belonging 
to the Spanish troops, and a great number of 
pack -mules belonging to merchants, who had 
come from San Luis two days before under the 
escort of the American troops. 

The fear of the insurgents was so prevalent 
that it was necessary to have a strong American 
garrison in each of the towns visited before pro- 
ceeding further with the disarming of the Span- 
ish prisoners. I arrived at San Luis from Palma 
about noon, and went on to Santiago the same 
afternoon, reported the situation to General 
Shafter, and returned to San Luis about mid- 
night. 

The railroad was in good repair as far as Boni- 
205 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

ato, five or six miles from Santiago, and the trip 
was made that far by rail, horses that had been 
carried in a freight-car being ridden the rest of 
the way. The First United States Infantry was 
detailed to garrison the towns, and the next day 
it marched to Boniato and was brought to San 
Luis by rail. Barely half the regiment was able 
to make the march, and this fact was considered 
when, about ten days later, orders were given to 
take the whole command to San Luis. The regi- 
ment was distributed among the towns, and 
the disarming of the prisoners proceeded very 
rapidly until the 29th, when it was completed 
and all the prisoners gathered at three points — 
San Luis, El Cristo, and El Songo. 

I returned to Santiago on July 29th, and two 
weeks later left to take the surrender of the gar- 
risons at Baracoa and Sagua de Tanamo, towns 
on the north coast of Cuba. On this expedition 
I was accompanied by Major Irles, one of Gen- 
eral Toral's staff officers, and by Mr. Ferrer, a 
Cuban volunteer aide of General Chaffee's staff, 
as interpreter. There were also on board the 
steamer Mr. Malcomb McDowell, the corre- 
spondent for the Chicago Record, whom I had 
invited to go with me, three Spanish officers, and 
a doctor in charge of the Red Cross stores. No 
206 



THE CAPITULATION 

troops were taken as an escort, as no trouble 
was anticipated at either place. The trip was 
made on the San Juan, one of the Spanish trans- 
ports in Santiago Bay at the time of the surren- 
der, and about thirty tons of rations were put on 
board for the garrisons at the two places, and 
about twenty tons for the Spanish prisoners at 
Guantanamo. About twenty-five or thirty tons 
of Red Cross supplies were also put on board for 
Baracoa and Sagua de Tanamo. 

We started down the bay at 4 p.m. on the 12th, 
and in half an hour the ship was passing out of 
the narrow mouth, past the sunken Merrimac 
and Reina Mercedes. Off to the right, sev- 
eral miles distant, could be seen the wrecks of 
Cervera's ships. Guantanamo was reached about 
midnight, and as the arrival of the ship had 
been telegraphed, requesting a detail of Spanish 
soldiers ready to unload the stores, by daybreak 
they were off and the San Juan at once pulled 
away from the wharf and continued on her trip. 

Just before leaving Caimanera, which is the 
seaport of Guantanamo and connected with it by 
a railroad. Commodore McCalla came alongside 
and read a cablegram telling of the signing of the 
protocol and of the suspension of hostilities. 
Some time that night the San Juan ran into 
207 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

the little harbor of Baracoa, dropped anchor, and 
early in the morning Major Irles went ashore in 
one of the ship's boats. He had been in the town 
but a few minutes when he sent me a note, tell- 
ing me that the comandante was ready to sur- 
render, but that ever since our arrival, in the 
night, the troops had been at the guns mounted 
along the shore ready to fire upon the San Juan 
at the first suspicious movement. 

Though nearly a month had elapsed since the 
surrender, nothing was known of it here. The 
fleet of transports, on its way to Santiago, passed 
near enough to this place to be seen, and the 
officers of the garrison informed the men that 
the ships were Spanish vessels loaded with Span- 
ish troops, and that soon they would hear of 
wonderful victories. After a few minutes' con- 
versation with the Spanish comandante, he put 
his entire office force at work preparing rolls of 
his men and lists of his stores, and, while these 
were being made up, the time was spent in visit- 
ing the forts, hospital, and the insurgent troops 
just outside the town. It was arranged that 
the arms carried by the troops here would not 
be given up until a force of American troops 
was sent to the place as a garrison. When I 
started on the expedition there were no troops 
208 



THE CAPITULATION 

available for this duty; the immune regiments 
that had already arrived were on duty in Santiago 
or Guantanamo, but other regiments were on 
their way, and a battalion from one of these was 
sent to this place soon after my return to San- 
tiago. The main object of my visit was to give 
timely notification of the capitulation of Santiago, 
which had included these garrisons, in order that 
when the time arrived for them to embark upon 
ships which were to carry them back to Spain, 
there should be no delay. 

About two o'clock I went out to see the Col- 
onel commanding the regiment of insurgents, for 
at this place, as at all the others that I visited, the 
Spaniards professed to have a great dread that the 
Cubans would now attempt to take the town and 
wreak vengeance upon them. Some time before 
I went out I sent a note to the Colonel asking 
for an interview, and received an affirmative an- 
swer in a very little while, but I was not prepared 
to find the insurgents as close to the city as I did. 

After passing the Spanish outposts, about three 
or four hundred yards from the town, on slightly 
elevated ground, three or four hundred yards 
farther on, the insurgent breastworks could be 
seen, constructed with logs banked with earth. I 
found the insurgent Colonel not inclined to be 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

very cordial, but, on the other hand, rather distrust- 
ful. He had heard of the surrender of Santiago 
but seemed to know very little of the particulars. 
All his men, he said, owned little patches of 
ground, from which they could make a fair living 
if they had money with which to buy a few do- 
mestic animals and also food until they could raise 
crops, and he declared that his command were 
not disposed to lay down their arms until they 
had received some compensation for their services. 
I thought then, and think yet, that it would be a 
wise course if the United States Government 
would give these men a year's pay, making pro- 
vision to be reimbursed from the revenues of the 
island, with a stipulation that an organization 
should not receive the money until its arms were 
given up. 

In this way, the insurgent soldiers would soon 
be scattered on their little patches of ground and 
be no longer a menace to the peace of the island. 
The principal products of this section of the 
country were bananas, cocoa-nuts, sugar, and to- 
bacco. The finest bananas produced on the island 
are raised here, and before the war there was a 
large export trade in them carried on. Now the 
banana groves are all ruined, but as it takes only 
eighteen months from planting to get a full crop, 



THE CAPITULATION 

the industry will soon revive. In times past a 
manufactory for the making of cocoa-nut oil had 
carried on a large business here, and the owners 
of this were anxious to get to work once more. 
Baracoa is regarded as a place which gives much 
promise for future development. The town itself 
is situated on high ground, and, judging from 
the statistics, a very healthy place. The harbor, 
while not large, affords ample room for a consid- 
erable amount of shipping and is accessible for 
vessels having considerable draught. The coun- 
try back of it is rich and fertile and capable of sus- 
taining a large population ; growing all kinds of 
fruits and vegetables indigenous to a Southern 
climate. Here, as elsewhere in Cuba, except in 
high altitudes, there is absolutely no frost. 

Before leaving Santiago I could learn very lit- 
tle about the facilities for reaching Sagua de Tan- 
amo, but at Baracoa it was found that this place 
was about seven miles inland from the head of Tan- 
amo Bay, and that this bay ran back from the sea 
about seven miles. The water in the bay was so 
shallow that the San Juan would only be able to 
enter its mouth and then be obliged to cast anchor. 
Half of the supplies brought had been landed at 
Baracoa, the remainder being intended for Sagua 
de Tanamo. For fear there was no lighter in Tan- 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

amo Bay, a steam-launch was taken from Bara- 
coa, and with this, if found necessary, the ship's 
boats loaded with stores could be towed ashore. 
The coast not being very well known to the 
transport captain, the services of a pilot were se- 
cured, and just before dark the San Juan started 
for Sagua de Tanamo, towing the steam-launch, 
and arrived at the mouth of Tanamo Bay early 
the next morning. 

There was a Spanish outpost at the mouth of 
the bay connected by telephone with a consider- 
ably larger force at a little place called Esteron, 
at the head of the bay, and this place, in turn, 
was connected with the main body of troops at 
Sagua de Tanamo. Major Irles rowed ashore 
to the outpost and telephoned to the com- 
manding officer at Sagua that an American 
officer had come to receive his surrender, and 
asked him to send saddle animals to meet the 
party at Esteron. Using the steam-launch, Este- 
ron was reached in an hour, passing over a beauti- 
ful sheet of water. The bay was only a few hun- 
dred yards wide, smooth as glass, fringed with 
mangoes and tropical trees, back of which the 
hills arose to a considerable height. No doubt 
some day this will become a beautiful winter re- 
sort. At Esteron a schooner was found, and ar- 



THE CAPITULATION 

rangements were made with its captain to lighter 
the food supplies on board the San Juan. The 
saddle animals had not yet arrived, and it was 
feared that the cool demand on the commanding 
officer to send means of transportation for an 
officer to come and take his surrender was not 
going to be complied with, but after a few min- 
utes' conversation over the telephone, Major Irles 
was informed that the animals had just started. 
In an hour they arrived, and, along with them, a 
considerable escort of infantry. I was much sur- 
prised to see this, but, after reaching Sagua de 
Tanamo, it was found that one of the Spanish 
officers who had come with Major Irles was a 
paymaster, and had a considerable sum of money 
with him with which to pay the garrison here, 
and then I realized that it was for the paymaster, 
and not the American officer, that the escort was 
intended. Returning, late that night, there was 
no escort of any kind. While waiting at Esteron 
for the saddle animals, the lieutenant in command 
at that place invited the party into his house, 
where we were introduced to his wife, and aston- 
ished to find a woman evidently of some refine- 
ment in such surroundings. The building was 
really a barrack accommodating fifteen or twenty 
soldiers, and one end of it had been partitioned 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

off by rough boards, forming one small room, in 
which the lieutenant and his wife lived. This 
room served as bed-room, kitchen, dining-room, 
and reception-room. Once at Sagua de Tanamo, 
there was little delay in arranging the details of 
the surrender, for everyone was delighted at the 
prospect of returning to Spain. Posted on the 
wall just outside the door of the comandante's 
office was a very remarkable bulletin. It invited 
attention to two telegrams, one from the Spanish 
Admiral at Manila, in which he described a won- 
derful victory he had won in the battle with the 
American Navy, and the other from Sagasta, 
sending the thanks of Spain to the Admiral for 
his glorious victory. We returned to the San 
Juan that night, and sailed for Santiago, which 
was reached the second morning after. 

The Spanish garrison at Guantanamo surren- 
dered to General Ewers, who was sent there by 
General Shafter as his representative. 

In round numbers, 23,500 Spanish troops in the 
Division of Santiago de Cuba laid down their 
arms, and of these, 13,000 were in garrisons out- 
side of Santiago. 



214 



CHAPTER XII 

RE-EMBARK A TION 

A FTER the surrender of General Toral's army 
'»* General Shafter urged the War Department 
from time to time to hasten the shipment of the 
Spanish prisoners to their homes, in order that 
the American Army, whose condition was now 
deplorable, might be transported to the United 
States. 

At this time about half the command had been 
attacked by malarial fever, with a few cases of 
yellow fever, dysentery, and typhoid fever. The 
yellow-fever cases were mainly confined to the 
troops at Siboney, and the few cases found among 
the troops at the front were at once transferred 
to that place. Stringent orders were given to 
enforce a quarantine there, the depot was 
broken up, and all non-infected persons were 
removed. 

There was great fear, and excellent grounds for 
it, that the yellow fever, now sporadic through- 

215 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

out the command, would become epidemic. 
With the command weakened by malarial fevers, 
and its general tone and vitality much reduced by 
all the circumstances incident to the campaign, 
the effects of such an epidemic would practically 
mean its annihilation. 

The first step taken to check the spread of 
disease was the removal of all the troops to new 
camping grounds. Only sufficient troops were 
left as a guard for the prisoners, and the rest of 
the command put on ground hitherto unused for 
camps. The cavalry division was taken into the 
foot-hills several miles to the interior, but the 
other troops moved only a short distance. These 
steps were taken in accordance with the best 
medical opinion, formulated in orders and trans- 
mitted to General Shafter for execution. It was 
directed that the command be moved in this way 
every few days, isolating the cases of yellow fever 
as they arose, and it was expected that in a short 
time the yellow fever would be stamped out, and 
the command could then be sent without danger 
of infection wherever the War Department 
directed. 

The tentage had been taken off the transports 
as soon as the harbor was entered and issued to 
the troops, but the effect produced on the com- 
216 



RE-EMBARKATION 

mand by the work necessary to set up the tents 
and in the removal of the camps increased the 
number on the sick report to an alarming degree. 
Convalescents from malarial fever were taken 
again with the fever, and yellow fever, dysentery, 
and typhoid increased. 

It was useless now to attempt to confine the 
yellow-fever cases to Siboney, and isolation hos- 
pitals were established around Santiago. It was 
apparent that to keep moving the command 
every few days simply weakened the troops and 
increased the fever cases. Any exertion in this 
heat caused a return of the fever, and it must 
be remembered that the convalescents now in- 
cluded about seventy-five per cent, of the com- 
mand. 

The Commanding General was now directed 
to move the entire command into the mountains 
to the end of the San Luis railroad, where the 
troops would be above the yellow-fever limit; 
but this was a physical impossibility, as the troops 
were too weak and sick to march, and the work 
of repairing the bridges on the railroad had not 
yet been completed. Even after this was done 
the rolling stock was so insufficient that only a 
comparatively small number could be transported 
in a day, and when once San Luis was reached 
217 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

the camps would have been less comfortable than 
those around Santiago. 

The situation was desperate ; the yellow-fever 
cases were increasing in number, and the month 
of August, the period in which it is epidemic, 
was at hand. It was with these conditions star- 
ing them in the face, that the officers command- 
ing divisions and brigades and the Chief Surgeon 
were invited by General Shafter to discuss the 
situation. As a result of this conference the 
General sent the following telegram giving his 
views and the letters addressed to him by the 
General Officers and by the Medical Officers. 

Santiago de Cuba, August 3, 1898. 
Adjutant - General United States Army, 
Washington, D. C. 
In reply to telegram of this date, stating that it is 
deemed best that my command be moved to end of 
railroad, where yellow fever is impossible, I have to 
say that under the circumstances this move is prac- 
tically impossible. The railroad is not yet repaired, 
although it will be in about a week. Its capacity is 
not to exceed one thousand men a day, at the best, 
and it will take until the end of August to make this 
move, even if the sick-list should not increase. An 
officer of my staff, Lieutenant Miley, who has looked 
over the ground, says it is not a good camping 
ground. The country is covered with grass as high 
as a man's head when riding a horse, and up in the 



RE-EMBARKATION 

hills there is no water, and it will be required to 
pump water two miles. He also states that the 
rainfall is twice as great as it is here, and the soil is 
a black loam that is not suitable for camping. Span- 
ish troops that have been sent to that locality have 
been housed in barracks. 

In my opinion there is but one course to take, and 
that is to immediately transport the Fifth Corps and 
the detached regiments that came with it, and were 
sent immediately after it, with the least delay possi- 
ble, to the United States. If this is not done I believe 
the death-rate will be appalling. I am sustained in 
this view by every medical officer present. I called 
together to-day the General Officers and the senior 
Medical Officers, and telegraph you their views. 
There is more or less yellow fever in every regiment 
throughout the command. As soon as it develops 
they are sent to hospital, but new cases arise ; not 
very many it is true, and it is of a mild type, but 
nevertheless, it is here. All men taken with it will 
of course have to be left and have to take their 
chances. Some will undoubtedly be taken sick on 
the ships and die, but the loss will be much less than 
if an attempt is made to move this army to the in- 
terior, which is now really an army of convalescents, 
at least seventy-five per cent, of the men having had 
malarial fever, and all so much weakened by the ex- 
posure and hardships which they have undergone 
that they are capable now of very little exertion. 
They should be put at once on all the transports in 
the harbor, and not crowded at all, and this move- 
ment should begin to-morrow and be completed be- 
fore the 15th. All here believe the loss of life by 
219 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

doing this will be much less than if more time is 
taken. If the plan is adopted of waiting until the 
fever is stamped out, there will be no troops moved 
from here until the fever season is past, and I believe 
there will then be very few to move. There are 
other diseases prevailing : typhoid fever, dysentery, 
etc., and severe types of malarial fever, which are 
quite as fatal as yellow fever. The matter of re- 
moving this army has been placed before you, and 
you have the opinions of all Commanding Officers 
and Chief Surgeons, who fully agree with me as to 
the only course left open for the preservation of this 
army. There can be no danger to the people at 
home, and it seems to me that infected ships are a 
matter of small moment. 

The following letter, giving the opinion of the 
Medical Officers of this command, is sent for the 
consideration of the War Department : 

The Adjutant-General, Fifth Army Corps. 

Sir: The Chief Surgeon of the Fifth Army 
Corps, and the Chief Surgeons of the divisions, con- 
sider it to be their imperative duty, after mature de- 
liberation, to express their unanimous opinion that 
this army is now in a very critical condition. They 
believe that the prevalent malarial fever will doubt- 
less continue its ravages, and that its mortality will 
soon increase; that there is imminent danger that 
the yellow fever, now sporadic and of a very mild 
type, may any day assume a virulent type and 
become epidemic. They unanimously recommend 
that the only course to pursue to save the lives of 
thousands of our soldiers is to transport the whole 
army to the United States as quickly as possible. 
Such transport tliey consider practicable and reason- 



RE-EMBARKATION 

ably free from danger. The proposed move to the 
plateau of San Luis they believe dangerous and im- 
practicable. 

Very respectfully, 
V. Harvard, 
Major-Surgeon U. S. A., Acting Chief Surgeon. 

H. S. KiLBOURNE, 

Major afid Surgeon U. S. A., Chief Surgeo ft 

Second Division, Fifth Army Corps. 
M. W. Wood, 
Major and Chief Surgeon, First Division 

Fifth Army Corps. 
Frank J. Ives, 
Major and Surgeon U. S. Volunteers, 

Chief Surgeon Provisional Division. 
H. S. T. Harris, 
Major and Surgeon U. S. Volunteers, 

Chief Surgeon Cavalry Division. 

The following letter, giving the views of the Gen- 
eral Officers of this command, is sent for the con- 
sideration of the War Department : 

To Major -General William R. Shafter, Com- 
manding United States Forces in Cuba. 
We, the undersigned General Officers, command- 
ing various Brigades, Divisions, etc., of the United 
States Army of Occupation in Cuba, are of the unan- 
imous opinion that this army must at once be 
taken out of the Island of Cuba, and sent to some 
point on the northern sea-coast of the United States ; 
that this can be done without danger to the people 
of the United States ; that there is no epidemic of 
yellow fever in the army at present, only a few 
sporadic cases ; that _the army is disabled by ma- 
larial fever to such an extent that its efficiency is 
destroyed, and it is in a condition to be practically 
entirely destroyed by the epidemic of yellow fever 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

sure to come^ in the near future. We know from 
reports from competent officers, and from personal 
observations, that (The army is unable to move to 
the interior,jand that there are no facilities for such 
a move if attempted, and will not be until too 
late ; moreover, the best medical authorities in the 
island say that with our present equipment we 
could not live in the interior during the rainy sea- 
son, without losses from malarial fever, almost as 
deadly as from yellow fever. -This army must be 
moved at once, or it will perish as an army. It can 
be safely moved now. Persons responsible for 
preventing- such a move will be responsible for the 
unnecessary loss of many thousands of livesj Our 
opinions are the result of careful personal ob- 
servation, and are also based upon the unanimous 
opinion of our medical officers who are with the 
army, and understand the situation absolutely. 



Jos. Wheeler, 

Major- General Volunteers. 

Samuel S. Sumner, 

Commanding First Cavalry Bri- 
gade. 
William Ludlow, 

Brigadier-General United States 
Volunteer s,Comtna7iditig First 
Brigade, Second Division. 

Adelbert Ames, 

Brigadier-General United States 
Volunteers, Com''ding Third 
Brigade, First Division. 

Leonard Wood, 

Brigadier-General United States 
Volunteers, Comfnanding City 
of Santiago. 

Theodore Roosevelt, 

Colonel, Commanding Second 
Cavalry Brigade. 



J. Ford Kent, 

Major-General Volunteers, Com- 
manding First Division, Fifth 
Corps. 
J. C. Bates, 

Major-General Volunteers, Com- 
manding Provisional Division, 
Fifth Corps. 
Adna R. Chaffee, 

Major- General United States 
Volunteers, Cotn'ding Third 
Brigade, Second Division. 

H. W. Lawton, 
Jlfajor- Genera I Volunteers, Com- 
manding Second Division, 
Fifth Corps. 
C. McKibben, 

Brigadier-General United States 
Volunteers, Commanding .Sec- 
ond Brigade, Second Division. 

(Signed) Shafter, 

Major-General. 



RE-EMBARKATION 

In connection with the foregoing telegram, a 
fairer opinion of the conditions can be formed by 
reading the telegram which follows : 

Santiago de Cuba, August 8, 1898, 
Adjutant-General of the Army, Washington, 
D. C. 
In connection with my telegram of the 3d instant, 
and the letter of the General Officers to me on the 
same date, I have the honor to say that since then I 
hav^ talked with the Division Commanders, and 
they join me in saying that the first report was made 
so sjtrong because -of the weakened and exhausted 
con(iition of the command, more than seventy-five 
percent, of which have been ill with a very weak- 
eniijg malarial fever, lasting from four to six days, 
and! which leaves every man too much broken down 
to he of any service, and in no condition to with- 
staijd an epidemic of yellow fever, which all regard 
as ii|niminent, as there are more or less cases in every 
regiment here. For strong and healthy regiments 
coniing here now and a little later, with plenty of 
tentjage to cover them, and not subject to any hard- 
shijjs, and with plenty of nourishing food, the dan- 
ger] in my opinion and that of the Division Com- 
manders, would be reduced to a minimum. For 
davfe this command lay in trenches without shelter, 
exposed to rain and sun, and with only hard bread, 
bac|)n, and coffee, and these hardships account for 
its [)resent condition, to none of which will troops 
coming now be subjected. 

(Signed) Shafter, 

Major- General. 
223 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

On August 4th instructions were received 
from the War Department to begin the removal 
of the command to Montauk Point, Long Island. 
Some of the immune regiments were on the way 
to Santiago, and other regiments were at once 
ordered there to garrison the district as General 
Shafter's command was withdrawn. 

The first of the fleet of vessels to return the 
Spanish troops arrived in time to be loaded and 
leave August 9th, and by the end of the month 
nearly all were transported. 

After the surrender the relations between the 
American and Spanish troops were very cordial. 
There could be little or no conversation between 
individuals, but in many ways the respect each 
had for the other was shown, and there seemed 
to be no hatred on either side. Most of the 
Spanish officers remained in their quarters in 1 
town, and they shared in the feeling displayed by 
their men. Salutations were generally exchanged 
between the officers, and American ways and 
manners became very popular among the Span- 
iards. 

The feeling is well illustrated by a letter 
addressed to General Shafter which reads as 
follows : 



224 



RE-EMBARKATION 

To Major-General Shafter, Commanding the 
American Army in Cuba. 

Sir : The Spanish soldiers who capitulated in this 
place on the i6th of July last, recognizing your high 
and just cause, pray that, through you, all the cou- 
rageous and noble soldiers under your command may 
receive our good wishes and farewell, which we send 
to you on embarking for our beloved Spain. 

For this favor, which we have no doubt you will 
grant, you will gain the everlasting gratitude and 
consideration of eleven thousand Spanish soldiers, 
whp are your most humble servants. 

(Signed) Pedro Lopez De Castillo, 

Private of Infantry. 

Santiago de Cuba, August 21, 1898. 

A second letter addressed to the soldiers of the 
Anerican army is surely the most remarkable 
letter ever addressed by vanquished soldiers to 
th nr conquerors : 

Soldiers of the American Army: 

We would not be fulfilling our duty as well-bom 
m|n in whose breasts there lives gratitude and cour- 
teiy, should we embark for our beloved Spain with- 
out sending you our most cordial and sincere good 
w shes and farewell. We fought you with ardor and 
w th all our strength, endeavoring to gain the vic- 
tory, but without the slightest rancor or hate toward 
the American nation. We have been vanquished 
b3f you, so our generals and chiefs judged in signing 
the capitulation, but our surrender and the blood- 
225 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

battles preceding it have left in our souls no place 
for resentment against the men who fought us nobly 
and valiantly. You fought and acted in compliance 
with the same call of duty as we, for we all but rep- 
resent the power of our respective States. You 
fought us as men, face to face, and with great cour- 
age, as before stated — a quality we had not met 
with during the three years we have carried on this 
war against a people without a religion, without 
morals, without conscience, and of doubtful origin, 
who could not confront the enemy, but shot their 
noble victims from ambush and then immediately 
fled. This was the kind of warfare we had to sus- 
tain in this unfortunate land. You have complied 
exactly with all the laws and usages of war as rec- 
ognized by the armies of the most civilized nations 
of the world ; have given honorable burial to the 
dead of the vanquished ; have cured their wounded 
with great humanity ; have respected and cared for 
your prisoners and their comfort ; and lastly, to us, 
whose condition was terrible, you have given freely 
of food and of your stock of medicines, and have 
honored us with distinction and courtesy, for after 
the fighting the two armies mingled with the ut- 
most harmony. 

With this high sentiment of appreciation from us 
all, there remains but to express our farewell, and 
with the greatest sincerity we wish you all happi- 
ness and health in this land, which will no longer 
belong to our dear Spain, but will be yours. You 
have conquered it by force and watered it with 
your blood, as your conscience called for under the 
demands of civilization and humanity ; but the de- 
226 



RE-EMBARKATION 

scendants of the Congos and Guineas, mingled with 
the blood of unscrupulous Spaniards and of traitors 
and adventurers — these people are not able to exer- 
cise or enjoy their liberty, for they will find it a bur- 
den to comply with the laws which govern civilized 
humanity. From eleven thousand Spanish soldiers. 
I (Signed) Pedro Lopez De Castillo, 
I Soldier of hifantry. 

Santiago de Cuba, August 21, 1898, 

The captured ordnance, arms, and ammunition 
included 100 cannon, 6,800 projectiles of all cali- 
brek, 15,000 pounds of powder, 25,1 14 small arms, 
made up of Remington, Spanish Mauser, and 
Argentina Mauser rifles; and 5,279,000 rounds 
of jsmall arms ammunition for these three kinds 
of Hfles. Of the 100 cannon, seven were modern 
breech-loading 8-inch rifles, and four similar guns 
with a calibre of 6 inches. These guns were all 
mounted at the mouth of the harbor. There 
were also eighteen rapid-fire and machine guns 
distributed among the forts at the entrance to 
the harbor and the defences immediately around 
th^ city. The rest of the cannon were obsolete 
bronze and cast-iron pieces. The rifle with which 
the Spanish troops were armed was the Spanish 
Mauser, and for this particular rifle there were 
only 1,500,000 rounds among the captured am- 
munition. 

227 



IN CUBA WITH SHAFTER 

The first troops for Montauk left Santiago on 
August 7th, and from that date the departure 
of the remainder was as expeditious as the 
necessary preparations would permit. 

A board of officers was appointed to inspect 
each ship to see that it was properly supplied 
with everything necessary for the trip, and also 
that there was no overcrowding of the transports. 

Another board, composed of medical officers, 
was appointed to examine each regiment before 
leaving camp for the transport, and all suspected 
cases of yellow fever were sent to temporary hos- 
pitals to await developments. The regiment was 
examined a second time just before sailing, and 
suspected cases that might have developed since 
the last inspection were sent to the hospitals, and 
the men left behind were forwarded as rapidly as 
it was shown they were free from yellow fever. 
By the 25th of the month General Shaft er's en- 
tire command, with the exception of a few organ- 
izations just ready to embark, had departed, and, 
turning over the command to General Lawton, 
he sailed that day with his staff on the Mexico, 
one of the captured transports, and at noon Sep- 
tember ist went ashore at Montauk Point, Long 
Island; 



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